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Preface 
 
 
This volume gathers a subset of the papers presented at the Workshop on the 
Morphological, Syntactic and Semantic Aspects of Dispositions held at the 
University of Stuttgart from June 25 to June 27 2015. The invited speakers were 
Artemis Alexiadou, Nora Boneh, Elena Castroviejo, Ariel Cohen, Bridget Copley, 
Hans Kamp, Marika Lekakou, John Maier, Christopher Piñón, Károly Varasdi 
and Barbara Vetter. Other contributions have been presented by Simona Aimar, 
Saveria Colonna, Marta Donazzan, Berit Gehrke, Daniel Kodaj, Nick Kroll, 
Isabelle Roy and Lucia Tovena. 
 
While appeals to dispositions have been made in just about every area of 
linguistics and philosophy, the syntax, semantics and ontology of dispositions is 
still subject to debate. A first obvious reason why dispositions are hard to deal 
with in linguistics is that the predominant Neo-Davidsonian account of logical 
forms is based on the isolated analysis of actual relations between causes and 
effects, whereas dispositions pertain to potential cause-effect relations, difficult 
to grasp in traditional syntax/semantic frameworks. Besides, whereas for actual 
causations, the binary distinction between the roles Agent/Causer and 
Theme/Patient makes perfect sense, possible cause-effect relations partly escape 
these distinctions. The instantiation of a disposition in an object is not related to 
being an Agent or to being a Theme of the disposition. A second obvious 
difficulty raised by dispositions is due to the versatility of dispositional 
predicates. Those are commonly used to describe either permanent or temporary 
properties of individuals, or manifestations of these properties through events, 
not to mention their other (e.g. epistemic) readings. 
 
The goal of the workshop was to subject to critical scrutiny the Neo-
Davidsonian foundation of syntax and semantics in the light of the linguistic 
expression of dispositional causal powers. We aimed to bring together linguists 
and philosophers interested in contributing to a common point of departure in 
the analysis of dispositions beyond the Neo-Davidsonian framework.  
 
Three central questions emerged as central issues of the workshop: 
 
1. Uncontroversially, dispositions are properties - but what kind of 
properties are dispositions? 
2. What are dispositions properties of?  
3. Do the different expressions we find in natural languages differentiate 
between different types of dispositions? 
 
The papers collected in this volume represent the variety of answers that have 
been provided by the workshop participants to one or more of these questions.  
 
 v 
Concerning the first question, centered on the nature of dispositions, the paper 
by Vetter argues that dispositions are irreducible modal properties, and proposes 
a modal semantics which uses the resources of an ‘anti-Humean’ metaphysics 
 instead of possible worlds. The papers by Boneh and Cohen approach in more 
detail the specificity of  the modal properties that correspond to dispositions. 
Boneh examines the relation between dispositional and habitual readings. She 
argues that in bare generic sentences, there is no sound linguistic criteria to set 
apart dispositional readings from habitual readings. Cohen proposes a 
classification of dispositions according to whether their argument is a causer or 
not, and whether they are always, or only sometimes realized. He demonstrates 
that each such type of disposition is expressed by a distinct linguistic expression. 
 
The bearer of dispositions is the subject of the papers of Kroll, Donazzan & 
Tovena and Cohen. Kroll analyzes events in progress as being the bearers of 
dispositions. Donazzan and Tovena, like Cohen, highlight the fact that bearers of 
dispositions are often systems consisting of one or more protagonists situated in 
an environment.   
 
With respect to the linguistic expression of dispositions, Castroviejo & Oltra-
Massuet present a case study on the semantics of the Spanish expression ser 
capaz ‘be capable’, which is carefully compared to its English counterpart.  
The paper by Alexiadou examines the restrictions on the formation of –able 
adjectives from object experiencer verbs. She argues that their availability 
depends not only on their aspectual properties, but also on the Voice system of a 
language – i.e. dispositional –able formation takes as input a structure involving 
passive resp. middle Voice. Finally, Roy et. al. consider how grammatical and 
conceptual knowledge affect children’s and adults’ interpretation of derived -er 
nominals such as cutter of branches (a phrasal -er nominal) and branch cutter (a 
compound -er nominal) in English.  
 
We very much thank all presenters of the workshop for their stimulating and 
inspiring contributions, and are very happy to present some of them in this 
exciting volume. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the 
Collaborative Research Center SFB 732 "Incremental specification in Context" 
financed by the Deutsche Forschung Gemeinschaft, the Lab Structures Formelles du 
Langage at CNRS/Université Paris 8 and the Department of Philosophy at the 
Humboldt University Berlin. Our thanks also go to all colleagues that accepted 
to review the submissions to our workshop and provided authors with 
substantial feedback. Finally, we would like to thank to Christopher Piñón for 
providing us with the template we used to ensure a uniform style of the 
proceedings and for support during the editing process. 
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1 Introduction  
Psych verbs have been a constant puzzle to researchers for a variety of reasons. A first concern 
relates to the fact that they can project the experiencer theta-role as an object or as a subject, 
thus creating a problem for thematic hierarchy and linking (see e.g. Belletti & Rizzi 1988, 
Grimshaw 1990, Pesetsky 1995, Arad 1998, Anagnostopoulou 1999, Pylkkänen 2000, Reinhart 
2001, Verhoeven 2008, Landau 2010, among many others). A second concern relates to their 
aspectual behavior. In particular, they are ambiguous between eventive and stative readings, 
and there is no agreement as to the exact categorization of the eventive interpretation these 
may receive (activity, achievement or accomplishment; see e.g. Grimshaw 1990, van Voorst 
1992, Tenny  1994, Martin 2006, Rozwadowska 2007, 2012, Landau 2010, Marín & McNally 2011 
and others).  
In this paper, I will not be concerned with the first issue, but try to contribute to the second 
one by looking at the behavior of psych verbs and -able affixation, a rather understudied area, 
which, however, seems to provide insights into the structure of psych verbs and more 
importantly the organization of Voice systems across languages. Let me briefly illustrate why. 
Previous literature has established that there are two types of -able adjectives in English 
and across languages, see for example Aronoff (1976) and much subsequent work, and more 
recently Oltra-Massuet (2013). Irrespectively of the perspective adopted, lexicalist vs. syntactic, 
reseachers all agree that the two types differ in that type 1 -able adjectives are idiosyncratic, 
while type 2 ones are transparently derived adjectives from a verbal source. 
Oltra-Massuet (2013: 42) in particular offers an analysis of these patterns adopting the 
framework of Distributed Morphology and argues that there are two places for -able 
derivations that give rise to distinct semantics (which she labels potential vs. evaluative). High 
vs. low -able differ in that high -able involves adjective formation out of a verbal predicate, 
specifically a passive, while low -able involves adjective formation out of a root. This high vs. 
low attachment of the morpheme correlates with a number of other properties summarized in 
table 1 (see Oltra-Massuet's work for a complete list): 
                                                          
I am grateful to the participants of the workshop on the morphological, syntactic and semantic aspects of 
dispositions organized at Stuttgart University in June 2015 for their input. Many thanks to Jeannique Darby, Nils 
Hirsch, Despina Oikonomou, and especially Gianina Iordăchioaia for comments and input. This research was 
supported by a DFG grant to the project B6 of the SFB 732 in Stuttgart. 
 
-Able Adjectives and the Syntax of Psych 
Verbs  
Artemis Alexiadou 
This paper deals with some restrictions on the formation of –able 
adjectives from object experiencer verbs. It is shown that these can 
be accounted for under the assumption –able dispositional formation 
takes as an input a structure including passive Voice.   
Keywords: psych-verbs, dispositional adjectives, evaluative adjectives, 
agentivity, passive 
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Table 1 
 High -able     Low -able 
 always expresses possibility   may express no modality 
 meaning is compositional   may have idiosyncratic meaning 
 does not trigger stem allomorphy  may trigger stem allomorphy 
 allows derived bases    only underived bases 
 stress does not shift    stress shifts 
 always spelled out as -able   maybe spelled out as -ible 
 
Evidence from morphology, discussed in Aronoff (1976), points to different modes of 
derivation. As can be seen in (1), root-derived, or truncated -able in Aronoff's terms, has 
unpredictable semantics, while un-truncated -able has transparent semantics and is related to 
a verbal form. 
 
 Truncation: 
(1) a. tolerable = moderately good 
 b. toleratable = capable of being tolerated 
 c. appreciable = substantial 
 d. appreciatable = capable of being appreciated  (Aronoff 1976) 
 
Thus in principle we could adopt the following two structures for the two types. (2) 
corresponds to low -able, and (3) to high -able. I will revise (3) later on the basis of Oltra-
Massuet's findings. 
 
(2)                 a 
       3 
               √toler         able 
 
(3)                      a 
           3 
              v             able 
    3 
            √toler          ate 
 
The above structures follow the general tenants of Distributed Morphology, according to 
which there are two places to build words: words can be built out of roots as in (2), or out of 
words, as in (3), see Alexiadou (2001), Arad (2005), Marantz (2000), and Embick (2010) for 
discussion. Word formation out of roots is characterized by low productivity, unpredictability 
in form and meaning, while word formation out of words is regular and shows predictability 
in both form and meaning. These properties apply to the two -able formations as well. 
Consider for example (4), where we have two -able adjectives related to the verb defend. 
Crucially, only in the former one do we have root allomorphy. By contrast, the latter, 
defendable, is transparently related to the meaning of the verb defend. As stated in Marantz 
(2000), this is expected if we are dealing with words derived from roots and words derived out 
of words. 
 
(4)  defend-defensible-defendable   (Aronoff 1976) 
 
The semantics of the two types also differ and this correlates with their morpho-syntactic 
make up. High -able adjectives create a generic property, according to which it is possible for 
some originator to achieve a resultant state. The event interpretation implies an external 
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argument e.g. translatable. Oltra-Massuet calls this reading potential. Low -able adjectives, by 
contrast, have idiosyncratic properties, and express a modality that differs from regular 
possibility, e.g. admirable. Oltra-Massuet calls this second interpretation evaluative. 
 
(5) a. translatable = can be translated 
 b. admirable = no direct reference to a verbal component 
 
As Oltra-Massuet points out, languages such as German have a different affix to express the 
evaluative judgment: 
 
(6) wünschenswert ‘desirable’  *wünschbar  
 
High -able adjectives have thus a more complex structure. They involve a resultative 
component and an agentive component. Oltra-Massuet discusses several tests that can be used 
to diagnose the presence of an external argument in high -able adjectives. These include: 
 
1. Control into purpose clauses 
2. Licensing of by-phrases (non-specific) 
3. Licensing of agent-oriented modifiers 
4. Licensing of instrumental phrases 
5. Licensing of aspectual/manner adverbs 
 
Applying these tests to English and German, we see, as stated in Oltra-Massuet (2013), that the 
form that is associated with high -able licenses by-phrases, but the low one does not: 
 
(7) a. *The view is defensible by anyone. 
 b. The view is defendable by anyone. 
 
(8) a. ein  vom  Benutzer/*von  Maria  leicht  modifizierbares  Programm 
  a  by.the  user/     by  Mary     easily  modifiable   program 
 b. Der  Angriff ist       *von  Maria/der  Regierung   beklagenswert. 
  the  attack  is  by  Maria/ by.the  government  regrettable 
 
Olta-Massuet observed some restrictions on by-phrases. To the extent that by-phrases occur, 
they must be non-specific and generic. These restrictions are interesting as they are similar to 
those found in adjectival passives and verbal passives in some languages, as well as 
dispositional middles (see e.g. McIntyre 2013, Gehrke 2015, among others; Lekakou 2005, 
Alexiadou, Anagnostopoulou & Schäfer 2015 for a summary of the literature and references) - 
a point I will turn to. 
But why is this discussion relevant for psych-verbs? Apparently, when it comes to -able 
formations out of object experiencer predicates, some are good, and some are not, see (9) (see 
also Trips & Stein 2008): 
 
(9) annoyable  *depressable 
 
This holds in other languages as well, e.g. Italian: 
 
(10) *atterribile  irritabile   Bisettto (2013) 
   terrify-able  irritable 
 
More interestingly, in languages such as German and Greek, it is not even possible to form an 
adjective bearing the potential reading from this class of predicates. In Greek, this is 
4 ARTEMIS ALEXIADOU 
particularly clear with the affix -sim-, which can have a reading similar to high -able, as I will 
show further below: 
 
(11)  *enohlisimos 
    annoyable 
 
German, as we have just seen, has distinct realizations of high (-bar) and low (-wert) -able. Still, 
object experiencer predicates cannot combine with either affix, see e.g. verwundern ‘amaze’: 
 
(12) a. *verwunderbar    
 b. *verwundernswert 
 
The above raises the following questions: what can the behavior of the potential affix across 
languages tell us about the properties of psych verbs? What other properties does it correlate 
with? 
Moreira (2014) and Oltra-Massuet (2013) describe the conditions on high -able as follows. 
According to Moreira, high -able combines with eventive predicates, and cannot combine with 
stative predicates. Oltra-Massuet claims that high -able combines with verbs that involve some 
originator who achieves a resultant state. There is no implication that the event has taken 
place. I will call this the Moreira/Oltra-Massuet generalization: high -able combines with 
eventive predicates that involve an originator that contributes to the achievement of a 
resultant state. In other words, high -able formation seems to prefer accomplishment 
predicates. If this is the correct description/generalization, then we can reformulate the 
research question: object experiencer predicates have been argued to have the relevant event 
structure properties, but still they seem to be marginal with -able. Why is that so? 
The paper is structured as follows: I will first discuss the main classes of psych verbs that 
have been acknowledged in the literature. In section 3 I will turn to -able adjectives and psych 
verbs across languages. Section 4 offers an analysis, and section 5 concludes my discussion. 
2 Types of psych verbs 
According to Belletti & Rizzi (1988), Pesetsky (1995), Landau (2010) and many others, there are 
three classes of psych verbs. The first class is that of subject experiencer verbs, where the 
experiencer appears as the subject of the predicate: 
 
(13) John fears storms. 
 
The second class is that of accusative object experiencer verbs, where the experiencer appears 
as the accusative object of the predicate: 
 
(14) The message worries John. 
 
The third class involves an object experiencer that surfaces with dative case: 
 
(15) The song appeals to John. 
 
While there is some consensus as to the status of class I and class III verbs, Class II has been 
controversially discussed in the literature, and the reader is referred to Landau (2010) for an 
overview. What is important for my discussion is here is Arad's (1998) classification. Arad 
shows that there are three different interpretations associated with class II verbs, see (16): an 
agentive reading where there is both an agent and a change of state in the experiencer; an 
eventive reading implying that something unintentionally caused a change of mental state in 
the experiencer; a stative reading where there is no agent nor any change of mental state. 
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(16) a. Anna frightened Laura deliberately.   agentive  
 b. Nina frightened Laura unintentionally.  eventive, non-agentive 
 c. The noise frightened Laura.    eventive, non-agentive 
 b. Anna’s behavior frightens Laura.   stative  
 
Landau (2010) argues that agentive class II verbs are change of state verbs (i.e. 
accomplishments) and not actually psych verbs. But now, if -able can attach both high and 
low, the behavior of psych verbs is unexpected both within a language and across languages. 
One would in principle expect that stative verbs should tolerate low -able, while eventive psych 
verbs should be fine with high -able. But as we have seen for some languages, there is simply 
no -able derivation with accusative object experiencer predicates. 
Let us consider this behavior in some detail in the next section. 
3 -Able adjectives and psych verbs 
3.1 In English1 
Formation of -able adjectives with Class I predicates, which researchers agree are stative, is 
generally possible, see (17): 
 
(17) admirable, hateable, enjoyable, likeable 
 
There is agreement in the literature that these formations involve low -able, i.e. admirable does 
not mean ‘can be admired’, and there is no direct reference to an event component. As these 
verbs are stative, it is expected that the -able formations derived from them will only involve 
low -able, see the Moreira/Oltra-Massuet generalization on high -able above. 
Formation of -able adjectives with accusative object experiencer verbs shows a non-
uniform behavior. For instance, Iwata (1995) considers (18) grammatical: 
 
(18)  a. I can’t help annoying John. He is so annoyable. 
 b. *This movie is annoyable. 
 
Iwata took (18) to suggest that psych verbs do have a direct internal argument, contra the 
unaccusative analysis proposed in e.g. Belletti & Rizzi (1988). However, not all accusative 
object experiencer verbs can form -able adjectives: 
 
(19) *disgustable, *puzzleable, *charmable 
 
The question then is which -able is involved in the formations that are possible. I believe there 
is evidence that, at least in some cases, low -able is involved. First of all, some of the forms that 
occur in these -able adjectives must be truncated: 
 
(20) irritate  irritable  *irritatable 
 
Second, -able affixation sometimes leads to stress shifts: 
(21) térrify  terrifíable 
 
Thirdly, they do not seem to tolerate by-phrases: 
 
(22) *John is irritable by anyone. 
 
                                                          
1 Note that it is often said that -able prefers Latinate bases. Trips & Stein (2008), however, show that the affix 
was integrated into the English word formation system and could be applied to native bases from very early on. 
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Thus, on the basis of Oltra-Massuet's criteria, at least for these psych verbs that can form -able 
adjectives, low -able seems to be involved. (We will slightly revise this later on). 
3.2 Beyond English  
If we now look at other languages, the picture becomes slightly more complicated. For 
instance, Italian seems to be similar to English: some object experiencer verbs can form -able 
adjectives, some cannot, see Bisetto (2013): 
 
(23) a. *divertibile b. *estasiabile c. *disgustabile 
    amuseable    delightable    disgustable 
 
 d. irritabile e. impensieribile f. incoraggiabile 
  irritable  worryable  encourageable 
 
Bisetto (2013) argues that this is so, as -bile does not attach to achievements. This seems 
consistent with the Moreira/Oltra-Massuet generalization, as achievements are punctual. 
In German, with the exception of verletzen ‘hurt’ and maybe verärgern ‘enrage’, other 
accusative object experiencer verbs do not form either -bar or -wert adjectives (Thanks to Nils 
Hirsch for providing me with the data). 
 
(24) *verblüffbar *verblüffenswert  *zermürbbar *zermürbenswert 
   amaze-able   amaze-wert       demoralize-able   demoralize-wert 
 
Class I predicates seem fine, with -wert but not with -bar, as expected: 
 
(25) liebenswert  bewundernswert mögenswert 
 love-able  admire-able  like-able 
 
(26) *lieben-bar  *bewunderbar  *mögenbar 
 
The behavior of Class I psych verbs is predicted on the basis of the Moreira/Oltra-Massuet 
generalization.2 What is not predicted is the behavior of class II predicates. 
In Greek, there are two ways to form dispositional adjectives. The first one is discussed 
extensively in Samioti (2015) and it involves the affix -tos, which forms potential adjectival 
participles, sometimes in combination with certain prefixes, e.g. axio ‘worthy’. Samioti argues 
in detail that ability/possibility -tos participles involve high -tos, as they can license by-phrases 
and manner adverbials: 
 
(27) a. I  istoria  tu ine  pistefti   apo olus. 
  the  story  his  is  believable  by   all 
  ‘His story is believable by all.’ 
 b. To mathima  ine  efkola katanoito. 
  the lesson  is  easily  understandable 
  ‘The lesson is easily understandable.’ 
 
The second one involves the affix -sim-: 
 
 
                                                          
2 Note also that in Spanish, most adjectives that show the evaluative/low -able reading are subject experiencer 
predicates (Class I). 
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(28) a. metafrasimo b. katikisimo c. fagosimo 
  translatable  inhabitable  eatable 
 
Note that (28c) does not necessarily denote that something can be eaten. In Greek, this form, 
especially in the plural, is used to refer to food in general. (28a)  has an interpretation similar 
to the one associated with high -able, as we will see immediately below. 
A closer look at the properties of -sim- in (28a) provides evidence for high affixation. First 
of all, it licenses manner adverbs: 
 
(29) To  vilvio ine  efkola metafrasimo. 
 the  book  is  easily  translatable 
 
It also licenses by-phrases as well as aspectual phrases: 
 
(30) To vivlio ine  metafrasimo  apo ebirus        metafrastes. 
 the book  is  translatable  by   experienced translators 
 
(31) To vivlio ine  metafrasimo  mesa se  deka meres. 
 the book  is  translatable  within  10    days 
 
We can thus conclude that -sim- patterns with high -able. Turning now to psych verbs and 
dispositional adjectives derived from such predicates, note that Class I predicates can combine 
with -tos but not with -sim: 
 
(32) agapitos  zileftos   misitos  thavmastos 
 lovable  jealous-able  hate-able  admire-able 
 
(33) axiolatreftos   axiozileftos  axiosevastos 
 worthy-admired worthy-jealous  worthy-respect 
 
Class II predicates cannot combine with -sim-: 
 
(34) *enohlisimos  *thimosimos  *sinhisimos 
   annoyable    angerable    confuse-able 
 
With very few exceptions, they do not combine with -tos either, and only in combination with 
a prefix/adverb meaning ‘easily’ (as Despina Oikonomou pointed out to me): 
 
(35)  everethistos  ev-prosvlitos  efkolo-siginitos 
  easily-irritable easily-assailable easily-moveable 
 
With respect to (35), Samioti notes that this seems to involve an anticausative formation, not 
a passive, as by-phrases are disallowed, but the by itself  phrase is allowed; this test diagnoses 
the absence of an external argument, as discussed at length in Alexiadou, Anagnostopoulou & 
Schäfer (2015): 
 
(36) O Janis ine everethistos     apo monos tu/*apo  olus. 
 John     is    easily.irritable by  himself/   *by  all 
 
That -tos in these examples has a potential reading is argued for in Samioti (2015: 76). As she 
points out, similar to -able, the adjective does not imply that the event described has taken 
place.  
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(37) To asteri ine orato apo ti gi, ala de to ehi di kanis akomi.   
 ‘The star is visible from the earth, but noone has seen it yet.’ 
 
We can make a similar observation for -sim: 
 
(38) To vivlio ine  metafrasimo ala  den to ehi metafrasi  kanis   akoma. 
 the book  is  translatable   but NEG it has translated anyone  yet 
 ‘The book is translatable but nobody has translated it yet.’ 
 
Thus the question that arises is: why is it not possible for a class II psych verb in Greek (or 
German) to form a dispositional adjective? 
4 Towards an analysis 
Let us now consider the syntax of high and low -able in some details, following Oltra-Massuet 
(2013). While both formations are adjectival, a crucial difference between the two is that high  
-able includes the layer that introduces the external argument. A further difference is that high 
-able contains an event layer, while low -able simply involves root affixation. According to 
Oltra-Massuet (2013: 153), in the case of low -able, first the root merges with AspP, which is a 
stativizer. ModP modalizes the formation, and when it merges with a stative root, the readings 
that are obtained may be non-potential. By contrast, in the case of high -able, the pieces 
involved in the formation yield a reading according to which it is possible for some arbitrary 
individual to perform the action denoted by the eventive predicate: 
 
(39) a.       aP   creates a property 
   3  
          ModP   creates a modalized resultant state 
         3     
        AspP   creates a resultant state 
            3 
      VoiceP   implies external argument 
              3 
                  Passive       vP 
       3  
                 √ 
 
 b.        aP   creates a property 
   3  
                   ModP   modalizes stative root 
    3     
                  AspP   stativizes root 
          3 
                                   √ 
 
Looking at the behavior of psych verbs from this perspective, we are close to offering an 
analysis of their restrictions. In all languages under discussion, subject experiencer predicates 
combine with low -able. These verbs do not denote events, and do not include an external 
argument that acts volitionally. Thus, these show the expected behavior. 
-ABLE ADJECTIVES 9 
 
Object experiencer predicates, by contrast, show a non-uniform behavior within a 
language and across languages. The reason for this is that such predicates do not all fit in one 
aspectual class, within a language and across languages. If the test discussed here is sensitive 
to aspectual properties, we expect to find a lot of variation. To this end, it is now crucial to 
consider different aspectual types of object experiencer predicates in English and in Greek in 
some detail. As Alexiadou & Iordăchioaia (2014) pointed out, building on e.g. Grafmiller (2013) 
and references therein, there is a group of these verbs that is stative only: e.g. fascinate. This 
group of verbs does not really give good -able formations, although in principle root affixation 
should be possible. As Gianina Iordăchioaia (p.c.) observes, a difference between the two types 
of stative verbs is that only in the case of stative object experiencer predicates would -able 
formation attribute a property/an evaluative judgment to the experiencer argument, i.e. the 
argument that experiences the mental state. In the case of class I verbs, which, in this respect, 
behave like other stative verbs, -able formation attributes an evaluative judgment to the 
argument of the state.  
In Spanish, according to Val Àlvaro (1981), cited in Oltra-Massuet (2013: 106), subject 
experiencer predicates give rise to appreciative readings in -able formation, which can be 
attributed to the argument of the state. By contrast, object experiencer predicate formations 
receive a second reading paraphrasable as ‘X is easy to V’, for instance excitable ‘excitable’ or 
irritable ‘irritable’ are interpreted as X is easy to excite or irritate. Thus one would expect that 
predicates that do not give rise to such an interpretation should be banned from low -able 
formation. Indeed, John is easy to fascinate is bad as opposed to John is easy to irritate, which 
is much better. If this is the correct semantic specification of these formations, then we can 
formulate the generalization that low -able is possible, whenever this second reading is also 
possible. I believe Iwata's data, discussed above, relate to this reading. Importantly, this is not 
a reading involving an implicit external argument. 
There is a second group of accusative object experiencer predicates which could be 
classified as states or activities. Evidence for this comes from the incompatibility of several of 
these verbs with in-adverbials, indicating that they lack a change of state reading. The question 
that arises is whether they permit low -able affixation. Interestingly, they seem not to. If we 
employ the easy to V paraphrase, we see that these verbs cannot be included in these 
paraphrases: ??Sue is easy to puzzle, ??Bill is easy to delight: 
  
(40) a. Sue grieved over the court decision for/*in half an hour. 
 b. Sue grieved at the court decision for/*in half an hour. 
 c. The court decision grieved Sue for/*in half an hour.    
 
(41) a. We puzzled over Sue's remarks for/*in an hour.     
 b. Sue's remarks puzzled us for/*in an hour.   
 c. Bill delighted in his new-found wealth for/??in two months. 
 d. His new-found wealth delighted Bill for/??in two months.  
 
If this is the case, they should disallow high -able affixation which requires a resultant state 
brought about by an originator – and indeed such formations are out. Moreover, low 
formations cannot acquire the second easy to V reading, e.g. *Sue is easy to grieve, thus low     -
able is also out: 
 
(42) *grievable *puzzleable  *delightable 
 
Finally, there is a class of predicates that are ambiguous between a change of state and a state 
reading. Alexiadou & Iordăchioaia show that this is supported by for-adverbials, which may 
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modify the result state (RS) of the COS reading documented in (43), or the single eventuality 
(SEv) like with pure states.  
 
(43)  The Chinese dinner satisfied Bill for ten minutes. 
  i. RS: After having the Chinese dinner, Bill was satisfied for ten minutes. 
 ii. SEv: Having the Chinese dinner kept Bill satisfied. Both the dinner and his 
satisfaction lasted for ten minutes simultaneously. 
 
We predict that the verbs that have a RS interpretation should be able to form high -able 
adjectives. Indeed this is the case. 
 
(44) John is easily satisfiable. 
 
Now what about Greek? Recall that Class II predicates cannot combine with neither -sim- nor 
-tos: 
 
(45) *enohlisimos  *thimosimos  *sinhisimos  *thimotos 
   annoyable    angerable    confuse-able    angerable 
 
But most Greek class II predicates have a RS, see (46-47) from Alexiadou & Iordăchioaia (2014). 
As these authors argued in detail in Greek several psych verbs undergo the causative 
alternation, i.e. they are change of state verbs. Evidence for this is provided by the availability 
of a restitutive reading for the Greek counterpart of again, ksana, which detects the presence 
of a resultant state in the structure: 
 
(46)  Ta  nea    enohlisan to   Jani  ksana     
  the news  annoyed   the John again 
  ‘The news annoyed John again.’ 
 
(47) a. Repetitive scenario 
 O Janis ine poli iremos anthropos, ala ta nea panda kapos katafernun ke ton 
enohlun. Htes, os sinithos itan iremos, ala … (46) 
 ‘John is a very calm person, but the news somehow always manage to annoy him. 
Yesterday, as usual, he was calm, but ...(46)’ 
 
 b. Restitutive scenario 
 O Janis ine panda thimomenos. Htes, itan, kat’ekseresi iremos, ja ligo, ala kapia 
stigmi…(46) 
 John is always angry/annoyed. Yesterday, he was exceptionally calm for a while, 
but at some point ...(46) 
  
Thus it seems to be that all ingredients are in place. However, the verbs do not form -able 
adjectives. I believe that this relates to the peculiarities of the Greek Voice system, and I will 
now show how this is connected. 
To begin with, in Greek psych verbs are not the only ones that cannot combine with -sim. 
In fact many change of state verbs cannot combine with it. Zombolou (2004: 130) notes the 
following:3 
 
                                                          
3 Zombolou further notes that the same class of predicates does not form -er nominals in Greek: 
(i) shizo ‘tear’ *shistis ‘tearer’   
Alexiadou, Anagnostopoulou & Schäfer (2015) suggest that only verbs based on manner roots form -er nominals. 
This raises the question of whether the restriction is similar for -sim-.  
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(48) shizo ‘tear’  *shisimo ‘tearable’ 
 keo ‘burn’  *kapsisimo  ‘burnable’ 
 lerono ‘dirty’  *lerosimo ‘dirty-able’ 
 
Some more examples are given in (49): 
 
(49) anigo ‘open’  *ahihtisimo  ‘openable‘ 
 spao ‘break’  *spasimo ‘breakable’ 
 
These predicates can combine with -tos, but not under the potential reading, only under the 
stative reading, which would involve a structure as the one in (50): 
 
(50)         AspectP  Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou (2008)   
   3 
  -tos           √anig ‘open’ 
 
But if the requirement to undergo -able affixation relies on event structure properties, the 
behavior of Greek change of state, as well as psych predicates becomes even more puzzling. 
In what follows, I will relate this behavior to the properties of Greek middle Voice. Samioti 
(2015) offers an analysis of potential -tos, which builds on Lekakou (2005). Basically, potential 
structures are based on a dispositional Middle syntax. Lekakou (2005) argued that in Greek the 
Dispositional Middle is actually built on the basis of a passive structure. 
 
(51)        Aspect      
     3  
    -tos            VoiceP    
                 3 
         Middle               vP 
           3  
                      √ 
 
Let us assume, following Alexiadou & Doron (2012), and Spathas, Alexiadou & Schäfer (2015), 
Alexiadou, Anagnostopoulou & Schäfer (2015) that Dispositional Middles, (Reflexives) and 
Passives in Greek all involve a particular Voice head, namely Middle Voice. Let us further 
assume that potential -sim- has a similar structure to the one proposed by Samioti for potential 
-tos. If the input to this affix is a well-formed Middle/Passive that implies an originator, then 
we can relate this puzzle to the problem of the restrictions on the formation of the Greek 
passive/Middle. -sim- cannot derive adjectives out of predicates that cannot combine with 
Middle Voice. 
As we will see, the restrictions on –sim- formation and Middle Voice combination are 
practically identical. For instance, Alexiadou, Anagnostopoulou & Schäfer (2015: 121f.) make 
the following observations: First, several of the verbs that undergo the causative alternation 
form anticausatives with active morphology, and are not allowed to combine with non-active 
morphology in order to form a passive, for example, the verb spao ‘break’ doesn’t form a 
passive morphologically. 
Second, most change-of-state verbs strongly resist the combination with the non-active 
ending resulting in a passive in Greek, yielding forms that are either outright ungrammatical 
or strongly deviant, e.g. kriono ‘cool-1sg’, *krionome ‘cool-NAct’; vatheno ‘deepen-1sg’, 
*vathenome ‘deepen-NAct’; adinatizo ‘thin-1sg’, ?*adinatizime ‘thinen-NAct’; gernao ‘age-1sg’, 
*gerazome ‘age-NAct’; etc. With some of these verbs, there seems to be a phonological clash 
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that results from the combination of a particular stem with the non-active affix (e.g.: 
*vathinome ‘deepen-NAct’, *kontenome ‘shorten-NAct’, *leptenome ‘thinen-NAct’, 
*makrenome ‘lenghten-NAct’). 
Zombolou (2004) points out that passivizability is also restricted outside the domain of change-
of-state verbs. For instance, the following (mono-eventive) verbs cannot easily form a passive 
in Greek (or not at all, for some speakers), while they can in English and German: haidevo 
‘stroke’, derno ‘beat’, klotsao ‘kick’, frondizo ‘take care of’.  These verbs do not combine with -
sim-. 
Third, there are several verbs, which, while they can combine with non-active 
morphology, they cannot receive a passive interpretation e.g. burn, cut and kill. As shown in 
(52), agentive apo-phrases are not tolerated with such verbs, i.e. they only form anticausatives.  
 
(52)  I     supa           kaike           me   ti    dinati fotia/ *apo  to   Jani. 
  the soup.NOM burnt.NAct with the strong fire/    from the John 
  ‘The soup burned from the strong fire.’ 
 
Crucially, none of these verbs combines with -sim-. 
Now, several of our psych verbs cannot combine with non-active morphology: 
 
(53) a. o Janis thimose ti Maria. 
  John   angered Mary. 
 b. *i Maria thimothike   (apo to Jani). 
  Mary     was.angered by   John 
 
(54)  *ponethike  ‘feel pain-NAct-3sg’ 
  *tromahtike  ‘terrify-NAct-3sg’ 
  *aidiastike  ‘disgust-NAct-3sg’ 
 
Other object experiencer verbs can have subject experiencer predicates with NActive 
morphology, but either prefer Causer PPs suggesting that maybe a passive (agentive) 
interpretation is not available (55a), or are purely stative (55b). See also Oikonomou (2011), 
who points out that even agentive OE predicates do not passivize in Greek: 
 
(55) a. disarestithike               me   to Tsipra. 
  was.displeased-NAct  with Tsipras 
  ‘He was displeased with Tsipras.’ 
 b. endiaferthike   ja ta fita. 
  was.interested-NAct  in plants 
  ‘He was interested in plants.’ 
 
Several class I psych verbs are deponent predicates, i.e. transitive verbs with NAct 
morphology, which cannot passivize: 
 
(56) fovame  ‘fear-NAct‘ 
 lipame  ‘feel sorry-NAct’ 
 
I thus conclude that the restrictions on –sim- formation in Greek relate to the restrictions on 
Middle Voice. Predicates that cannot combine with Middle Voice cannot from -sim adjectives.  
The above suggests that these predicates never form agentive passives. In fact, there is 
further evidence for the absence of an agent external argument in these formations. This is 
provided by interaction with modals. Giannakidou & Staraki (2013) show that there is a lexical 
-ABLE ADJECTIVES 13 
 
split in Greek between the impersonal bori – an epistemic possibility modal form, something 
like might in English – and personal boro which is never epistemic, but abilitative or deontic. 
 
(57)  a.  Ta  pedia  bori       na  ine      sto    spiti. 
  the children  might.3sg.INP  SUBJ  be.3pl.INP to-the home 
  Epistemic: ‘As far as I know, it is possible that children are at home.’  
 b.  Ta  pedia     borun       na    pane   sto  spiti   mona tus.  
  the children can.3pl.INP  SUBJ   go.3pl.INP  to-the  home alone them  
  Ability: ‘Children are able to go home on their own.’ 
  Deontic: ‘The children are allowed to go home by themselves.’  
 
Note that those psych verbs that can build NAct cannot appear in the latter context, i.e. they 
can only combine with epistemic modality. This is in sharp contrast with the predicates that 
can form -sim- adjectives: 
 
(58)  Ta  pedia         bori/*borun    na        enohlithun. 
  the children   might/can.3pl  SUBJ  annoyed-3pl 
 
(59)  Ta  vivlia       borun   na       metafrastun. 
  the books  can.3pl SUBJ  translated-3pl 
 
This is reminiscent of the contrast discussed in Hackl (1998). Hackl notes that verbal passives 
are fine under an ability modal, while stative or adjectival passives are not. Thus, one gets only 
the epistemic reading for can with an adjectival passive, and semi-modals are ungrammatical 
with an adjectival passive. This is particularly clear in German that distinguishes between the 
two passives morphologically, see (60-61), Hackl’s (38-39):4 
 
(60) a. John can be arrested. 
 b. ?John is able to be arrested. 
 
(61) a. Der Hans kann eingesperrt werden. 
 b. Der Hans kann eingesperrt sein.    epistemic only 
  ‘John can be arrested.’ 
 
Hackl relates that to the fact that verbal passives have an external argument (an agent), while 
adjectival passives lack such an argument. 
The above would thus suggest that in Greek psych verbs cannot form agentive passives, 
as also observed by Oikonomou (2011), and are unable to enter any formation that would 
involve the presence of a Middle Voice head of the type described above, i.e. a head that is 
involved in the formation of agentive passives. Intransitive variants of these verbs are thus 
only anticausative and never passive. 
If this is the correct analysis of the Greek pattern, the question that arises is what the 
explanation for German is, and what other properties the behavior we have seen correlates 
with. It is clear that the details of the Greek Voice system do not apply to German, e.g. 
passivization of change of state verbs is not restricted as is the case in Greek. However, it is 
not clear that class II psych verbs can form passives. For instance, verletzen ‘hurt’ and verärgern 
‘anger’ can, and in this case high -able formation is possible, while verwundern ‘amaze’ cannot 
and high -able formation is out. In all cases, low -able formation is out, relating perhaps to the 
                                                          
4 Thanks to G. Iordăchioaia and D. Oikonomou for discussion on this point. 
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second type of reading that these predicates may or may not acquire, e.g. it is easy to V. I leave 
this for further research. 
5 Conclusion  
In this paper, I argued that the restrictions on -able formation relate to three factors, namely: 
i) high and low domains for word formation, ii) properties of event structure, and iii) properties 
of Voice systems across languages. High -able formation is only possible out of 
accomplishment predicates that give a well-formed agentive passive. 
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1 Introduction 
Characterizing or generic sentences give rise both to habitual and dispositional statements
(see Kria et al. 1995, p. 3), but it has been debated whether these distinct readings can be at-
tributed to the same generic operator. For some scholars, habituals are a subtype of generics
(Carlson 1977, Dahl 1985, Schubert & Pelletier 1989, Kria et al. 1995, Greenberg 2002, Land -
man 2008), while for others the habitual is not modal but a particular type of grammatical as-
pect (Comrie 1976, Kleiber 1987, Verkuyl 1995, Bonomi 1997, Xrakovskij 1997, Lenci &
Bertine5o 2000). As for dispositionals, some scholars take them to be a particular case of
generics, see for instance Carlson (1989), Schubert & Pelletier (1989), while for others, dispo-
sitions have a distinct interpretation with existential force (Lawler 1973, Dahl 1975, Green
2000, Menendez-Benito 2005, 2013, Nickel 2010).
Concretely, it has been claimed that the following examples are ambiguous between a
habitual and a dispositional interpretation.
(1) John drinks beer.
         i. John habitually drinks beer
 I wish to thank Edit Doron, Yael Greenberg and the audience of the Dispositions Workshop 2015, at the
University of Stu5gart for useful discussion. All errors are my own. @is research is supported by ISF grant
1366/14.
Morphological, Syntactic and Semantic Aspects of Dispositions 
ed. Fabienne Martin, Marcel Pi5eroC, and Tillmann Pross, 16–29 
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On habituals and dispositionals
Nora Boneh
@e paper sets out to challenge the claim that the distribution of FC-
any in bare generic sentences giving rise to dispositional readings
constitutes empirical evidence for the Possibility Hypothesis, assum-
ing that dispositional sentences feature a covert existential modal
quantiLer equivalent to can or might. More generally, the paper at-
tempts to suggest that dispositional and habitual readings, which
arise in bare characterizing sentences, are not due to the same un-
derlying covert modal operator. What enables suggesting such a
view is the fact that bare characterizing sentences present diCerent
properties from those characterizing sentences that feature overt
(temporal) quantiLcation. It is shown that bare characterizing sen-
tences pa5ern alike aspectually, irrespective of whether they give
rise to a habitual or a dispositional reading. Following work by
Boneh & Doron (2010, 2013), it is suggested that whereas quantiLed
characterizing sentences feature the quasi-universal Gen, bare ones
feature a VP-level operator Hab, built on the availability of sums of
events in all relevant accessible worlds once a disposition for this
type of event iteration is manifested in the actual world.
Keywords: habituals, dispositionals, genericity, bare characterizing
sentences, Free Choice any, viewpoint aspect
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ii. John is disposed to drink beer (if oCered beer, he might very well drink it)
(2)      @is car goes 120 mph.
i. @is car habitually goes 120 mph (it's a race car)
ii. @is car is disposed to go 120 mph (it was built to reach this speed)
While there is li5le disagreement that habituals, similarly to many plain generics, involve
universal or quasi-universal quantiLcation over situations, the view that takes there to be an
existential quantiLer underlying the dispositional interpretation has been dubbed by Dahl
(1975) the Possibility Hypothesis.
In this paper, following Boneh & Doron (2010, 2013), I will suggest that a semantic dis-
tinction should be made between bare characterizing sentences and characterizing sentences
which are in the scope of an overt temporal quantiLer. Boneh & Doron (2010, 2013) argue
that once such a distinction is drawn, bare characterizing sentences should be analyzed as
based on a disposition for event iteration in accessible worlds, and are thus not distinct from
dispositionals, despite of the fact that dispositionals are usually identiLed on the basis of
non-occurrence of events in the actual world (pace Carlson 1989, Schubert & Pelletier 1989).
In characterizing sentences with overt quantiLcation, habitual readings are interpreted as
generic. While the LF of bare habituals features an operator Hab, that of quantiLcational ha -
bituals features Gen, a quasi-universal modal operator.1
SpeciLcally, I will show that arguments suggested in favor of the Possibility Hypothesis
are not actually strong arguments. In particular, I will focus on the argument from Free
Choice-any which is said to be sensitive to quantiLcational force. I will also point to the fact
that dispositionals and habituals pa5ern alike in the way they interact with aspect, and that
they are both distinct from quantiLcational characterizing generic sentences in this respect.
@is will be taken to indicate that compositionally, there is an underlying V or VP-level oper-
ator underlying both dispositionals and habituals.
@e paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers arguments in favor of the Possi-
bility Hypothesis, focusing mainly on the issue of licensing of FC-any, suggesting that it can-
not be a test for detecting the quantiLcational force of an implicit modal. In section 3, I re-
view the proposal put forth in Boneh & Doron (2010, 2013) se5ing bare habituals and quan -
tiLcational generics apart. Section 4 shows how two verbal forms in English - the simple past
form and would - pa5ern diCerently in bare sentences and quantiLcational ones, respectively.
Section 5 argues that bare sentences with dispositional and habitual readings pa5ern to-
gether in terms of event actualization in the actual world and their aspectual properties, con-
trary to generics. Section 6 concludes.
2 e Possibility Hypothesis and the argument from FC-any
Evidence for the Possibility Hypothesis seems to come from two main sources. First, para-
phrases of the interpretations in (ii) of (1) and (2) can be respectively as follows:
(3) John can/might drink beer.
(4) @is car can go 120 mph.
1As a consequence of focusing the a5ention on bare generic sentences such as (1) and (2), Cohen's claim
(this volume) that habituals are not modal and should therefore not be grouped together with dispositionals and
generics is not applicable. Cohen claims that although habituals are intensional, they are not modal, since they
are parametric on time, not worlds. As far as I understand, this cannot be demonstrated for bare habituals exem-
pliLed in (1) and (2), but might apply to habitual sentences containing overt quantiLcation.
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Second, the licensing of FC-any by modal auxiliaries may serve as an indication as to the
quantiLcational force of the implicit modal underlying a dispositional sentence. Menéndez-
Benito (2005), (2013) points to the following pa5ern, where FC-any  is licensed under can
(5a), but not under must (5b):
(5) a. John can eat anything.
b. *John must eat anything.
c. John eats anything.
@e implicit modal operator in (5c) seems analogous to can in (5a) and not to must (5b) in its
ability to license FC-any, indicating that the implicit modal is existential. @e dispositional
operator diCers from can/might in how the conversational background is determined (see
discussion in Menéndez-Benito 2005, 2013). 
Nickel (2010) uses the FC-any test to show that whereas (6b') is comparable to (6b), both
presumably expressing the disposition of the car to go 120 mph, but not its habits, (6a') and
(6a) are distinct: (6a) expresses a habitual reading and (6a') the disposition of the Eurostar. In
other words, for Nickel, neither of (6a') or (6b') conveys a habitual reading, but rather the dis -
position of the Eurostar and of my Peugeot. In the case of (6a'), world knowledge makes it so
that the sentence is slightly awkward, since it is known that the Eurostar goes at this high
speed most of the time, but (6b') naturally expresses the capacities of my Peugeot.
(6) a. @e Eurostar goes 120 mph.
b. My Peugeot goes 120 mph.
a'. @e Eurostar goes any speed up to 120 mph.
b'. My Peugeot goes any speed up to 120 mph.                                  
                                                                                                          (Nickel 2010: ex. 9)
@is reiterates the point made by Menéndez-Benito that FC-any is available only under the
dispositional reading, not the habitual one.
@e Lrst argument in support for the Possibility Hypothesis, relying on paraphrase, is
not a strong one, since paraphrase is no indication of LF. @e second argument, involving the
licensing of FC-any, will be shown not to be a sound diagnostic to detect existential quantiL-
cation over universal one. In other words, I will try to show that the salience of a disposi -
tional reading in a sentence containing any, as exempliLed above, cannot be straightfor-
wardly linked to the nature of the quantiLcational force of the covert modal.
Let us start by pointing out that not all speakers reject (5c) with a habitual interpreta -
tion, namely with an interpretation where there are regular eating events taking place in the
actual world. Consider (7b) placed in the context set up in (7a):
(7) a. How do you survive in this area, where food is so scarce?
b. I (just) eat anything (I can Lnd).
Note that (7b) is good under a habitual reading, without obligatorily adding a relative clause,
namely without subtrigging.2 @is issue leads us to the next point. 
Whereas the presence of FC-any in episodic sentences (8) and with an overt must-like
modal (9) is usually impossible, subtrigging makes it possible (for discussion of the following
examples see Menéndez-Benito 2005, Dayal 2009, Chierchia 2013, among others):
(8) Bill read any book *(he found) / *(that was on his reading list).
2 But see Dayal (2004) on the issue of covert subtrigging. 
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(Dayal 2009: ex. 2)
(9) a.   Bill may/*must read any book. 
b.   Bill may read any book (he Lnds)/(on his reading list). 
c.   Bill must read any book *(he Lnds)/ *(on his reading list). 
(Dayal 2009: ex. 3)
Dayal (2009) claims that what is at stake in non-subtrigged episodic sentences and those con-
taining the must-like modal is not directly the availability of an existential versus universal
quantiLcational force, but the Ructuation requirement which any introduces. According to
this requirement, no single set of individuals is such that it constitutes in every accessible
world the set of individuals in the intersection of the nominal and the verbal properties in
that world. In the case of possibility modals with existential quantiLcation, this follows natu-
rally, hence the felicity of FC-any in these environments. In plain episodic sentences, the ex-
clusion of FC-any is trivial, since the set of individuals is only evaluated with respect to the
actual world, the only relevant world. In the case of must-like modals, sets of individuals are
identical across all the accessible worlds. Dayal (2009) suggests that subtrigging ameliorates
the acceptance of any in the case of episodic sentences and must-like modals since it disables
access to the full set of individuals involved, in such a way that the Ructuation requirement
can then be maintained.
Let us reconsider Nickel's examples in (6), equipped now with Dayal's Ructuation re-
quirement.3 In (6a'), the Ructuation requirement is not maintained if the Eurostar, in all ac-
cessible words, goes 120 mph; in this case, only a habitual reading is available. However, in
the case of my Peugeot in (6b'), no clear distinction between a habitual and a dispositional
reading can be made since under both readings, the Ructuation requirement may be re-
spected. Under a dispositional reading, the actual world is not among the worlds in which
my Peugeot goes (any speed up to) 120 mph, and under a habitual reading, my Peugeot may
regularly go in varying high speeds in all accessible worlds, including the actual world. So
the set of speeds need not be constant across accessible worlds, irrespective of the quantiLca-
tional force. It becomes clear that what is at work are pragmatic conditions of interpretation
and not directly the modal force of the implicit operator said to distinguish between a habit-
ual and a dispositional reading. @is is reminiscent of Carlson's (1981) view, whereby the
presence of any forces a dispositional reading, but that otherwise, this type of sentence is
vague with regard to the expression of dispositionality or habituality.
Support for the fact that there is no genuine ambiguity between a habitual and a disposi-
tional reading in bare characterizing sentences comes from the following examples contain-
ing VP ellipsis.4 Consider Lrst (10), which can be felicitously u5ered in a context where a car
dealer wants to convince a race driver to exchange her old car, which she really likes, for a
brand new one:
(10) Your car goes 100 mph without any problem, but so does this brand new one.
Here, the old car may be understood to go 100 mph habitually, due to the owner’s profession,
but with respect to the brand new car, the speed is intended dispositionally, as there are no
actual driving events of this car yet. @e felicity of this example, where ellipsis does not dis-
tinguish the habitual reading from the dispositional one, indicates that there is no true ambi-
guity.
3 See Chierchia (2013) for suggesting a wide scope analysis for any  over the modal in these cases.
4 I thank Edit Doron for suggesting this test.
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Here is an additional such example. A host would like to know what to prepare for his
guests for dinner. He receives the following information:
(11) John eats bacon and so does Bill.
In this case, it is irrelevant whether one does so habitually and the other dispositionally, i.e.
he does not object to eating bacon, and would eat bacon if presented with the right occasion,
even if so far he has not eaten bacon on a regular basis.
@e next section is concerned with teasing apart bare habituals from quantiLed habitu-
als. @is sets the basis for subsuming both dispositions and habituals under bare characteriz-
ing sentences.
3 Teasing apart bare habituals from characterizing generic sentences
According to the classical view (Kria et al. 1995), habitual characterizing sentences express
regularities which summarize a group of episodes or facts; in other words, a habitual sen-
tence is related to an episodic sentence:
(12) a. Mary smokes when she comes home.
b. Gen (s;x) ; (x=Mary & x come home in s; x smokes in s)
Under this approach, there is no diCerence between characterizing sentences with overt
quantiLcation and those without. @us, similarly to (12), a sentence such as in (13a), has the
LF in (13b):
(13) a. Mary smokes.
b. Gen (s;x) ;(x=Mary & s is a normal situation with respect to smoking & s contains 
x ; x smokes in s)
But then if the habitual sentence is based on an underlying episodic sentence, it is not
clear what in (14a) blocks the indeLnite singular 'a cigare5e' in a bare characterizing sen-
tence, allowing only the bare plural NP 'cigare5es'; moreover, it is not clear why no such dis -
tinction arises when an overt restrictor, aVer dinner, is available in (14b).
 
(14) a. Mary smokes *a cigare5e/cigare5es.
b. Mary smokes a cigare5e/cigare5es aVer dinner.
One would expect the indeLnite singular to allow a narrow scope interpretation in (14a),
given the LF in (12b), but it does not. Assuming a covert restrictor as in (13b), one would also
expect there to be no diCerence between a bare characterizing sentence and one with an
overt restrictor such as in (14b).
In order to account for the infelicity of (14a) with an indeLnite singular, Kria et al.
(1995: 40) need to assume that each simple situation is related to a diCerent object. Others
have proposed that some sort of monadic operator should be available in the case of bare ha -
bituals (cf. Carlson 1977, Dobrovie-Sorin 2001, Rimell 2004, Vogeleer 2012, Cabredo-HoWerr
2013). Boneh & Doron (2013) follow this line of thought and suggest that in the case of bare
generics, the plurality of events is the output of the operator Hab, which is distinct from Gen:
(15)   a. # Mary smokes a cigare5e.
         b. ∃x[cigare5e(x) & Hab e smoke (e, Mary, x)]
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The infelicity of (14a) then stems from the fact that one cannot smoke the same cigare5e in
multiple events. In a similar fashion, a singular indeLnite object has an obligatory wide scope
reading in habitual sentences, indicating that the operator involved in habituality does not
scopally interact with the existential quantiLer introduced by the singular indeLnite.
 
(16) a.  John babysits a boy.                                   ∃ > ‘hab’
b. *John usually babysits a boy.                              ∃ > ‘hab’; ‘hab’ > ∃
This fact has been noted by many (Carlson 1977, Lenci 1995, Zucchi & White 2001, Spector
2001, Scheiner 2002, van Geenhoven 2004, Rimell 2004, Ferreira 2005, Kratzer 2008).5
Furthermore, in characterizing sentences featuring a bare plural in subject position, Gen
alone does not su^ce to account for a habitual reading in the absence of overt quantiLcation
over events.
(17) a. Women smoke.
b. #Women smoke a cigare5e.
c. Women smoke a cigare5e aVer dinner.
The examples in (17), with their LF in (18), indicate that a generic operator introduced to
bind the variable of the bare plural, cannot at the same time bind the event variable in the ab-
sence of an overt restrictor on events. @ese example illustrate that while a bare characteriz-
ing sentence as in (17a) might lead one to assume that it features a Gen operator as an unse -
lective binder, (17b) shows that this is not the case, since here too, the indeLnite singular may
only be interpreted as having wide scope with respect to the covert operator. @e singular in-
deLnite in object position is only licensed if an overt restrictor is available, as in (17c). In this
case, Gen unselectively binds the event variable restricted over by the quantiLcational ex-
pression, aVer dinner (18c).
(18) a. Gen y [woman(y)]  [Hab e smoke(e, y)]
b. Gen y [woman(y)] ∃x[cigare5e(x) & Hab e smoke(e, y, x)]
c. Gen y, e [woman(y) & aVer-dinner(e, y)] ∃x[cigare5e(x) & smoke(e, y, x)]
Assuming, as do Boneh & Doron (2010, 2013), that the bare characterizing sentences in (17a)-
(17b) feature a covert operator Hab, (18a)-(18b) is a way to solve the puzzle of the unavail -
ability of a singular indeLnite in characterizing sentences, and its availability in quantiLed
ones. Based on this reasoning, Boneh & Doron (2010, 2013) propose the following semantic
deLnition for Hab.
(19) Hab ~> λPλsλw [[INIT(P,s,w) & ∀w'∈MBτ(s)w ∃e[τ(s)⊆τ(e) & ITER(P,e,w')]]
In words, (19) says that Hab(P) is true of a state s in world w iC s is initiated in w, and for all
worlds w' which are worlds close to the ideal world of the modal base MBτ(s),w there is an
event e, which temporally extends the state s, such that e is an iteration of P-events in w'.
@e modal base (Kratzer 1981, 1991) is a function from world-time pairs to a set of worlds,
which are a set of gnomic alternatives to world w at time i, where dispositions are as in w at
i. @e alternatives are ordered by their closeness to the ideal world where dispositions hold
constantly once initiated.
@e deLnition of ITER is provided in (20). @e notion at the basis of habituality is event
iteration (e.g. Vlach 1993). It is deLned on the basis of iteration in Kratzer (2008), where P is a
5 The authors mentioned differ as to whether they consider habituals or non-habitual event iteration. Among
those that discuss habitual sentences, some do not take habituality to involve modality (e.g. Scheiner 2002).
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variable over properties of plural events (where plurality includes singularity) and σ is the
sum operator of Link (1983).
(20) ITER ~> λPλeλw[P(e, w) & e = σe’[P(e’, w) & e’⊂e]]
e is an ITER(P)-event in w iC e is a sum of P-events in w, where the sum has proper P-sub-
parts, i.e. it consists of at least two P-events.
@e deLnition of INIT is provided in (21). Hab does not require the actualization of the
predicate P, but  does require some initiating event, an event which P-initiates the state s:
(21) INIT ~> λPλsλw∃e[τ(e) < τ(s) & e is an event indicating a disposition for P in w]
A state s is P-initiated in world w iC there is a prior event e indicating a disposition for P in
w. @e notion of "indicating-a-disposition" is not further decomposed, but it concerns events
which satisfy either P itself (e.g. 22a-b) or something like the signing of a contract in (22c) or
the manufacturing of an inanimate object with particular telic qualia in (22d), etc.
 
(22) a. John smokes.
b. Bob jumps 8.90 meters.
c. Mary handles the mail from Antarctica.
d. @is machine crashes oranges.
 
Habituals are thought to be actualized, i.e. instantiated in the actual world, while generics do
not require actualization. Boneh & Doron's way of deLning habituals as based on disposi-
tions considers the issue of actualization in the current world from a slightly diCerent angle.
Under this view, event iteration occurs in alternatives to the actual world, which are worlds
where nothing inhibits the disposition from being manifested habitually. But in the actual
world, nothing is required to occur beyond the initiating event, therefore there is no require -
ment for further actualization, only for the manifestation of a disposition. In the case of
many habituals (e.g. 22a-b), the initiating event will itself simply satisfy P. @is fact is what
allows (23a) to be felicitous when said while the addressee smokes for the Lrst time; and
what allows the ascription of a habit to the prime minister in (23b):
(23)    a.   When did you start to smoke?
 b.  Look, the Prime Minister dyes his hair!
(adapted from Vogeleer 2012, ex. 14c)
In these cases, the manifestation of the disposition is the Lrst event of the habit in the actual
world (INIT), and the habit is based on the existence of event summation (ITER) in all the ac -
cessible worlds. We return to this in section 5.
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Compositionally speaking, Hab is a modal VP-level operator, a5ached below AspP:
(24)
 
@e analysis presented here of the operator Hab underlying bare habitual sentences
leads to predictions that can be tested empirically. SpeciLcally, we expect that in bare habit-
ual sentences lacking overt quantiLcation, an indeLnite singular has only wide scope with
respect to event iteration, and the habit can be viewed both perfectively and imperfectively.
In the next section, two English past tensed verb forms, customarily used to express ha -
bituality, are reviewed: the simple past form and would.6
4 Evidence for Hab: Habitual forms in English
Let us start by considering the following context, which indicates that would obligatorily re-
quires an explicit restrictor. @e simple form may or may not have one:
(25) (At the opera). Look at how sloppily people are dressed.
          a. In the good old days, people dressed elegantly.
          b. # In the good old days, people would dress elegantly.
          c. In the good old days, people would dress elegantly to go to the opera.
Second, would diCers from the simple form in that an indeLnite singular may also have
narrow scope:
(26) a. I received eight more treatments, and the temporary amnesia became severe. I 
thought nothing bad about the treatments, however, for I was given a wonderful 
anesthetic. When I awoke, a kind nurse would be sitting beside me with warm 
milk for my stomach if it hurt. (Internet)
b. I received eight more treatments, and the temporary amnesia became severe. I 
thought nothing bad about the treatments, however, for I was given a wonderful 
anesthetic. When I awoke, a kind nurse sat beside me with warm milk for my 
stomach if it hurt. 
(27) a. When I was young, I would babysit a kid.
b. When I was young, I babysat a kid.
In (26a), nurses vary with episodes described in the sentence with would, whereas only one
6 @is discussion has been presented in Boneh & Doron (2013), and it includes also the form used to. @ere,
similarly to Binnick (2005, 2006), used to is presented to be a complex aspect which selects stative VPs, habitual
or not (see also Comrie 1976). In other words, synchronically, it is not a form that is dedicated to encoding habit -
uality.
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nurse regularly sat beside the patient's bed with the simple form in (26b). In the case of
indeLnite singulars in object position, again kids vary in the babysi5ing episodes expressed
with would in (27a), but in (27b), like in (18a), with the simple form, only one kid was
repeatedly guarded.
@ese two forms also diCer as to their aspectual properties. Whereas the habit expressed
with would can only be viewed imperfectively, the one with the simple form can be either
perfective or imperfective.7
If we consider Lrst how the temporal extent of the habit pa5erns with respect to when-
clauses, both would and with the simple form seem to express habituals that only include the
event expressed in the when-clause. @is means that an imperfective interpretation arises for
both forms here.
(28) a. When I met her, Yael slept during the day and worked at night.
b. When I met her, Yael would sleep during the day and work at night.
However, when considering frame adverbials like in the 80s, a diCerence between the
forms becomes visible.
(29) a. In the 80's, John went to work by bus.
b. In the 80's, John would go to work by bus.
@e simple form in (29a) can be interpreted both perfectively and imperfectively, namely the
habit of going to work by bus can be understood to span part of the 80s (perfective interpre-
tation), or to have started before the 80s and continue past the 80s. In (29b), only the second
interpretation is available. Similarly, when a durational adverb is added, a perfective inter-
pretation easily obtains in (30a) with the simple form, but is infelicitous with would. (30b) is
only good under the unlikely situation where the subject's referent has a habit of working in
the garden for three years, and this habit stretches throughout the 80s and beyond. In other
words, when would is used, a durational adverb cannot measure the length of a habit ex -
pressed with would.
(30) a. In the 80's, I worked in the garden for three years.
b. #In the 80's, he would work in the garden for three years.
To summarize, we have seen that the two verbal forms exhibit correlated properties. @e
simple form, which does not require an overt quantiLcational expression to yield a habitual
reading, triggers a 'wide scope only' reading for a singular indeLnite and is Rexible with re-
spect to view point aspect in bare sentences. Would, on the other hand, obligatorily appears
in sentences featuring overt quantiLcation; the indeLnite singular may have either wide or
narrow scope and these sentences are only interpreted imperfectively. We take this to follow
from a distinction between Hab and Gen. Hab underlies the simple form in bare quantiLer-
less sentences, whereas would appears when there is a covert Gen operator. Contrary to Gen,
Hab does not have to have an obligatorily overt restrictor. @e wide scope of the indeLnite
comes from the existential quantiLcation over the sum of events. @is leads to a situation in
which the direct object is not multiplied over the events instantiating the habit; in other
words, it escapes the scope of the habitual operator (cf. Kratzer 2008). @is property renders
Hab distinct from Gen, which is quasi-universal. @e syntactic positioning of Hab below
7 Note that we are considering the aspectual properties of the overall habit, not the aspectual properties of
its instantiating episodes.
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AspP enables it to freely interact with viewpoint aspect. Gen, in contrast, is available higher
up in the clausal architecture, and selects for an imperfective aspect.
Having focused now on habituals in bare characterizing sentences and shown how they
pa5ern diCerently from generics in quantiLcational characterizing sentences, we return to
dispositional statements, and show that they too are distinct from generics but are quite sim-
ilar to habituals.
5 Common properties of habituals and dispositionals in bare characterizing 
sentences
To recall, the semantics of bare habituals is built on the notion of disposition that is constant
in all accessible worlds of the modal base. Under the deLnition of Hab, the issue of instantia-
tion in the actual world depends on the INIT meaning component and the particular conver-
sational background. As stated above in section 3, the manifestation of the disposition to
carry on a habit has to occur in the actual world. @e habit itself, which is based on summa -
tion of events that occur in all accessible worlds may exclude the actual world. @is way we
may have habits that are only instantiated once in the actual world – if the Lrst occurrence is
of the same type of the event itself, like smoke, discussed in (22a), (23a). In order to illustrate
this further, consider a context where Ruti recently started a new job, and she decided to go
to work by bus. She only went there once, and shortly aVer that she died. In a eulogy, one
could truthfully say:
(31) Ruti was such a modest person. She went to work by bus.
@e example certainly cannot be interpreted episodically, although only one event occurred
in the actual world. @e example expresses that Ruti was disposed to go to work by bus –
this was a decision she made. @is would have turned into Ruti's habit, had she not died in
the actual world.
In comparison, with respect to examples such as (22d) (is machine crushes oranges), the
event that counts for INIT are particular telic qualia, and summation of events occurs in all
the accessible worlds, even if the actual world is not included in the set of accessible worlds.
In other words, if the event relevant for indicating a disposition that counts for INIT is of
the same kind as P, there will always be an instantiation in the actual world. If, on the other
hand, what counts for INIT is the signing of a contract, the telic qualia of an object, or some
relevant commitment, no instantiations in the actual world have to take place, but summa-
tion over events does occur in all accessible worlds. In this way, cases like (22a-b) can be
treated on a par with cases like (22c-d).
Finally, aspectual properties of habituals and dispositionals also indicate that they pat -
tern alike, contrary to generics, which were shown to be always imperfective (see also Lenci
& Bertine5o 2001). Habituals and dispositionals can be expressed with perfective, imperfec-
tive and progressive aspect.
Although not discussed much in the literature, the progressive need not be episodic (cf.
Rothstein and Landman 2014). (32a) seems to express a short termed habit, compared to the
habit described in (32b).
(32) a. @ey are issuing visas at the consulate.
b. @ey issue visas at the consulate.
In the following pair, a dispositional reading seems more salient (see discussion of exam-
ple (6) in section 2).
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(33) a. @ey are issuing any type of visa at this consulate these days. 
b. @ey issue any type of visa at this consulate.
So bare characterizing sentences in the progressive give rise to both habitual and disposi -
tional readings.
Next, consider the following examples from French, a language that morphologically dis-
tinguishes between perfective and imperfective. @e following examples illustrate perfective
or perfect habituals, similar to the English examples in (29a) and (30a):
(34) a. Marie a gardé un enfant (pendant deux ans).
‘Mary looked.PFV aVer a child (for two years).’ 
b. Marie a dirigé une entreprise (pendant cinq ans).
‘Mary ran.PVF a company (for Lve years).’                    (Vogeleer 2012, ex. 12)
Here, the habit of babysi5ing a child (a wide scope indeLnite) is bounded in time (34a), and
so is Marie's running a company (34b). In French, the perfective passé composé form may also
feature in sentences giving rise to a clear dispositional reading:
(35) La carte a permis pendant dix minutes seulement d’entrer dans la bibliothèque. 
‘@e card permi5ed.PFV for ten minutes only to enter the library.’ 
Mais stupidement je n’en ai pas proLté.
‘But stupidly, I didn’t enjoy the opportunity.’
(36) Notre nouveau robot a même pu repasser les chemises à un stade bien précis de son      
développement.
‘Our new robot could.PFV even iron shirts at a particular stage of its development.’ 
Mais on a supprimé ce5e fonction (qui n’a jamais été testée) pour des raisons de 
rentabilité.
‘But we suppressed this function (which was never tested) for rentability reasons.’
(Mari & Martin 2007, ex. 6-7)
In (35)-(36), an overt modal word  (a permis ‘permi5ed’; a pu ‘could’)  is available but no con-
crete event takes place in the actual world; what seems to be bounded in time is the temporal
extent of the disposition of the card in (35) and the robot in (36). @ese examples are assimi -
lated to those in (22c-d), where what falls under the scope of the perfective viewpoint aspect
is the event indicating a disposition, without there being event iteration in the actual world,
only in the other accessible worlds.
To sum up, the fact that habitual and dispositional readings are available under both per-
fective and imperfective viewpoint aspect, as well as the progressive in English, provides
some further indication for analyzing the covert modal giving rise to both reading as belong-
ing at the VP-level.
6 Conclusion
@e outcome of the current discussion is that there seem to be no sound linguistic criteria to
set apart dispositional readings from habitual readings in bare generic sentences, which pat-
tern diCerently from quantiLed characterizing sentences. I have suggested that the semantics
of Hab as deLned by Boneh & Doron (2010, 2013) can be extended to cover the dispositional
reading. @is has been done in a somewhat indirect way: Lrst by suggesting that habitual and
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dispositional statements do not feature covert operators with distinct quantiLcational force,
then by suggesting that the readings are not a case of ambiguity, and Lnally by indicating
that, unlike generics, they interact in a similar manner with viewpoint aspect, suggesting
that they are both due to a VP-level covert operator.
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What does ‘be capable’ tell us about
capacities? An answer from Romance
Elena Castroviejo
Isabel Oltra-Massuet
This paper investigates the semantics of the Spanish expression ser ca-
paz ‘be capable’ [SC henceforth]. On the one hand, it re￿ects on how
languages encode capacity ascriptions. In particular, a comparison is
drawn between SC and have the capacity. On the other hand, it delves
into the meanings denoted by SC as a modal. Building on previous
work (Castroviejo and Oltra-Massuet 2015, In press), we show that SC
has both an abilitative and an epistemic-like interpretation, which we
discuss and qualify, and characterize SC’s additional ‘unusual’ infer-
ence as a willful component.
Keywords: capacities, abilities, capable, modality
1 Introduction
In the context of discussing what dispositions are and how they should be characterized, one
goal of this paper is to re￿ect on the notion of capacity, and, more speci￿cally, to ￿nd out what be
capable — a modal that seems to rely on capacities — can tell us about this kind of disposition.
To this e￿ect, we draw a comparison between English be capable and have the capacity, and
between be capable and be able. However, our focus is on Spanish ser capaz ‘be capable’ [SC
henceforth], as illustrated in (1).
(1) Hobbes
Hobbes
fue
was.PERF
capaz
capable
de
of
traducir
translate
la
the
obra
work
completa
complete
de
of
Homero
Homer
a
to
los
the
86
86
años.
years
‘Hobbes was capable of translating the complete works of Homer at 86.’
From Castroviejo and Oltra-Massuet (2015:60)
Our second goal is to delve into the semantics of SC. In particular, we will provide evidence
that SC has both properties of abilitative modals like (1) and epistemic modals exempli￿ed in
(2), and will lay out the ￿rst steps of an analysis that can account for these di￿erent readings.
As with other ‘ambiguous’ modals, such as Englishmust, we will assume that the two readings
derive from a di￿erence in syntactic position and in the content of the modal base.
(2) Mi
my
hijo
son
es
is
capaz
capable
de
of
haber
have
resuelto
resolved
el
the
caso
case
sin
without
acudir
turn-to
a
to
la
the
policía.
police
‘My son is capable of having solved the case without going to the police.’
From Castroviejo and Oltra-Massuet (2015:60)
Finally, we further comment on an additional meaning component of SC constructions, namely
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an ‘unusual reading’ (Castroviejo and Oltra-Massuet 2015), which treats the prejacent of the
modal as something extraordinary, daring or remarkable. Thus, in both (1) and (2), translating
Homer’s works at 86 and solving the case without going to the police are quite an achievement.
1.1 On dispositions, abilities and capacities
In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry on abilities, Maier (2010) provides some charac-
teristics of dispositions. We are interested in identifying the relationship that exists between
abilities and dispositions.
Dispositions are said to be properties picked out by predicates like ‘is fragile’, ‘is soluble’,
which are paraphrased as ‘x is disposed to break when struck’ or ‘x is disposed to dissolve when
placed in water.’ In this sense, dispositions are inherently modal, since they refer to result states
that need not be the case in the actual world; they only hold when ‘the right conditions’ apply.
Likewise, abilities can exist even when not manifested. However, it does not necessarily hold
that the property is manifested once the right conditions are met.
In the philosophical literature, a distinction is sometimes established between dispositions
and powers. The latter have two properties: (1) they are possessed by agents and (ii) are typ-
ically expressed by the modal can. Crucially, abilities are considered to be a particular kind of
power that relates its agent to an action. The subject being an agent, s/he may decide to realize
or not realize the mentioned action, unlike a regular disposition. This makes powers existential
modals, i.e. a power can be realized, but it does not have to (Cohen, this volume). In a nutshell,
abilities are considered to be a type of disposition because the result state need not be man-
ifested, but their subject is an agent that is related to an action. Thus, ‘is soluble’ cannot be
considered an ability because the subject of the predicate is not an agent, and the result of the
predicate in the right conditions is a state rather than an action. On the other hand, an indi-
vidual can have the ability to jump a fence. She may end up not jumping that fence – so the
action is not necessarily manifested – but the subject needs to be an agent, who is related to
this particular action.
Are abilities and capacities the same? Cartwright (1989) explores the status of capacities
(or rather ‘attributions of capacities’) in connection to causality. One such attribution would
be an expression such as Aspirins relieve headaches. She assumes that capacities do not need to
have sentient subjects (individuals who have a will and understanding). And yet, even if the
right conditions are met, aspirins do not always relieve one’s headache. Their force is hence ex-
istential. Drawing on these thoughts and building on Maier’s (2010), among others, Cohen (this
volume) proposes that there is something else called ‘capabilities’, which includes properties of
both abilities and capacities, namely being active dispositions, relating an agent to an action,
and having existential modal force.1
In this paper, we concentrate on the linguistic expression of capacities — or rather capabil-
ities, a notion that does not have an obvious translation in Spanish — by focusing on apparently
analogous expressions such as be able, be capable, have the ability, have the capacity, and their
Spanish counterparts.
1We refer the interested reader to Cohen (this volume) for the full-￿edged idea behind the ‘square of disposition’.
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1.2 Starting point
It has been noted in the linguistic literature (Thalberg 1972, Piñón 2003, Mari and Martin 2007,
2009) that (3a) and (3b) are not equivalent.
(3) a. Brown was able to hit three bull’s-eyes in a row.
b. Brown had the ability to hit three bull’s-eyes in a row.
Speci￿cally, (3a) could be uttered to express an action that was achieved by accident. In con-
trast, (3b) conveys that hitting three bull’s-eyes in a row is an action that Brown can carry out
whenever he wants to. It is temporally persistent and repeatable.
At ￿rst sight, this extends to SC, but some non-trivial issues arise. If we say (4), it seems
that there is a straightforward parallel with (3a) in that they both involve results that could be
accidentally achieved.
(4) Brown fue capaz de dar en la diana tres veces seguidas.
‘Brown was capable of hitting three bull’s-eyes in a row.’
Now, if we carry out the same task for (3b), we realize that the linguistic expression have the
capacity to hit three bull’s-eyes in a row seems infelicitous. Intuitively, hitting three bull’s-eyes
in a row may be considered an ability, but probably not a capacity.
It is the purpose of next section to identify further di￿erences between have the capacity
and SC. To do so, we delve into how capacities (or rather, capacidades) are linguistically encoded
in Spanish.
1.3 Main claims
Ourmain claims are summarized as follows: ￿rst, SC and have the capacity are di￿erent in many
respects, even beyond the observation that we have exempli￿edwith be able. However, we show
that SC does rely on some of the subject’s capacities, namely non-standard or ‘specialized’ ones.
In particular ‘x is capable of VP’ in Spanish can be paraphrased as ‘x can VP’ if x resorts to such
specialized capacities. From this, a number of inferences are generated. To begin with, the pre-
jacent must denote an action that requires resorting to non-regular capacities. This yields either
an e￿ort or a daring component. Additionally, it yields a so-called willful reading, whereby it
solely depends on the subject’s will to carry out the action denoted by the prejacent. We ￿nally
claim that SC is an unstable modal, which is in the process of also acquiring epistemic values.
2 The linguistic encoding of capacities
In this section we sketch an overview of how capacities, broadly understood, are expressed
in Spanish. Though not exhaustive, this list attempts to show that languages overtly convey
distinctions that may turn to be relevant for our theory of capacity and ability.
Let us start with intrinsic capacities. By these, we mean those skills that are inalienable
properties of a particular species. For instance, ￿ying or breathing under water. To express such
capacities, Spanish can use poder ‘can’ or tener la capacidad ‘have the capacity’ of ￿ying or
breathing under water, (5a). Note that (5b), with SC, is infelicitous.
(5) a. El águila real {puede / tiene la capacidad de} volar.
‘The royal eagle can / has the capacity to ￿y.’
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b. #El
the
águila
eagle
real
royal
es
is
capaz
capable
de
of
volar.
￿y
Now, we can think of externally assigned or alienable capacities. This meaning is probably not
included in the denotation of English capacity, but it is de￿nitely there in Spanish capacidad.
This covers actions such as calling an election, christening a boat, marrying a couple or putting
someone in jail. These can be expressed with poder ‘can’, tener la capacidad ‘have the capacity’
and also estar capacitado ‘be quali￿ed’ to call an election, christen a boat, etc., (6a). Again, notice
that SC is infelicitous in this context, (6b).
(6) a. El alcalde {puede / tiene la capacidad de / está capacitado para} casar a una pareja.
‘The mayor {can / has the capacity to / is quali￿ed to} marry a couple.’
b. #El
the
alcalde
mayor
es
is
capaz
capable
de
of
casar
marry
a
to
una
a
pareja.
couple
Third, there are skills that require learning or training, such as cycling, speaking languages, or
solving crosswords. Spanish uses the verb saber ‘know (how)’, (7a). Here, note that neither SC
nor poder ‘can’ can felicitously express these properties, (7b). In fact, they are acceptable but
not equivalent to (7a). We will come back to what these mean in subsequent sections.
(7) a. María sabe ir en bici.
‘Mary {knows how to / can} ride a bike.’
b. María {puede / es capaz de} ir en bici. (not equivalent to (7a))
‘Mary {can / is capable of} ride/ing a bike.’
Fourth, there are skills that do not require previous learning but which do involve reasoning
(or other cognition-related mechanisms). For instance, identify the leader among the crowd, or
consolidate and unify the monarchy. These are expressed with saber ‘know (how)’, poder ‘can’,
tener la habilidad ‘have the ability’, and also SC, (8).
(8) Manolo {sabe / puede / tiene la habilidad de / es capaz de} identi￿car al líder en lamultitud.
‘Manolo {knows (how to) / can / has the ability to / is capable of} identify/ing the leader
among the crowd.’
Fifth, we encounter remarkable, non-cognitive skills, such as hitting three bull’s eyes in a row
(Thalberg 1972), or making the world record in the 100 meter sprint (Piñón 2003). These are
expressed with poder ‘can’, tener la habilidad ‘have the ability’ or SC, (9).
(9) Pedro {pudo / tuvo la habilidad de / fue capaz de} dar en la diana tres veces seguidas.
‘Peter {could / had the ability to / was able to} hit three bull’s eyes in a row.’
Finally, we consider remarkable actions that are not triggered by skill but by e￿ort, such as
climbing Mt. Everest, or eating four pies in 30 minutes. Spanish uses poder ‘can’ and SC, (10).
(10) Teresa {pudo / fue capaz de} escalar el Everest.
‘Theresa was {could / was capable of} climb/ing Mt. Everest.’
Out of the six di￿erent dispositions that we have identi￿ed, tener la capacidad ‘have the ca-
pacity’ is only acceptable to express the ￿rst two, whereas SC is acceptable in the last four.
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Therefore, they systematically express di￿erent meanings and seem to stand in complementary
distribution.
We can thus conclude that the contrast is not only between be able and have the ability. SC
does not have the same distribution as have the capacity, have the ability or can. Furthermore,
have the capacity and have the ability also exhibit linguistically relevant di￿erences. This does
not rule out that there may be cross-linguistic di￿erences in the encoding of capacities.
Building on this last thought, we now turn to the examination of the di￿erences between
SC and English be able.
3 SC vs. be able
While English has both be capable and be able, Spanish only has SC as the apparent right trans-
lation for both terms. Let us consider the properties they have in common, and especially those
where they di￿er.
Both SC and be able are abilitative modals, even the most prototypical cases thereof. In
addition, they both include an e￿ort component analogous to the one in implicative verbs (e.g.
manage, cf. Karttunen 1971). This is illustrated for Greek borese ‘can’ in (11). As Giannakidou
and Staraki (2013) point out, even in cases which do not a priori require an e￿ort (like ￿xing
the car or escape), the e￿ort component is accommodated.
(11) O
the
Janis
John
borese
can.perf.past.3sg
na
subj.c
sikothi.
stand-up.perf.nonpast.3sg
‘John was able to stand up–it was a di￿cult thing!’
From Giannakidou and Staraki (2013:254)
The same holds for its English translation with be able and with SC (Castroviejo and Oltra-
Massuet In press), as exempli￿ed in (12).
(12) Juan fue capaz de levantarse.
‘Juan was capable of standing up.’
Here, standing up is seen as an action that takes some e￿ort, maybe because e.g. Juan has been
sick recently or he has just received a punch in a ￿ght.
Focusing on be able more speci￿cally, Piñón (2003) argues that this abilitative modal has
both an abililtative and an opportunity reading. This latter interpretation is the one in (13),
which can be paraphrased as had the opportunity (rather than had the ability).
(13) “During the rehearsals, I was able to sit and watch [Rodgers] work every day,” he said.
(WP, 12 Feb. 03, p. B06)
From Piñón (2003:385)
Interestingly, the opportunity reading is absent from SC. (14) is not equivalent to (13).
(14) Durante los ensayos, fui capaz de sentarme y observar a Rodgers trabajar todos los días,
dijo.
‘During the rehearsals, I was capable of sitting and watching Rodgers work every day,
he said.’
There is another respect in which these two modal expressions di￿er, namely the interpretation
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of the simple present. Take Bhatt’s (1999) example in (15). This piece of data is actually presented
as evidence of be able’s e￿ort component.2
(15) a. #Timmy is able to breathe.
b. Timmy had a terrible car accident as a result of which he lost control over most of
his muscles. Thankfully, he is able to breathe.
From Bhatt (1999:11)
Certainly, when breathing is taken as an activity that involves some additional e￿ort, then be
able is acceptable. However, we are interested in the fact that be able can be used in the present
tense in a situation where the actuality of the complement is allowed. That is, in (15b), Timmy
is actually breathing (he is not getting ready to breath when the right conditions are met).
By contrast, if we turn to SC, the outcome is quite di￿erent, (16).
(16) [Manuel tuvo un terrible accidente de coche cuyo resultado fue la pérdida de control de
sus músculos.] #Por suerte, es capaz de respirar.
‘Manuel had a terrible car accident as a result of which he lost control overmost of his
muscles. Thankfully, he is capable of breathing.’
Crucially, even with the contextual enrichment, which makes clear that breathing would take
an extra e￿ort, (16) is not acceptable. Moreover, (16) cannot be interpreted as (15b) in the sense
of is breathing, which is available in can breathe and its Spanish counterpart puede respirar. In
the present tense, SC seems to necessarily refer to a non-manifested property.
Finally, SC and be able di￿er in another striking property. As discussed in Castroviejo and
Oltra-Massuet (2015), SC seems to allow for an epistemic reading (see §4 for a more thorough
elaboration), while this is absent from be able. In otherwords, SC can be usedwith an impersonal
predicate, such as a weather verb, to express the speaker’s conjecture, (17a), but this option is
ruled out for be able, (17b).
(17) a. Es capaz de llover.
‘It’s capable of raining.’
b. *It’s able to rain.
Summing up, the two abilitativemodals SC and be able, though apparently very similar inmean-
ing, show non-trivial di￿erences that a systematic analysis should be able to make explicit. We
can conclude from this that SC and be able do not only di￿er in their distribution but also in
their interpretation, and that abilitative modality is not a uniform phenomenon once we look
at speci￿c expressions.
Before we move on to the analysis, let us brie￿y consider some data to re￿ect on SC’s
epistemic reading.
4 An epistemic SC?
It has been noticed that (at least) certain Romance versions of SC allow for an epistemic reading.
To our knowledge, this was ￿rst pointed out for Portuguese in Oliveira (2000), (18).
2Bhatt has an analysis whereby be able is a fake modal, comparable to manage. See (Bhatt 1999) for the details
and quali￿cations of this claim.
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(18) From Oliveira (2000:3)
a. Ele
he
foi
was
capaz
able
de
of
chegar
arrive
a
to
horas.
hours
‘He was able to arrive on time.’ [Abilitative]
b. Ele
he
é
is
capaz
able
de
of
chegar
arrive
amanhã.
tomorrow
‘He may arrive tomorrow.’ [Epistemic]
The availability of such a reading, paired up with some grammatical di￿erences, was devel-
oped for Spanish in Castroviejo and Oltra-Massuet (2015). (19a) is the abilitative SC and (19b)
corresponds to the epistemic one.
(19) From Castroviejo and Oltra-Massuet (2015:60)
a. Hobbes
Hobbes
fue
was.￿￿￿￿
capaz
capable
de
of
traducir
translate
la
the
obra
work
completa
complete
de
of
Homero
Homer
a
to
los
the
86
86
años.
years
‘Hobbes was capable of translating the complete works of Homer at 86.’
b. Mi
my
hijo
son
es
is
capaz
capable
de
of
haber
have
resuelto
resolved
el
the
caso
case
sin
without
acudir
turn-to
a
to
la
the
policía.
police
‘My son is capable of having solved the case without going to the police.’
A further grammatical development in this direction is found in some varieties of American
Spanish, as attested by e.g. Grández-Ávila (2010), (20) (our glosses). Observe that instead of
capaz de ‘capable of’, here we have capaz que ‘it is capable that.’
(20) a. Todo
all
el
the
mundo
world
lo
it
va
goes
a
to
creer,
believe
y
and
yo
I
mismo,
self
si
if
mañana
tomorrow
lo
it
leo
read
en
in
el
the
diario,
newspaper
es
is
capaz
capable
que
that
lo
it
creo.
believe.I
‘Everybody will believe it, and I myself, if tomorrow I read this in the paper, (it) is
possible/likely that I believe it.’
(Walsh Cuento para tahúres y otros relatos policiales [Argentina 1951-61])
b. Capaz
capable
que
that
hasta
even
resulte
turns-out
un
a
buen
good
senador.
senator
‘Maybe/ Possibly he even turns out to be a good senator.’
(Donoso El obsceno pájaro de la noche [Chile 1970])
Inwhat follows, we ￿rst brie￿y overview some grammatical tests that set apart the two readings,
and then describe the existence of a reading we call willful, which fails to be classi￿ed under
the abilitative or the epistemic rubric.
4.1 Selected diagnostics
In Castroviejo and Oltra-Massuet (2015:62-68) we propose a number of grammatical diagnostics
that tease apart the two readings of SC, namely the abilitative [AB] and the epistemic [EP]. We
present a few of those here and add some new ones.
First, only [AB] is compatible with perfective aspect on SC. That is, if the copula ser ‘be’ is
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in￿ected in the simple past, [AB] necessarily arises, (21).3
(21) a. Hobbes fue capaz de traducir las obras completas de Homero. [AB]
‘Hobbes was-PERF capable of translating Homer’s collected works.’
b. Mi hijo fue capaz de resolver el caso sin acudir a la policía. [AB]
‘My son was-PERF capable of solving the case without going to the police.’
Second, if the embedded verb (i.e. the one selected by SC) is in the perfective or progressive
aspects, then [EP] necessarily arises, (22).
(22) a. Este ￿lósofo es capaz de haber traducido / estar traduciendo las obras completas de
Homero. [EP]
‘This philosopher is capable of having translated / being translating Homer’s col-
lected works.’
b. Mi hijo es capaz de haber resuelto / estar resolviendo el caso sin acudir a la policía.
[EP]
‘My son is capable of having solved / being solving the case without going to the
police.’
Third, when SC is in present tense, only [EP] can license the adverbial cualquier día de estos
‘one of these days’, (23). It is compatible with [AB] if SC is in future tense, (24).
(23) Este ￿lósofo es capaz de traducir las obras completas de Homero cualquier día de estos.
a. It is possible that this philosopher translates Homer’s collected works one of these
days.’ [EP]
b. #This philosopher is capable of translating Homer’s collected works one of these
days.’ [AB]
(24) Este ￿lósofo será capaz de traducir las obras completas de Homero cualquier día de estos.
[AB]
‘This philosopher will be able to translate Homer’s collected works one of these days.’
Fourth, [AB] requires the presence of a sentient subject that can have the ability that is attributed
to him/her. Therefore, if the subject is not an agent, it is because SC has an [EP] reading, (25).
(25) Este libro es capaz de ser un éxito de ventas.
‘This book is capable of being a best-seller.’
a. This book might end up being a best-seller. [EP]
b. #This book has the ability of being a best-seller. [AB]
Fifth, if the interlocutors are experiencing the ongoing event, [EP], which is supposed to express
a conjecture, is infelicitous, but [AB] is acceptable.4 Consider the following scenario:
(26) a. Context: everyone is contemplating Juan bathing in the river.
3Fabienne Martin (p.c.) points out to us the possibility that [EP] arises with the present perfect. Pending further
testing, we do agree that ha sido capaz may be construed epistemically. The same holds with the verb poder ‘can’ in
Spanish, as also observed for French and Italian in Mari and Martin (2007) and subsequent work.
4This test and the next one are based on Hackl’s (1998) analysis of the readings of English can.
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b. Juan es (realmente) capaz de bañarse en el río en invierno. [AB] / #[EP]
‘Juan is (really) capable of bathing in the river in winter.’
By contrast, imagine a scenario where all interlocutors have witnessed the achievement of the
event, as in (27). Here, the embedded verb is in the perfective aspect, so [AB] does not arise.
On the other hand, since [EP], again, is supposed to express a (future-shifted) conjecture, the
sentence cannot have an [EP] reading, either.
(27) a. Context: everyone knows Juan has been bathing in the river.
b. #Juan es capaz de haberse bañado en el río en invierno. *[AB] / #[EP]
‘Juan is capable of having bathed in the river in winter.’
From these data we could con￿rm that we are facing two di￿erent interpretations of a modal
that relate SC to other better known modals (can, must). It also seems that the two readings
have clear structural mappings, as was proposed in Castroviejo and Oltra-Massuet (2015).
Additional evidence comes from the fact that only [EP] allows for degree modi￿cation.
Consider ￿rst the contrast pointed out by Mari (2015), (28).
(28) a. Ha potuto benissimo rovesciare l’acqua dei ￿ori e rovinare così il parquet.
b. Il
he
a
has
très
very
bien
well
pu
can.PERF
renverser
spill
l’eau
the water
des
of the
￿eurs
￿owers
et
and
ainsi
so
abîmer
damage
le
the
parquet.
parquet
‘Hemay verywell have spilled the water of the ￿owers and so damage the parquet.’
From Mari (2015:123)
Here, the verb potere, pouvoir ‘can’ may be modi￿ed by the adverbials benissimo, très bien ‘very
well’ and so we obtain the [EP] reading of can.5
When applied to capaz ‘capable’, since it is an adjective, it could in principle be modi￿ed
by a degree expression such as very.6 Interestingly, though, capaz ‘capable’ only seems to be
gradable in its [EP] reading, (29).7,8
(29) a. El águila es (??muy) capaz de volar bajo el sol sin ser deslumbrada.
‘The eagle is (??very) capable of ￿ying under the sun without being blinded.’
b. Mi hijo es muy capaz de haber resuelto el caso sin acudir a la policía.
‘My son is very capable of having solved the case without going to the police.’
Unless we are making a prediction, modi￿cation by muy ‘very’ is unacceptable in (29a).
An additional strategy we can follow to distinguish the two readings is to make the modal
5The interpretive e￿ect of composing these precise modi￿ers with the modal is left for future research. As
pointed out to us by Fabienne Martin (p.c.), the fact that other degree modi￿ers are not available in this position
may cast doubt on the idea that benissimo and très bien are grading probabilities or strengthening epistemic force.
6Kennedy and McNally (2005) show that English able can be modi￿ed by well but not by very. For an analysis
of how good and well end up having the e￿ect of degree boosters, see Castroviejo and Gehrke (2015).
7We should mention that capaz can in fact be modi￿ed by perfectamente ‘perfectly’ in its [AB] reading. We leave
the analysis of this data point for future research.
8Fabienne Martin (p.c.) observes that the [AB] version of SC could be compatible with más o menos ‘more or
less’. This is indeed the case, which suggests that capaz behaves like an absolute or closed scale adjective in its [AB]
reading. We will elaborate further on this observation in future research.
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base explicit. In particular, we assume the epistemic reading can be introduced by Knowing x
while the abilitative reading can be introduced by In virtue of x’s capacities. Compare (30) with
(31).
(30) a. Conociendo a mi hijo, es capaz de haber resuelto el caso.
‘Knowing my son, he’s capable of having solved the case.’
b. ??En
in
virtud
virtue
de
of
sus
his
capacidades,
capacities
mi
my
hijo
son
es
is
capaz
capable
de
of
haber
have
resuelto
solved
el
the
caso.
case
(31) En virtud de sus capacidades, el águila es capaz de volar bajo el sol sin ser deslum-
brada.
‘In virtue of its capacities, the eagle is capable of ￿ying under the sun without being
blinded.’
The abilitative modal base is not acceptable with SC when it embeds a verb in the perfective
form, (30b), which we have assumed is a diagnostic for [EP]. However, it is ￿ne when the pre-
jacent does not have overt aspectual marking.
A further test concerns the speaker’s degree of commitment, which should be weaker for
epistemic modals (Martin 2011). This is illustrated below with the addition of the phrase Con
toda seguridad ‘most certainly’, which is only felicitous with the abilitative reading in (32a).
(32) a. Con toda seguridad, el águila es capaz de volar bajo el sol sin ser deslumbrada.
‘Most certainly, the eagle is capable of ￿ying under the sun without being blinded.’
b. ??Con
with
toda
all
seguridad,
security
mi
my
hijo
son
es
is
capaz
capable
de
of
haber
have
resuelto
solved
el
the
caso.
case
Building on Brennan (1993), we can also distinguish between the two readings by means of the
(un)availability of the equivalence with the -ble derivation. Take for instance the contrast in
(33).
(33) a. La mesa es capaz de desmontarse en plena función.
‘The table is capable of falling apart in the middle of the play.’
b. . La
the
mesa
table
es
is
desmontable.
disassemble-ble
(33a) has the epistemic reading, because the subject is not an agent. Clearly, the sentence in
(33b), which can only give rise to what Cohen (this volume) would call a passivility interpreta-
tion,9 is not its equivalent.
These and further tests are indicative of the existence of a reading that has evolved from its
original abilitative core, which is in line with diachronic work on semantic change for modals
(c.f. e.g. Traugott 1985, Bybee et al. 1994, Narrog 2012).
4.2 The willful reading
In this section we would like to draw the reader’s attention to an additional feature of willful-
ness that SC can contribute. Consider a sentence like (34), which cannot easily be attributed an
abilitative or an epistemic reading.
9Thanks to Fabienne Martin for pointing this out to us.
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(34) Belén Esteban es capaz de escribir novelas si con eso consigue intervenir en los progra-
mas del corazón.
‘Belén Esteban is capable of writing novels if that allows her to be in romance shows.’
For an optimal interpretation of this sentence, one needs to know that Belén Esteban is a Spanish
TV iconwho started to be one because shewas oncemarried to a bull ￿ghter. She is not precisely
well known for her intellectual skills. Hence, the quirk of the example is that if she realizes that
writing a novel would bring her into the limelight, then she might feel in the mood to embark in
such an enterprise. This type of sentences conveys that the subject can participate in a certain
event if she happens to want or need to achieve a certain goal. Intuitively, the participation in
the event solely depends on a sudden need or wish. That is why we have called this reading a
willful interpretation.10
In cases like this, it seems that we can construct scenarios that are compatible with both,
a capacity and a conjecture reading. (35) provides an abilitative context, (36) describes an epis-
temic one.
(35) A: Para pasar a la siguiente fase del concurso, Belén Esteban debe escribir algo. ¿Crees
que puede cumplir con este objetivo?
‘To move on to the second phase of the contest, Belén Esteban must write some-
thing. Do you think she can accomplish this goal?’
B: Yo creo que es capaz de escribir una novela si así gana el concurso.
‘I believe she’s capable of writing a novel to win the contest.’
(36) A: ¿Qué probabilidades hay de que Belén Esteban algún día se haga escritora?
‘How likely is it that Belén Esteban ends up being a writer?’
B: Yo creo que cualquier día es capaz de escribir una novela si así gana popularidad.
‘I believe she’s capable of writing a novel any day to win popularity.’
A formal analysis of SC needs to address both the set of diagnostics that seem to suggest two
modal ￿avors for SC, and the characterization of this so-called willful reading.
4.3 Interim summary
So far, we have shown that SC is not equivalent to have the capacity, because they do not overlap
in distribution and also because the former has a potential epistemic reading that the latter lacks
altogether. We have further presented empirical evidence that supports our claim that SC can
neither be equated to be able.
Therefore, the questions that the analysis should address are the following:
1. What restricts the appearance of SC, especially, the ill-formedness of the breathing ex-
ample (16)?
2. What is the status of the e￿ort component in (12)?
3. What is the source of the willful reading (cf. §4.2)?
10Another option that we will not explore in this article is to treat unexpectedness – rather than willfulness –
as the primitive or main component of this reading. We leave this option open to further consideration and thank
Fabienne Martin (p.c.) for the remark.
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5 First steps towards an analysis
To address the aforementioned questions, we outline an analysis of the semantics of SC that will
￿rst focus on its comparison with be able and the kind of disposition it denotes (§5.1). In §5.2 we
then attempt to gain a better understanding of the so-called epistemic reading by contributing
further data to the analysis.
5.1 SC in the simple present and the breathing example
In this subsection we discuss the kind of contrast exempli￿ed in (37) and (38) between SC and be
able, in the light of the previous literature on be able and abilitative modals (Bhatt 1999, Piñón
2003, Mari and Martin 2007, 2009).
(37) a. #Timmy is able to breathe.
b. Timmy had a terrible car accident as a result of which he lost control overmost of
his muscles. Thankfully, he is able to breathe.
(38) [Manuel tuvo un terrible accidente de coche cuyo resultado fue la pérdida de control de
sus músculos.] #Por suerte, es capaz de respirar.
‘Manuel had a terrible car accident as a result of which he lost control overmost of his
muscles. Thankfully, he is capable of breathing.’
5.1.1 Previous accounts of ‘be able’ As pointed out in §3, Bhatt (1999) brings up sentences like
(37) to motivate the analogy between be able and manage. He further presents an account of
the di￿erence between ability attributions, (39a), and actuality implications (which have later
been called actuality entailments, AE for short), (39b).
(39) John was able to eat ￿ve apples in an hour.
a. In those days, John was able to eat ￿ve apples in an hour. (past generic)
b. Yesterday, John was able to eat ￿ve apples in an hour. (past episodic)
In brief, he proposes that be able in (39a) is a fake modal with the semantics of the implicative
verb manage, and (39b) is under the scope of an imperfective aspectual operator, which yields
the lack of AE.
Let us now turn to Piñón (2003), who connects the availability of AE with two di￿erent
readings of be able. He identi￿es an ‘ability able’, (40), and an ‘opportunity able’, (41).
(40) a. In her early twenties, Rebecca was able to swim across Lake Balaton.
b. In her early twenties, Rebecca had the ability to swim across Lake Balaton.
(41) a. By detecting subtle variations in the glow’s warmth, scientists were able to dis-
cern the primordial structure of the universe a mere 380,000 years after its birth.
(WP, 12 Feb. 03, p. 01)
b. By detecting subtle variations in the glow’swarmth, scientistshad the opportunity to
discern the primordial structure of the universe a mere 380,000 years after its birth.
These two readings correspond to a di￿erent behavior when it comes to AE, as illustrated in
(42).
(42) a. [(40a)]9 In her early twenties, Rebecca swam across Lake Balaton.
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b. [(41a)] ! Scientists discerned the primordial structure of the universe a mere
380,000 years after its birth.
Abilities are taken to be permanent (enduring, reliable), while opportunities may be transitory
(come and go). The explanation of these facts rests on the scope between tense operators and
the (historical) possibility modal, (43) and (44).
(43) a. ability{ Tense [Modal]
b. opportunity{ Modal [Tense]
(44) a. No AE: at some time in the past it was possible for Rebecca to swim across LB.
b. AE: it is possible for Rebecca to carry the action of swimming across LB at some
point in the past.
This works straightforwardly for the past was able. It predicts that the AE is triggered when the
modal is interpreted above tense. That is, taking (40a) as an example, the inference according to
which Rebecca swam across Lake Balaton arises if we interpret that it is possible for Rebecca to
swim across LB (where past is embedded under the historical possibility modal). The relevant
question refers to the predictions it makes for abilitative modals in the present tense.
The case that most resembles the breathing example is Piñón’s (2003) opportunity able in
the present tense. Take (45), which does not strictly entail that the subject actually sits and
watches Rodgers work every day, (45).
(45) During the rehearsals, I am able to sit and watch Rodgers work every day.
Certainly, (45) does not have an AE, which could be framed under the assumption that we are
facing an abilitative (not opportunity) able, so that tense scopes over the modal. However, notice
that this would not prevent the potential actuality of the complement; there is indeed a reading
(remember the breathing example), where the subject does sit and watch Rodgers work every
day.
Turning now to SC, recall that the breathing example is ruled out in the present tense, (46).
(46) #Manolo
Manolo
es
is
capaz
capable
de
of
respirar.
breathe
Piñón’s (2003) analysis cannot be applied to account for the unacceptability of SC in this sce-
nario. Note that, if it were felicitous, it would not be compatible with a reading in which Manolo
is actually breathing. Hence, the opportunity reading is unavailable for SC, which might imply
that tense always scopes over the modal. However, SC does appear felicitously in other scenar-
ios in the past, where there is an AE, as in (19a),repeated as (47) for convenience.
(47) Hobbes
Hobbes
fue
was.PERF
capaz
capable
de
of
traducir
translate
la
the
obra
work
completa
complete
de
of
Homero
Homer
a
to
los
the
86
86
años.
years
‘Hobbes was capable of translating the complete works of Homer at 86.’
In (47), Hobbes did translate the complete works of Homer, which apparently means that the
opportunity reading arises in the past, but not in the present. There might be a way to extend
Piñón’s analysis to explain the behavior of be able in the present tense with respect to the
actuality of the prejacent. However, it could hardly explain the behavior of SC, unless we are
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ready to admit that be able and SC do not share the same building blocks.
Mari and Martin’s (2007, 2009) work on the interpretation of abilitative modals takes up on
Piñón’s distinction and apply it to French. They propose amodi￿ed ontology and argue against a
structural account of AE exclusively based on the syntactic scope between tense/aspect and the
modal (cf. Hacquard 2006). According to them, abilities (and dispositions) come in two types (see
also Giannakidou and Staraki 2013 for an extension of this approach when applied to Greek):
generic vs. action-dependent.
Building on Kenny (1976), they assume there are Generic abilities (GAs) with the following
properties:
(i) They do not require verifying instances.
(ii) They are ascribed to an agent i i￿ i can repeat the action whenever s/he wants to.
(iii) By default they are unbounded (temporally persistent).
(iv) They trigger a positive explanatory factor: “He was able to do it, so he did it.”
In their account, have the ability and French avoir la capacité denote exclusively GAs, but
be able to and être capable de have a broader extension.
Thus they further propose the existence of action-dependent abilities (ADAs), with the
following properties:
(i) They ontologically depend on the corresponding action.
(ii) A unique and non-repeatable performance su￿ces to imply the corresponding ADA.
(iii) They have the same temporal boundaries as the action on which they depend and are
thus bounded.
(iv) There is no explanatory factor. “He did it, so he was able to do it.”
They conclude that be able to and être capable de can denote both GAs and the correspond-
ing ADA. They further support the idea that there is no need to assume two lexical entries,
but rather an underspeci￿ed semantics. The relevant reading is picked out through contextual
factors like tense, aspect or rhetorical relations.
This theory is aimed to explain cases like (48), where the French modal pouvoir ‘can’ is in
Passé Composé and, yet, no AE obtains.
(48) Notre nouveau robot a même pu repasser les chemises à un stade bien précis de son
développement. OK Mais on a supprimé cette fonction (qui n’a jamais été testée) pour
des raisons de rentabilité.
‘Our new robot could.PERF even iron shirts at a particular stage of its development. But
we suppressed this function (which was never tested) for rentability reasons.’
From Mari and Martin (2009:10)
In (48), the adverbial in italics coerces the default GA, so that it stops being temporally persistent,
but the fact that it is still a GA explains why AE does not obtain, despite the Passé Composé on
the modal.
Going back to SC, let us consider its behavior in the past with respect to AEs.
44 E￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿ O￿￿￿￿￿M￿￿￿￿￿￿
(49) a. María ha sido / fue capaz de escaparse, #pero no se ha escapado.
Mary has been was.PERF capable of escape but NEG self has escaped
‘Mary has been / was capable of escaping, #but she didn’t do it.’
b. Nuestro
our
nuevo
new
robot
robot
ha
has
sido
been
/ fue
was.PERF
capaz
capable
de
of
planchar
iron
las
the
camisas
shirts
en
in
un
a
estadio
phase
preciso
precise
de
of
su
its
desarrollo.
development
OK
OK
Pero
but
hemos
have.we
suprimido
suppressed
esta
this
función
function
. . .
‘Our new robot has been / was capable of ironing the shirts in a precise phase of
its development. OK But we have suppressed this function . . . ’
As in the previous case, this account successfully explains the behavior of SC with perfective
past tenses. However, its predictions for the simple present are unclear. The extension of this
proposal does not seem to provide us with any straightforward explanation for the di￿erence
between be able and SC in terms of the distinction between GAs and ADAs and their interplay
with tense, aspect and rhetorical relations. On the one hand, it looks as if SC should denote a
GA only in the present tense; there is nothing explaining the infelicity of the breathing cases.
On the other hand, it is unclear whether it predicts a compatible actuality of the complement of
be able in the present tense, and whether this would classify these examples as GAs or ADAs.
Summing up, AEs-based analyses work for be able or can in past tenses, but they are not
explicit about their predictions for the present tense. More importantly, they do not seem to
help us understand the behavior of SC.
5.1.2 Proposal Our claims about abilitative SC (SCAB ) can be summarized as follows:
(i) SC expresses that the subject can participate in the event denoted by the prejacent if s/he
resorts to her specialized intrinsic capacities.
(ii) SC in the present tense is incompatible with the (ongoing) actuality of the prejacent. It
just expresses a capacity attribution (Bhatt 1999).
Let us now proceed to further develop and motivate our main claims. First, we take SC to
be an existential modal whose speci￿c lexical information is encoded in its modal base. Our
tentative – though unsurprising – proposal for a sentence such as (50) is in (51).
(50) El águila es capaz de volar bajo el sol.
‘The eagle is capable of ￿ying under the sun.’
(51) [[El águila es capaz de volar bajo el sol]]w,  = 1 i￿ 9w 0 2 MBSCAB (the-eagle)(w)
[￿y-under-sun(the-eagle)(w 0) = 1]
In prose, (50) is true in a world w with respect to abilitative modal base MBSCAB (x )(w) if and
only if there is a world w 0 compatible with the modal base in which the eagle ￿ies under the
sun. As to the modal base for SCAB , we suggest (53), building on Giannakidou’s (2001) ability
modal base for Greek bori and English can in (52). Note that the modal base is relativized to
the subject, so as to restrict the set of worlds to those which are compatible with the subject’s
specialized intrinsic capacities.
(52) K-ability (x )(w) = {w 0 : 8p[x is capable of p (w ) ! p (w 0)]}
(53) MBSCAB (x )(w) = {w 0 : 8p[x has the specialized intrinsic capacity to p (w ) ! p (w 0)]}
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As in Kratzer (1981:et seq.) and Brennan (1993), MB is intersected with a stereotypical Ordering
Source, which ensures that the worlds in MB are maximally similar to the evaluation world,
and hence also include circumstantial information surrounding the subject and the action s/he
is taking part in.
Althoughwewill remain informal about it here,11 let us elaborate on the concept of ‘special-
ized intrinsic capacities’, on the basis of some relevant examples. Consider Thomason’s (2005)
comment on his example (54).
(54) I can’t write a check.
The reasons why the speaker cannot write a check may be e.g. his balance is negative or he
cannot ￿nd his checkbook. A similar case can be made for be able, (55).
(55) That didn’t do any good and now they have probably ￿agged me and I won’t be able to
write a check anywhere.
http://www.consumera￿airs.com/debt/telecheck.html
By contrast, a sentence like (56), with SC, is infelicitous in most scenarios. The motivations that
license can and be able in (54) and (55) are not adequate in this context.
(56) No soy capaz de extender un cheque.
‘I’m not capable of writing a check.’
Also, the reasons for not having climbed Mt. Everest, (57), cannot be that the climbing material
got stolen or the bad weather. It has to be the subject’s strength, self con￿dence, courage, or
alike.
(57) No he sido capaz de escalar el Everest.
‘I haven’t been capable of climbing Mt. Everest.’
This suggests that a MB that contains worlds (or situations) that are related to the subject of the
main verb is too wide, i.e. it is not a plain circumstantial modal. Rather, since SC has no access
to an opportunity reading, it must invoke an MB whose worlds/situations are compatible with
the subject’s capacities. Interestingly, though, just picking out capacities in the broad sense may
not be enough, either. Recall from §2 that tener la capacidad ‘have the capacity’ covers a wider
range of capacities than SC, so (58a) . (58b).12
(58) a. El presidente tiene la capacidad de convocar elecciones.
‘The president has the capacity to call an election.’
b. El presidente es capaz de convocar elecciones.
‘The president is capable of calling an election.’
11A possible way to model it would be to adopt the idea of widening of alternatives in the sense of Kadmon
and Landman (1993) and applied to negative polarity, according to which the set of usual alternatives is expanded
to include non-standard ones. This has also been used to account for the semantics of exclamatives in Zanuttini
and Portner (2003). Importantly, having a specialized capacity entails having all the regular, standard ones, but the
inverse does not hold.
12Notice that (58b) is not ungrammatical. It is in fact acceptable under a willful reading. That is, it expresses that
the president is so unpredictable that s/he can call an election, say, to ful￿ll some sudden wish.
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So, it seems that we should appeal to intrinsic capacities to avoid deriving the equivalence
between (58a) and (58b). We want to show, though, that this also falls short. Let us go back to
an example like (56) or its interrogative counterpart in (59).
(59) ¿Has sido capaz de extender el cheque?
‘Have you been capable of writing the check?’
Writing a check also involves intrinsic capacities, like moving arms and ￿ngers, wanting to
carry out this action, a relative degree of intelligence to ￿ll it in properly, etc. And yet, the two
sentences are only felicitous in very speci￿c contexts. We claim that they are only acceptable
if we assume that writing a check involves resorting to intrinsic capacities that go beyond the
standard capacities any regular human being – or the same human being at di￿erent stages
– would resort to in order to perform such an action. This is what we call specialized capac-
ities. These are the ones you resort to in order to face unusual situations or to participate in
non-standard events. So, we assume the existence of a varied set of standard capacities to be
determined contextually (probably relying on a comparison class of individuals or stages of the
same individual), and then another set of intrinsic capacities that one puts into play in special
situations.13 Note that the addressee of (59) could in fact complain that the speaker is casting
doubts on his set of standard capacities, since she is suggesting that he needs to resort to his
specialized skills to carry out the action of writing a check.
From here, it is easy to derive the e￿ort implication that is found in SC. Certainly, special-
ized capacities are put into play when the event is challenging. This usually — but not necessar-
ily — triggers e￿ort. Additionally, facing the participation in a somewhat challenging event will
usually involve having a good reason to do so; hence, the frequent co-occurrence of SC with
purpose clauses. Recall (34), repeated in (60) for convenience. The boldfaced sentence describes
a purpose for engaging in writing novels.
(60) Belén Esteban es capaz de escribir novelas . . .
si con eso consigue intervenir en los programas del corazón.
‘Belén Esteban is capable of writing novels if that allows her to be in romance shows.’
Likewise, SC sentences are most productive in contexts where a speci￿c need or wish is spelled
out or activated in the Common Ground. Establishing a goal to be achieved accommodates the
consideration of appealing to those specialized inner capacities.
Now, how do we derive the di￿erences between SC and be able that we have pointed out
in §3? For one, the MB for be able is not as constrained as the one for SC. Moreover, a thor-
ough analysis of be able and can should explain how an ability attribution is compatible with
its ongoing actualization. Nothing in the standard analysis of abilitative modals as existential
quanti￿ers derives this output. This topic deserves further attention, but this is not a problem
for SCAB , which, in terms of AEs, we consider a well-behaved abilitative modal.
13We thank Fabienne Martin (p.c.) for pointing out to us that capacities can be specialized in two di￿erent ways,
depending onwhether they build on a comparison class which includes di￿erent individuals or di￿erent stages of the
same individual. The latter would be necessary to account for cases in which e.g. the subject su￿ers from Parkinson
and he manages to carry out an action that would not be a challenge for a healthy subject. In such cases, SC would
be licensed.
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5.2 Qualifying the epistemic reading
Now, we have shown that SC covers a wider range of meanings than be able. We have even
presented extensive data that suggest that SC has an epistemic interpretation, along with its
abilitative meaning. In Castroviejo and Oltra-Massuet (2015), we contributed a list of empirical
diagnostics to tease apart two readings of SC and adopted a structural model along the lines
of Hacquard (2006), but this is not unproblematic. It has been shown that such a model is not
able to account for some of the Romance data (Mari and Martin 2007, 2009, Martin 2011). In this
subsection we aim to provide counter-evidence to qualify the modal ambiguity of SC that would
pair it with can or must. In particular, we will show that SCEP is not a full-￿edged epistemic
modal, and will sketch an interpretation for it.
Let us start with a note on the interpretation of tense and aspect in root and epistemic
modals, and the fact pointed out in §4.1 that the presence of perfective aspect in the embedded
verb yields an epistemic reading. Stowell (2004) suggests that for abilitative modals can and
could, a simultaneity reading between modal time and eventuality time is natural (in contrast
to the rest of root modals, which favor a forward-shifted reading). Importantly, in SCAB , the
main tense of the sentence (i.e. the copula) provides the evaluation time, which can be PAST,
PRES, FUT. Now, if the main tense of the sentence is PRES but the eventuality time is PAST
(MOD-HAVE) or FUT (through an adverbial modi￿er such as cualquier día ‘any day’), then a
division betweenmodality time and eventuality time arises. In such cases of lack of simultaneity,
the evaluation time remains the utterance time, which yields an epistemic-like interpretation.
This being true, there are reasons to believe that SCEP is not a regular epistemic modal.
For one, it only arises under a willful reading. This is not the case for Portuguese and Latin
American Spanish in the case of capaz que ‘capable that’, but it is the case in Catalan.
Let us ￿rst consider weather predicates. Take (61) as a starting point.
(61) Es capaz de llover.
‘It’s capable of raining.’
The sentence is certainly acceptable, but it does attribute an intention to the rain (or rather
destiny or any force determining the course of events),14 as though it were a sentient subject
that had the willful purpose to spoil our day. In fact, if we turn to other impersonal predicates
such as existentials, they are not acceptable with SC, (62a), while an ambiguous modal such as
puede ‘can’ is okay, (62b).
(62) a. ??Es
is
capaz
capable
de
of
haber
have
un
a
tesoro
treasure
en
in
la
the
isla.
island
intended: ‘There may be a treasure in the island.’
b. Puede
may
haber
have
un
a
tesoro
treasure
en
in
la
the
isla.
island
‘There may be a treasure in the island.’
Something along the same lines applies to stative complements. The literature on modals (e.g.
Zagona 1990, Condoravdi 2002) has shown that abilitative modals are incompatible with preja-
cents that denote states. SC can indeed have a stative complement, as shown in (63).
14We thank Fabienne Martin for this remark.
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(63) Pedro es capaz de estar enfermo.
‘Pedro is capable of being sick.’
However, it is also true that it is interpreted in such a way that the speaker is blaming Pedro for
the possibility of being sick, as if he did it on purpose. In a sense, it is not clear that the situation
is “beyond the control of the subject referent” (Boogaart 2007:48).
Finally, notice that the indiscriminate / indi￿erence reading of the adverbialmodi￿er cualquier
día de estos ‘any day’, which contains a Free Choice Item (e.g. Quer 1998, Giannakidou 2001),
matches the willful interpretation of SC, (64).
(64) Cualquier día, Paula es capaz de matar a su suegra.
‘Any day Paula is capable of killing her mother-in-law.’
Paula is thus characterized as an individual who could kill her mother-in-law if she happens to
have a good reason for it, but we cannot predict exactly when this will happen.
For this speci￿c reading, it seems that the skills and capacities we are resorting to are
even less standard and ordinary than the regular SCAB . In fact, they are typically construed as
unusual in the sense of peculiar. Hence, they license unusual and non-standard purposes and
motivations, rather than an e￿ort inference. This willful reading may have evolved from an
ironic use of SCAB . It has a root behavior, but it is also licensing epistemic-like interpretation.
Our claim is that SC is an unstable modal in the process of semantic change. The epistemic-
like reading derives from awell-documented andwidely attested development from rootmodals
to epistemic ones (e.g. Traugott 1985, Bybee et al. 1994, Narrog 2012). Unlike regular epistemics,
here the MB is relativized both to the speech act subject (the speaker) and the event subject.
Hence, in examples such as (2), repeated in (65) below for convenience, the MB could be spelled
out as “Given what I know about (the unusual skills of) my son.”
(65) Mi hijo es capaz de haber resuelto el caso sin acudir a la policía.
‘My son is capable of having solved the case without going to the police.’
Therefore, we expect SC to license epistemic-like readings if there is a mismatch betweenmodal
and eventuality time. In such cases, a conjecture can be made on the basis of the unusual ca-
pacities of the event subject, which play an important role in the actualization of the prejacent.
Hence, a sentence like (66a) is not equivalent to (66b).
(66) a. Juan puede haber ganado la lotería.
‘John might have won the lottery.’
b. Juan es capaz de haber ganado la lotería.
‘John is capable of having won the lottery.’
While in (66a) the speaker collects evidence of all types (John’s desk is empty, the newspaper
says there is a winner in town, his wife has been driving a new Porsche, . . . ), in (66b) our
conjecture is based on the fact that he has such unusual skills (maybe he’s so annoyingly lucky)
that he could even have won the lottery.
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6 Wrap-up and prospects
6.1 Summary
In this paper we have argued that SC and have the capacity are di￿erent. Not only because the
former can denote an action-dependent ability (or rather capacity). Unlike have the capacity
SC is restricted to a modal base that picks out unusual skills (what we have tentatively called
specialized intrinsic capacities), and it can derive an epistemic-like reading.
SC also di￿ers in many respects from be able to, especially in the fact that SC, but not be
able, is incompatible with the ongoing actuality of the prejacent. We can conclude from this
study that abilitative modality does not exhibit a uni￿ed behavior. Abilitative modals deserve a
thorough comparative analysis.
6.2 One last (and interesting) open issue
We conclude with an interesting open issue regarding capaz ‘capable.’ Throughout this paper,
we have mostly treated SC as a modal expression rather than as an adjectival predicate of a
copular construction. But capaz can also occur without the copula. Interestingly, in such cases,
the restrictions of occurrence are not the same. Compare (67a) and (67b).
(67) a. Ayer
yesterday
me
me
compré
bought.I
una
a
lámpara
lamp
capaz
capable
de
of
iluminar
light up
mi
my
cuarto
bedroom
de
of
10m2.
10m2
‘Yesterday, I got myself a lamp capable of lighting up my 10m2 bedroom.’
b. #La
the
lámpara
lamp
es
is
capaz
capable
de
of
iluminar
light up
mi
my
cuarto
bedroom
de
of
10m2.
10m2
Observe that the subject need not be a sentient individual if capaz is not preceded by the copula.
Additionally, the prejacent need not refer to an extraordinary state of a￿airs. An explanation
for this puzzling contrast is yet to be provided.
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The Square of Disposition
Ariel Cohen
I propose a classification of dispositions according to two parameters:
(i) whether their argument is a causer, and (ii) whether they are al-
ways realized or only sometimes realized. This results in a four way
distinction, which I represent as the Square of Disposition. Each cell of
this square corresponds to a different type of disposition; I show that
each such type is expressed by a distinct linguistic expression. This
correspondence between philosophy-based and linguistics-based dis-
tinctions shows the potential usefulness of linguistic considerations in
philosophical debates.
Keywords: classification of dispositions, capability, can passivility, -
able adjectives, active disposition, -er nominals, passive disposition,
middles
1 Introduction and Overview
Not all dispositions are the same. Philosophers have considered the nature of dispositions, and
introduced many classification of dispositions, based on a variety of dimensions. In this paper, I
focus on two dimensions:
1. Whether the bearer of the disposition is an agent/causer or not
2. The modal force of the disposition: universal or existential
Using two dimensions naturally creates a four way distinction: universal dispositions whose
bearer is an agent/causer, existential dispositions whose bearer is an agent/causer, universal dis-
positions whose bearer is not an agent/causer, and existential dispositions whose bearer is not an
agent/causer. I will call this classification The Square of Disposition.
In this paper, I argue that the Square is expressed linguistically. Specifically, each of the four
classes of disposition expressed by the Square corresponds to a linguistic construction.
2 The nature of dispositions
2.1 Dispositions and modality
My starting point is the rather standard assumption that dispositions are modal. In fact, this
view is so common, that it is hard to find an explicit statement of it, and in most sources it is
simply presupposed. For example, Vetter (2014) writes: “In the contemporary literature on the
subject, it is almost unanimously assumed that the modal nature of dispositions is best captured
by some kind of conditional” (p. 129). Note that what is almost unanimously assumed is not the
modal nature of dispositions, but a particular analysis of it. The modal nature is presupposed,
i.e. it is presumably accepted even by those individuals (such as Vetter herself) who dispute the
conditional analysis.
It therefore follows that dispositions can only be expressed linguistically by modal expres-
sions. In particular, modal expressions are intensional—they are parametric on possible worlds:
being parametric on possible worlds is a necessary (though arguably not sufficient) condition for
being modal.
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For example, the expressions The President of the US and Barack Obama have the same
extension. However, they have different intensions, as in different possible worlds, the US might
have a different president. Modal expressions are sensitive to this distinction: when we substitute
one of these expressions for another in a modal statmeent, the corresponding truth values might
differ. For example, while the American Constitution makes (1a) true, (1b) is false; and while(2a)
is true, (2b) is false.
(1) a. The American President was necessarily born in the US.
b. Barack Obama was necessarily born in the US.
(2) a. The American President may be a woman.
b. Barack Obama may be a woman.
It therefore follows that any non-modal expression, however “dispositional” it feels like,
cannot express a disposition. This criterion will become very important as we consider the appli-
cability of various expressions as descriptions of dispositions.
2.2 Active and passive dispositions
As we consider the nature of dispositions, it behooves us to begin at the beginning. And, just like
many other philosophical investigations, the study of dispositions begins with Aristotle.
Aristotle has established what is perhaps the most interesting property of dispositions: that
they do not have to be realized. To take the classic example, if this piece of glass is fragile, it
means that it is disposed to break if struck. But if it isn’t struck, it probably won’t break; and yet,
even if it is never struck and never breaks, it is still fragile.1
Since Aristotle allows for unrealized disposition, he is faced with the task of explaining
when a disposition is realized. His answer is that this happens when the right conditions obtain.
Specifically: “When the agent and the patient meet in the way appropriate to the disposition in
question, the one must act and the other be acted on” (Metaphysics IX 5)
Aristotle’s statement is usually interpreted to imply two types of disposition, active and
passive. And then, dispositions are realized when the bearer of the active disposition and the
bearer of the complementary passive disposition meet in an “appropriate” way.
For example, glass has a passive disposition to break if struck, and a hammer has an active
disposition to break the glass if it strikes it. If the two meet in an appropriate way—the hammer
strikes the glass—the glass breaks. Note that for Aristotle, the realization conditions are fully de-
fined for each disposition: he makes no use of ceteris paribus clauses. Therefore, if the conditions
are satisfied, the disposition must be realized.
2.3 Capablities and passivilities
Can we have a type of disposition that doesn’t have to be realized, even if the conditions for it
obtain? Thomas Reid (1788) argues that the answer is yes, and calls such dispositions powers.
For Reid, an agent has the power to perform an action only if the agent has the power to
choose to perform the action. It follows that the agent who has the power to perform an action
also has the power not to perform the action. Hence, a power doesn’t have to be realized, but
rather can be realized.
1It is well known that there are exceptions to this property of dispositions—they will be discussed in section 5.
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There is another conclusion that follows from Reid’s conception: the agent that has a power
must be sentient, with a will and understanding. Reid’s argument is as follows. An agent has a
power only if she has the power to exert it; an agent has the power to exert only if she has a will;
an agent has a will only if she has an understanding; therefore, an agent has a power only if she
has a will and an understanding.
Reid’s powers must involve a sentient agent. However, is it not clear that all dispositions that
don’t have to be realized must satisfy this restriction. Indeed, Cartwright (1989) proposes such
dispositions, which she calls capacities.
For example, aspirin has the capacity to relieve headaches, but this capacity is not always
realized. Cartwright writes:
“Aspirins relieve headaches”. This does not say that aspirins always relieve headaches,
or always do so if the rest of the world is arranged in a particularly felicitous way, or
that they relieve headaches most of the time, or more often than not. Rather it says
that. . . on occasion some of them do (p. 3).
Since dispositions are modal, it follows from what Cartwright’s characterization that capacities
express possibility rather than necessity: their modal force is existential, not universal.
Clearly, an aspirin is not a sentient agent, so capacities do not require a sentient agent. How-
ever, we can note that, nonetheless, the aspirin’s role is not passive—we can say that it has the
role of a causer. We can therefore conclude that capacities are active dispositions.
Often, a subtype of power is singled out—the powers that relate an agent to an action. Such
powers are usually called abilities (Maier 2014).
We can apply the same distinction with respect to capacities, namely identify the subtype of
capacity that relate a causer to an action. Let us call such dispositions capabilities. Capabilities,
then, are active dispositions with an existential modal force.
Are there also passive dispositions with an existential modal force? It would mean that x has
a disposition to sometimes have a certain property if something acts on x in the appropriate way.
For example, to say that someone is irritable means they have the disposition to get angry when
provoked, but it doesn’t mean they always have to get angry if provoked. Let us coin a new term
for such dispositions: passivilities
2.4 The square of disposition
According to the distinctions drawn above, dispositions vary along two dimensions:
1. Whether their argument is a causer;
2. Whether they are always (universal) realized or only sometimes (existential)
We can represent this classification in a table, which I will call The Square of Disposition:
+causer -causer
existential capability passivility
universal active disposition passive disposition
3 Linguistic manifestations
The considerations that come into the construction of the Square of Disposition are philosophical;
yet, all these dispositions are expressible in natural language. A natural question, then, arises:
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how are these types of disposition manifested? Is there a correlation between this classification
of dispositions and the classification of linguistic phenomena?
In this paper I argue that, in fact, there is such a correlation: specific types of linguistic
construction correspond to specific cells on the Square of Disposition.
4 Passivilities and -able
Let us begin with the newly coined term of passivilities: passive dispositions with an existential
modal force.
A natural candidate for the linguistic expression of passibilities is the class of adjectives with
the suffix -able or -ible in English: irritable, conceivable, washable, accessible, etc.
Clearly, the argument of these adjectives is not a causer, let alone an agent, hence they are
appropriate as expressions of passive, rather than active, dispositions.
What about their modal force? First, we must demonstrate that -able adjectives are modal
to begin with. Consider the following example. Let us suppose there are many databases on
some computer server. Some are accessible, but others are protected by a password; some are
searchable, whereas others lack a search engine. Let us further suppose that, in point of fact, ever
since the server had been placed online, every database that was accessed, was also searched,
and vice versa. So, in this scenario, the property of being accessed and the property of being
searched have the same extension. However, it still doesn’t follow that a database is accessible
iff it is searchable. There might be a database that is accessible, although it has never, in fact,
been accessed; but if it had been accessed, the user would have found that it is not searchable.
Hence, although the properties of being accessed and being searched have the same extension,
the properties of being accessible and being searchable do not. Hence, -able adjectives are modal,
and are therefore appropriate as expressions of dispositions.
The modal force of -able adjectives is usually existential; they can, but do not have to, be
realized: if something is accessible, it means that it can be accessed; if something is searchable, it
means that it can be searched; if something is conceivable, it means that it can be conceived, etc.
Indeed, regarding the corresponding suffixes in German, Kratzer (1981) points out: “In general,
the suffixes -lich and -bar express possibility” (p. 40).
It has long been known, however, that there are exceptions to this generalization. Kratzer
herself notes a clear exception—payable:
(3) The rent amounts to twenty guilders, payable on the first of January
Kratzer notes: “Here, it is not that the twenty guilders can be paid, they definitely have to be
paid on the first of January” (original emphasis). So, in this case it appears that -able can mean
(deontic) necessity rather than possibility.
Other exceptions to the generalization that -able indicates possibility are not hard to find. If
something is edible, it does not mean simply that it can be eaten; rather it means that it can be
eaten safely; and if something is chewable, it does not mean merely that it can be chewed, but
indicates that it is tasty (Fortin 2013).
But are these really exceptions? Fortin (2013) argues that the answer is no. He proposes
that the basic sense of -able is possibility; all the additional senses are cases of conversational
implicature.
One piece of evidence is cancelability—the strengthened sense can be canceled:
(4) a. Benefits are payable at age 55, but may be deferred at the member’s discretion.
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b. A: Is this edible?
B: Yes. It’ll put you in hospital, but you can eat it
c. All vitamins are chewable, it’s just that they taste shitty
Sentence (4a) means that benefits may be paid, not that they have to be paid; in (4b), B affirms
only the possibility sense of edible; and (4c) clearly canceles the tasty sense of chewable, though
not its existential modal force.
Another argument involves reinforceability: implicature, but not entailment, can be rein-
forced without the sentence being odd. For example, (5a) is fine, whereas (5b) seems redundant
and odd:
(5) a. Some, but not all of the students came to the lecture.
b. ?Some of the students came to the lecture, and/but not all of them stayed away.
Now, note that the strengthened meaning of -able is reinforceable without oddness:
(6) a. The invoice is payable no later than 30 days after receipt
b. It is safely edible
c. These tasty chewable tablets will make you feel better in no time
Of course, conversational implicature must be calculable: it must be shown to follow from
Grice’s maxims. Fortin (2013) analyzes the implicature of x is payable by date d as follows.
Its literal meaning is simply “x can be paid by date d.” By scalar implicature, we can conclude
that “x can’t be paid by date d+ 1”, “x can’t be paid by date d+ 2”, etc. We therefore get the
strengthened meaning, namely “x must be paid by date d.”
The literal meaning of edible is simply “can be eaten.” But Fortin (2013) points out that
almost anything can be eaten. Hence, saying of something that it can be eaten, is really giving
very little information. This is a flouting of Quantity; hence, the strengthened meaning is conver-
sationally implicated. A similar explanation is proposed for chewable.
We can conclude, then, that -able adjectives are modal, their argument is not a causer, and
they have an existential modal force. It follows that these are the linguisitic expressions that
express passivilities.
5 Capabilities and dynamic can
Recall that capabilities are active dispositions with an existential modal force. I propose that they
are expressed by dynamic modals of ability, such as the dynamic can:
(7) John can lift heavy weights.
Note first that dynamic can is modal. Suppose everybody who climbed the Everest learned
Klingon in two months, and everybody who learned Klingon in two months climbed the Everest.
So the properties of climbing the Everest and learning Klingon in two months have the same
extension. Yet, clearly, they have different intensions: in different worlds, the set of individuals
who climbed the Everest is not equal to the set of individuals who learned Klingon in two weeks.
Indeed, dynamic can is sensitive to this difference in intensions: (8a) need not have the truth
value as (8b).
(8) a. Sharon can climb the Everest
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b. Sharon can learn Klingon in two months
Having satisfied ourselves that dynamic can is a modal, let us consider whether it behaves
as a disposition. Recall that we have said that dispositions do not have to be manifested; indeed,
dynamic can seems to fit the bill:
(9) Our grad students are so tough, they can even eat cardboard, though thankfully it’s
never come to that (Copley 2005).
However, let us not be too hasty. Sometimes, dynamic can does require the occurrence of
actual events, as the oddness of (10) indicates.
(10) #Terence can be really obnoxious, but he has never been obnoxious.
Is this a counterexample to the proposal that dynamic can expresses dispositions?
The answer is no. It has, in fact, been argued that some dispositions do require manifestation
of actual instances demonstrating them:
Fragility does not require manifestation. . . bravery is unlikely to be a disposition
one possesses but never shows; thoughtfulness and intelligence look impossible;
gracefulness and humorousness are impossible (Wright 1991:49).
Dynamic can and its synonyms can even have an actual reading, describing a specific mani-
festation:
(11) Brown was able to hit three bull’s-eyes in a row
Thalberg (1972) evaluates (11) in the following situation: “Before he hit the three bull’s-eyes, he
fired 600 rounds, without coming close to the bull’s-eye; and his subsequent tries were equally
wild. . . Therefore he does not have this sort of ability at target shooting.” He concludes: “‘Was
able’ sometimes means ‘had the ability” and sometimes means ‘did’ ” (p. 121).
However, it should be pointed out that was able to in (11) doesn’t mean merely ‘did’; the
sentence implies that hitting three bull’s-eyes in a row is remarkable, difficult, or otherwise un-
expected. From this we can conclude that even actual readings of ability modals have a modal
flavor: (11) says that the actual world, where Brown hit three bull’s-eyes in a row, deviates from
what one would expect.
Indeed, such readings pass the test for modality. Suppose everybody who climbed the Everest
wore purple socks and a yellow hat, and everybody who wore purple socks and a yellow hat
climbed the Everest. So the property of wearing purple socks and a yellow hat and having climbed
the Everest have the same extension, though of course different intensions. Now, suppose (12a)
is true. This does not make (12b) true, since although climbing the Everest is quite a remarkable
accomplishment, wearing purple socks and a yellow hat is not.
(12) a. Joyce was able to climb the Everest
b. Joyce was able to wear purple socks and a yellow hat.
An important property of dynamic can and its synonyms is that they are subject-oriented.
Brennan (1993) proposes that dynamic can combines with the VP, resulting in an inherent/essential
property predicated of the subject. For example:
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(13) Mary can swim
Sentence (13) does not mean merely that it is possible that Mary will swim; rather, it says that
the subject (Mary) has the property of being capable of swimming. One way to see this is to
assume that Mary doesn’t know how to swim. It is possible that, by chance, she will perform the
movements appropriate for swimming; yet (13) is nonetheless false. But if Mary does know how
to swim, intends to swim, the conditions are suitable for swimming, and there is no hindrance, it
follows from (13) that Mary will, in fact, swim.
Brennan discusses two pieces of evidence for the claim that these modals are subject-oriented.
One is the in virtue of test. This expression can only attach to dynamic modals, as in (14a) but
not, say, epistemic modals, as indicated by the unacceptability of (14b).
(14) a. Joan can sing arias in virtue of her natural ability.
b. *In virtue of being a graduate student, Joan may/must be intelligent.
Now, note that in virtue of is only fine when it describes properties of the subject, as in (14a), but
not the object, as in (15).
(15) ##In virtue of the rock being lightweight, Mary can lift it.
Note that the problem is not that in virtue of cannot describe a property of the subject, because,
in general, it can:
(16) They denied him the prize in virtue of his reputation
Hence, the in virtue of test indicates that dynamic can is, indeed, subject-oriented.
The second piece of evidence produced by Brennan involves expletives. Brennan notes that,
when a sentence contains an epistemic modal, the subject can be replaced by a semantically
empty expletive:
(17) a. Some eggs may be in the refrigerator
b. There may be some eggs in the refrigerator.
The same holds for deontic modals:
(18) a. Three lifeguards must be on duty
b. There must be three lifeguards on duty.
However, this is impossible in the case of dynamic can:
(19) a. Only one demon can be in two places at the same time
b. *There can be only one demon in two places at the same time.2
It must be admitted, however, that there appear to be counterexamples—sentences where it
looks like can does not predicate a capability of the subject. For example, (20a) predicates of the
subject (John) the capability to lift that big stone; but no capability is predicated of the subject
in (20b).
2The sentence is, of course, fine if can is taken to indicate circumstantial modality rather than a capability.
58 ARIEL COHEN
(20) a. John can lift that big stone
b. That big stone can be lifted by John
Why, then, is (20b) acceptable?
Tao (2011) proposes: “While [(20a)] expresses John’s ability, [(20b)] asserts some objective
possibility of John’s lifting that stone” (p. 68). In other words, can is reinterpreted as a circum-
stantial modal.
The following examples probably makes the point more clearly:
(21) a. John can open this safe
b. This safe can be opened by John
Suppose John knows nothing about cracking safes; he merely tries codes at random. Of course,
there is a possibility that he will guess the right code by chance. In this case, (21a) is false
but (21b) is true. The explanation is that whereas the former ascribes to John the capability to
open this safe, the latter merely expresses a circumstantial possibility that John will open the
safe.
However, treating can as subject-oriented is not quite accurate; rather, it applies to the exter-
nal argument. The external argument is usually the subject, but not always. Unaccusatives are a
case in point: their subjects are not external arguments. And, indeed, capability can is incompat-
ible with unaccusatives:
(22) Terry can arrive late.
Sentence (22) can only receive a non-capability interpretation, perhaps a deontic reading (“Terry
is permitted to arrive late”).
It should be noted that the external argument is not merely a formal syntactic notion, but is
associated with semantic notions of agentivity and causality (Marantz 1984). Therefore, ability
modals are good candidates for representing capabilities: existential dispositions that require an
agent/causer.
If can indicates capabilities, it cannot indicate dispositions that do not relate to actions. We
would therefore expect it to be bad, in general, with stative verbs. Indeed, can appears to be bad
with the stative know, compared with the non-stative speak:
(23) a. *Mary can know French
b. Mary can speak French
It should be noted that Maier (2014) argues that can can be used to indicate powers that are
not abilities, i.e. that do not have to relate to actions. As an example, he presents (24), and argues
that “the power to understand French will be a power, but not an ability.”
(24) Mary can understand French
Sentence (24) is, indeed, perfectly acceptable; and understand is, indeed, normally a stative verb.
However, this sentence does not constitute a counterexample, since understand can also be used
non-statively—for example, it can be used in the progressive (Comrie 1976:36):
(25) I am understanding French more and more
I argue that sentences like (24) are other cases where understand is used non-statively.
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6 Universal dispositions and will
Dynamic can is usually considered together with other dynamic modals, primarily dispositional
will. Dispositional will does, indeed, seem appropriate for the expression of dispositions, since
it usually does not require the occurrence of actual events, as indicated by (26a). However, note
that, as can be seen by the unacceptability of (26b), sometimes it does.
(26) a. Our grad students are so tough, they will even eat cardboard, though thankfully it’s
never come to that (Copley 2005).
b. #Frank will start crying if left alone, but he has never cried in his life.
As we have seen, a necessary condition for a linguistic construction to express dispositions
is modality. Indeed, dispositional will satisfies this requirement. Suppose everyone who ate card-
board wore purple socks and yellow hats, and everybody who wore purple socks and yellow
hats ate cardboard. Then the two properties would have the same extension; yet (26a) does not
entail (27).
(27) Our grad students will wear purple socks and yellow hats.
The modal force expressed by dispositional will is universal: (28) says that under normal
conditions, whenever sugar is put into water, it dissolves.
(28) Sugar will dissolve if put into water.
Example (28) is interesting for another reason. Note that the verb dissolve is an unaccusative:
its subject is not the external argument. Hence, the argument of dispositional will may be the
external argument (as in, e.g., (26a)), but does not have to be. It follows that dispositional will
can express both types of universal disposition: active and passive.
A natural question to ask is whether there are expressions that are limited to expressing only
active, or only passive, universal dispositions.
7 Passive universal dispositions and middles
I propose that the answer is yes. Specifically, active universal dispositions are expressed by -er
nominals—to be discussed in the next section—and passive universal dispositions are expressed
by the middle construction, to which we will now turn.
First, note that middles are modal. Suppose every book that was read easily was also trans-
lated easily, and vice versa. So the properties of being read easily and being translated easilty
would have the same extension, though different intensions. Now, suppose a new book has just
been published, and has not yet been read (or translated). Then (29a) would not entail (29b).
(29) a. This book reads easily
b. This book translates easily.
Now note further that middles have a necessity flavor. Sentence (30) implies that, when-
ever this bread is cut, it is cut easily, not that it is sometimes cut easily, and sometimes with
difficulty.3
3Of course, (30) still allows for exceptional cases, e.g. when the bread is frozen solid.
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(30) This bread cuts easily
Indeed, it has been suggested (Condoravdi 1987, Ackema and Schoorlemmer 1994, Lekakou
2005) that middles involve a (quasi) universal modal operator. Middles are therefore appropriate
for the expression of universal dispositions.
Lekakou (2005) argues that middles ascribe a dispositional property to the internal, rather
than the external argument of the verb. Hence, middles express passive, rather than active univer-
sal dispositions.
8 Active universal dispositions and -er nominals
-Er nominals are words like smoker, jogger, liar, etc. A necessary condition for them to express
dispositions is that they be modal, and indeed they are. Specifically, I will show that they quantify
over worlds that maintain essential or inherent properties of the actual world (sometimes called
normal worlds).
Suppose that, in the actual world, Sally’s birthday is December 25th. Unless one believes in
astrology, Sally’s birthday is not an essential property of Sally: she could have been born on any
other day, and still be the same person. Hence, there are possible worlds that preserve essential
properties of the actual world, in which Sally’s birthday is not on Christmas. We can see that these
worlds are considered when an -er nominal is evaluated, i.e. they can affect truth conditions.
For suppose Sally drinks on her birthday (and only then). Then (31) would be true; how-
ever, (31) would not follow—Sally may not celebrate Christmas, she may not even be aware that
her birthday falls on Christmas.
(31) Sally is a birthday drinker. Sally is a Christmas drinker.
To give another example, suppose all animals except dogs suddenly died in the actual world.
But they continue to live in other worlds, which can be as normal as you like. Then (32a)
and (32b) would have the same truth value, since all the animals are dogs; however, (33a) can
still be true without (33b) being true, since one can be certified to be a dog trainer without being
certified to be an animal trainer.
(32) a. John trains dogs.
b. John trains animals.
(33) a. John is a dog trainer.
b. John is an animal trainer.
As a final example, consider (34).
(34) Sally is a smoker
Suppose Sally hates cigarettes, but she is constantly harassed by a militant smoker who forces
her to smoke at gunpoint. Consequently, she smokes several cigarettes every day. In this situa-
tion, (34) is false.
Now suppose Sally is very fond of cigarettes, but she is confined to a prison where no
smoking is allowed, and never leaves it. So Sally doesn’t actually smoke, yet (34) is true. Since
-er nominals are modal, they satisfy the necessary condition for expressing dispositions.
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The disposition expressed by -er nominals sometimes does and sometimes doesn’t have to be
manifested. Rappaport-Hovav and Levin (1992) draw a distinction between two types of -er nom-
inals: eventive (e.g., saver of lives) and non-eventive (e.g., lifesaver). In eventive -er nominals,
the disposition has to be manifested, as exemplified by the unaccepatbility of (35a); in contrast,
in non-eventive -er nominals the disposition does not have to be manifested, as exemplified by
the acceptability of (35b).
(35) a. #Cora is a saver of lives, but she has never saved anybody’s life.
b. Cora is a lifesaver, but she has never saved anybody’s life.
Both eventive and non-eventive readings of -er nominals are dispositional; but -er nominals
also have non-dispositional readings:
(36) a. John is a murderer.
b. I was mesmerized by the singer’s voice.
c. John is a goner.
Sentence (36a) has a dispositional reading: what John does is murder people. However, it also
has a non-dispositional reading, the satisfaction of which requires only the existence in the ac-
tual world of one event of a murder committed by John. Sentence (36b) can have a dispositional
reading, referring to a person whose profession is to sing, but also a non-dispositional reading,
referring to a person who was singing at the event time in the actual world. And since the dispo-
sitional reading of (36c) is ruled out pragmatically, it only has a non-dispositional reading: there
is in the (immediate) future of the actual world an event of John’s being gone.
But note that even these non-dispositional expressions are modal, although not disposi-
tional.4 Suppose there are exactly three people who murdered someone; and suppose they are
about to be executed, and, on their way to the gallows, they are singing. Then, at that moment,
the (non-dipositional) properties of being murderers and being singers have the same extension.
Yet, although (37a) entails (37b), (38a) does not entail (38b).
(37) a. Three people who have murdered someone are about to be executed.
b. Three people who are singing are about to be executed.
(38) a. Three murderers are about to be executed.
b. Three singers are about to be executed.
What kind of disposition do -er nominals express (under their dispositional readings)? Many
researchers (Fabb 1984, Keyser and Roeper 1984, Burzio 1986, Rappaport-Hovav and Levin
1992, van Hout and Roeper 1998) note the External Argument Generalization: -er indicates that
the argument of the nominal receives the thematic role that the verb assigns to its external argu-
ment.
The subject is often the external argument, but not always—unaccusatives are a case in point.
Indeed, -er nominals normally are not formed from unaccusative verbs:
(39) *arriver, *faller, *descender, *resembler.
4Recall that actual readings of dynamic can, as exmplified in (11) and (12) above, behave in the same way.
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Schäfer (2010) notes:
The literature sometimes provides examples of -er nominals derived from alleged
unaccusative verbs. But these examples involve verbs that can be reanalyzed as
unergatives in the right contexts. Such contexts typically assign [semantic] control
to the only argument of the verb.
Hence, we can conclude that -er nominals express active dispositions.
-Er nominals have a universal rather than existential flavor. For example, by Jewish custom,
every Jewish baby boy is given a few drops of wine before his circumcision. So, for every Jewish
man, in every world (compatible with the custom), there is an event of this man drinking wine.
However, this doesn’t make him a wine drinker.
One step further is taken by von Fintel and Heim (1999), who identify the universally-
flavored quantifier associated with -er nominals with the generic quantifier.5 They note that,
under one reading,
beautiful dancer ⇡> someone x such that generally if x dances. . . x does so beauti-
fully
To develop an approach based on this intuition, we need a way of treating dancer
as involving a stage-level/episodic predicate (which can be the host of the manner
predicate beautiful) and a generic quantifier.
Hence, we can conclude that -er nominals are modal, they require an agent/causer, and have
a universal flavor. Hence, they express active universal dispositions.
9 A note on habituals
Habituals are often thought to express dispositions.6 Indeed, habituals certainly have a disposi-
tional “feel.” And yet, habituals cannot express dispositions, because they are not modal. To be
more precise: although habituals are intensional, they are parametric on time, not worlds. That is
to say, they are only sensitive to stable properties (properties that hold throughout time) but not
essential properties (properties that hold across worlds).
First, let use see that habituals are parametric on time. Let us go back to Sally, whose birthday
is December 25th. It is a historical fact that Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Egyptian
President Anwar el-Sadat met on December 25th, 1977. But there were other meetings between
Israeli and Egyptian leaders, at other times, before and after that date. Now, if someone were to
utter (40a) on 25.12.1977, (40b) would clearly not follow.
(40) a. Sally drinks on her birthday.
b. Sally drinks when Israeli and Egyptian leaders meet.
However, habituals are not parametirc on possible worlds, and, specifically, they are not sen-
sitive to essential properties. Since Sally’s birthday is not an essential property of Sally, there are
possible worlds that preserve essential properties of the actual world, in which Sally’s birthday
is not on Christmas. But such worlds are not considered when a habitual is evaluated: (41b) does
follow from (41a).
5See also Larson (1998).
6See, e.g., Boneh and Doron (2010), Boneh (this volume).
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(41) a. Sally drinks on her birthday.
b. Sally drinks on Christmas.
To get back to another of our examples, consider (42), and contrast it with (34).
(42) Sally smokes.
Suppose, as before, that Sally is constantly harassed by a militant smoker who forces her to
smoke at gunpoint, and, consequently, she smokes several cigarettes every day. Sentence (42),
unlike (34), is true. Now suppose that Sally is very fond of cigarettes, but she is confined to her
smoke-free prison. Now, (42) is false.
Since modality is necessary condition for the expression of dispositions, and habituals fail
this condition, they cannot be candidates for the expression of dispositions.
10 The Square of Disposition
We can now fill in the square of disposition, for each type of disposition, the linguistic expression
that is appropriate for representing it.:
+Causer -causer
Existential capability: can passivility: -able
Universal active disposition: -er passive disposition: middles
w i l l
Before concluding, I have a confession to make. In this paper, I first constructed the Square
of Disposition, and then tried to fit linguistic expressions into it. However, in the research leading
to the paper, I actually worked backwards: I looked at linguistic expressions, and formed the
Square so as to fit them in.
What is the significance of this fact? There are many ways to classify dispositions—the
Square is only one option. The debate over the correct classification of dispositions will no doubt
go on. The debate is, and should remain, a philosophical one, following philosophical consider-
ations.
What I have tried to show is that there is one particular classification that corresponds to
what is expressible in natural language. This, of course, doesn’t mean that this classification
is metaphysically correct. However, what we can say is that, to the extent that metaphysical
assumptions are expressed by natural language, they are those assumptions which are cognitively
important (Bach 1981). It follows that the distinctions between dispositions that are made by
natural language, as represented in the Square of Disposition, are those metaphysical distinctions
that are cognitively important
I will conclude by echoing the words of Vetter (2014): “I am certainly not advocating that
philosophy be replaced by linguistics. . . but I do take these data to provide some motivation for
an alternative approach” (p. 131).
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Dispositions and event nouns:
decomposing the agentivity constraint
in a light verb construction
Marta Donazzan
Lucia M. Tovena
In this paper, we o￿er a new argument for introducing dispositions
in the analysis of natural language. We present data drawn from light
verb constructions in Italian that show the need for a ￿ner-grained
characterisation of the properties associated with the Agentive role.
These agentive properties relativised to types of events are called
agentive dispositions. Dispositions can be seen to express a type of po-
tentiality, i.e. a possibility rooted in objects and manifested as proper-
ties anchored to individuals. In the context of argument selection, an
agentive disposition is a property that holds of the instantiator of the
external argument and is understood to be a power for the realisation
of the event described by the event predicate of the clause.
Keywords: event nouns, agentivity, dispositions, powers
1 Dispositions, events and event nouns
Dispositions have proved to be a useful notion for describing some linguistic phenomena, one
well-known example being that of middle constructions. By saying that a vase is breakable or
that The vase breaks easily, one means that the vase has some dispositions to be broken. Middle
constructions of this type appear to be licensed by what may be termed passive dispositions: the
disposition expressed by breakable relates to properties ascribed to an entity and licences for
its bearer the role of patient in a breaking event (Lekakou 2004). Such a "passive" view is moti-
vated by the traditional treatement that disposition ascription has received in the philosophical
literature. According to the received view, the reasoning underlying disposition ascription is a
counterfactual relation between entities and events: if an entity x were in an event y, then the
manifestation z would ensue, in case x is disposed to y-ing. Importantly, the event is triggered
by some stimulus condition: a vase is breakable if, whenever something would act upon the vase
with a certain force, the vase would break.
This way of analysing dispositions is not without problems. On the one hand, some dispo-
sitions can be triggered by more than one stimulous condition, and these conditions can be so
di￿erent that it proves di￿cult to reduce them to a single case that would ￿t into the counterfac-
tual conditional antecedent. For example, an irascible man is disposed to get angry easily, which
means precisely that there may be a variety of stimuli that can trigger the manifestation of this
disposition. On the other hand, some dispositions seem to manifest themselves spontaneously,
i.e. without being triggered (at least overtly) by stimuli. As pointed out by Vetter (2010), the
very existence of the latter type of dispositional properties, sometimes called active dispositions,
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is excluded within the counterfactual model.
A way to overcome these problems is to assume that the characterisation of dispositions
need not be related to counterfactual reasoning, but that dispositions express a type of modality
which is a species of possibility. According to the view defended recently by Vetter (2010),
dispositions can be seen to express a type of potentiality. Potentialities are a "’local’ analogue
of possibility" (Vetter 2010:41), which is to say possibilities rooted in objects and manifested
as properties anchored to individuals. The departure from the counterfactual model implies
that modal properties are accepted in the basic furniture of the world. This is an ontological
complication, but it has also some advantages to o￿er to metaphysics and to the philosophy of
science, as extensively argued by Vetter (2010, 2012).
In this paper, we argue that looking at dispositions as modal properties is an approach
that can also be of use in describing linguistic phenomena. In particular, it can come in handy
in dealing with phenomena related to licensing a thematic role for an entity with respect to a
verbal predicate. The contrast between the pairs of sentences in the English and Italian examples
in (1) and (6) illustrates the phenomenon we are going to study.
(1) (2) Yesterday, Mario fell down.
(3) Ieri Mario è caduto
(4) The Berlin Wall fell down in 1989.
(5) Il muro di Berlino è caduto nel 1989
(6) (7) Yesterday Mario had a (great) fall.
(8) Ieri Mario ha fatto una (brutta) caduta
(9) #In 1989, the Berlin Wall had a (great) fall.
(10) #Nel 1989, il muro di Berlino ha fatto una (brutta) caduta
The sentences in (1) display the unaccusative verb fall (in Italian, cadere), and di￿er in the type
of entity referred to by the noun phrase in subject position. Sentences (1a,b) have an animate
subject, while the subject is inanimate in (1c,d). The di￿erence does not a￿ect the status of the
sentences, which are in all cases perfectly acceptable. In the sentences in (6), on the other hand,
the verbal predicate is nominalised and is embedded in a complex predication headed by a light-
verb, respectively have and fare, litt. ‘do’. Here the animacy di￿erence matters, and sentences
(6c,d) with inanimate subjects are unacceptable, whereas (6a,b) are ￿ne.
The di￿erence between the structures in (1) and (6), and the contrast between the subjects
in (6a,b) and (6c,d) can be decomposed into a set of issues. A question is whether the contrast can
be imputed to properties that the entities participating in the event are expected to exhibit—
such as animacy—and, if so, how these properties can be expressed in relation to the verbal
predicate. We propose to capture the constraints that lead to the contrast between (6a,b) vs.
(6c,d) by considering that the relevant participants’ properties express dispositions towards the
event described by the predicate.
Looking at the properties of agents and undergoers as dispositions is a way to ￿ll a gap in
themodelling of thematic relations. Thematic roles can be seen as the linguistic realisation of the
participants’ relations in an event, and it is fairly common to assume a two-way conditioning,
in the line of Dowty (1991); i) verbs entail for each thematic role a set of relations with respect
to their participants, and ii) those entities that satisfy some or all of these entailments are likely
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to be mapped to the corresponding thematic role. (Proto-)role entailments are de￿ned with
respect to the semantics of verbs and research on verbs has thrived, whereas the requisites of the
entities denoted by the nominals realising the verb’s arguments are less frequently investigated.
We propose to approach the contrast in (6) by talking of dispositions related to thematic roles
as a way of telescoping two pieces of information. On the one hand, dispositions are modal
properties ascribed to an entity and, on the other hand, these properties are seen as elements in
a causal chain. Disposition ascription is a form of conceptual bridging between an entity and a
class of events, which, due to the modal essence of dispositions, tells something about the entity
but does not carry any existential commitment on the instantiation of the class of events.
The local expression of some requirements on the subject via disposition ascription is in-
strumental in dealing with sentences such as in (6) where the verb is light and the characterisa-
tion of the event comes from a nominal (Jespersen 1954). These are instances of complex pred-
ication and the entailments that are projected on the external position have multiple origins, in
our view. The possible origin of the animacy constraint that both English and Italian sentences
exhibit in (6) is discussed by focussing on the case of Italian, because Ata1 nominalisations in
Italian provide us with a more transparent case. These nominalisations are morphologically de-
rived from verbs by su￿xationwith themorphemeAta. Following Tovena andDonazzan (2015),
we argue that this su￿x carries the trace of a condition restricting a potential external argument
of the verb whose root enters the nominalisation, and contributes speci￿c constraints on the
combination of the argument structure of the noun with that of the light-verb. The properties
related to the thematic position associated with the external argument are referred to as agen-
tive dispositions, and we show that introducing agentive dispositions as a type of potentialities
can help us to deal with an issue of argument selection at the syntax-semantic interface.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we will expound in detail the semantics of
Ata nouns. Our key hypothesis is that Ata event nouns enter light verb constructions in or-
der to regain the possibility of being predicated of something. This hypothesis spells out the
assumption put forth by Tovena and Donazzan (2015) that the deverbal Ata nominalisation is
endowed with a semantic trace of an external argument, i.e. the external argument is at least se-
mantically active, even if syntactically not realisable. As a consequence, the event noun imposes
some speci￿c constraints on the realisation of a complex predicate. The ￿rst step, in section 2.2,
is to review some empirical arguments that strengthen the case for such a semantic trace in
the nominalisation. Section 2.3 will then provide a formal de￿nition for the semantics of the
su￿x. Next, section 3 discusses the proposal according to which dispositions are properties re-
lated to thematic roles assigned by predicates, and provides broad empirical support for it. We
will start by taking the macro-property of animacy as a ￿rst approximation, and consider its
relation to typical (proto-)agentive entailments. Our aim is to look more precisely at the way
in which the thematic role associated to the subject position should be characterised, and at
the properties that should be ascribed to the entity that discharges this role. We will then pro-
pose a non-restrictive de￿nition of the Agent role in terms of causal relations, and show that
these properties can be expressed as dispositions. Dispositions are put into use in the further
compositional step that is taken up more speci￿cally in section 4, where we look at how to put
1In the following, we will refer to the Italian su￿x as Ata. We consider Ata as one derivational su￿x with
allomorphs. The capitalised vowel refers therefore to the thematic vowel of the verb, which may varies depending
on the declension to which the verb belongs (e.g. cadere ‘fall’ has the form cadUta, and nuotare ‘swim’ gives nuotAta).
Irregular verbs may also have speci￿c forms, cf. leggere ‘read’! letta of example (30) below.
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together a verb that is light, has undergone semantic bleaching, at least to a certain extent and
only preserves a causative meaning, with an event predicate that is expressed by a nominal.
The contrast between (6b) and (6d) calls for a ￿ner characterisation of the agentive role associ-
ated with the external argument, one that is relative/sensitive to the type of event described by
the nominalisation and of the light verb construction. Agentive dispositions are put at work to
relativise causative capacities to types of events. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Ata-nominals and their contribution in light verb constructions
2.1 The elective a￿nity
There is a clear elective a￿nity between light verb constructions in Italian and event nouns
ending by Ata.2 This facet of the distribution of Ata event nouns has drawn the attention of
researchers, mainly with regards to the issue of how the argument structure of these nominal-
isations is realised in the light verb construction, or, if they do not have one, what is realised
in such a construction. This is the concern of syntactic proposals put forth by Samek-Lodovici
(2003) and Folli and Harley (2013). They do not address explicitly the issue of whyAta-nominals
are the speci￿c event nominals used in Italian for this type of construction, and this is a point
on which our paper makes a contribution. In our view, the semantic constraint on the external
argument present in Ata-nominals together with the possibility of overtly expressing such an
external argument o￿ered by the light verb construction, are the key for making sense of what
looks like an elective a￿nity of Ata-nominals for light verb constructions.
On the one hand, a bias for expressing an external argument seems to be imposed by the
derivational su￿x itself. The verb that the su￿x selects as a base has to be a causative predicate,
i.e. it has to encode the potential for expressing an external argument. As we will show, non-
dynamic predicates such as stative verbs cannot serve as a base for the derivation process, and
predicates that express a change of state of their thematic argument are also generally excluded.
On the other hand, as we have seen in (6b), when the nominalisation is part of a com-
plex predication, more speci￿c constraints on the realisation of the external argument arise. As
noted also by Alba-Salas (2004), the nominalisation of cadere does not obey to the same con-
straints when it is used outside the complex predicate, compare the marginality of (6d) with the
acceptability of the attested example in (11).3
(11) La caduta del Muro di Berlino simboleggia l’inizio del processo di uni￿cazione della
Germania.
the fall-ATA of the Berlin Wall symbolises the start of Germany uni￿cation process
In the remainder of this section, we tackle the question of how to compose the constraints
imposed by the nominalised verb (in a way, the output of the nominalisation process) with the
selectional requirements of the light verb.
2.2 Three empirical arguments for an external argument in Ata-nouns
In this section, we recall three empirical arguments that support the existence of a semantic
trace of some agentive requirement within Ata nominalisations. Before we present them, we
provide some background on Ata-nouns in light-v constructions. The two main patterns that
2The reverse is only partly true, because these nominalisations are not restricted to light verb constructions.
3http://www.berlino.com/muro-di-berlino/
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are realised have been identi￿ed by crossing the arity of the base verb with that of the light verb
(Samek-Lodovici 1999, 2003). Ata-nouns construed on transitive verbs occur with ditransitive
light-  dare "give" (12), and Ata-nouns construed on intransitive verbs occur with transitive
light-  fare "do" (13).
(12) Mario ha dato una mescolata al minestrone. transitive V-base
Mario gave a stir to the soup
(13) Gianni ha fatto una camminata. intransitive V-base
Gianni had a walk
In some cases, both light verbs are possible with the same nominalisation, cf. the case of lavata
‘wash’ in (14). The transitivity distinction surfaces via the referentiality of the complement
noun. When the patient is expressed by an inde￿nite nominal, the light verb is fare, as in (14a).
When it is de￿nite, the light verb is dare, see (14b).
(14) (15) Gianni ha fatto una lavata di lenzuola. inde￿nite NP
Gianni made a washing of sheets
(16) Gianni ha dato una lavata alle lenzuola. de￿nite NP
Gianni gave a washing to the sheets
For the purposes of this paperwewill not discuss in detail the issue of the internal argument
and its relation to the choice of the light-v. We leave aside the speci￿cs of the alternance in (12)–
(13) by assuming that the nominalisation—directly or indirectly, e.g. via a ApplicativeP as per
Folli and Harley (2013)—is always the complement of this little v projection.4
2.2.1 Coincidence of subjects The ￿rst piece of evidence comes from facts holding in several
languages. In Ata complex predications, the subject of the light verb is obligatorily coreferential
with one of the arguments of the event noun. An analogous constraint was observed to hold for
English light verb constructions byWierzbicka (1982) in her descriptive study. This requirement
is captured by a transfer style approach such as the one proposed by Samek-Lodovici (2003).
Sentence (17b) is judged ungrammatical, contrary to (17a) where fare is a full verb.
(17) (18) Mario ha fatto la ￿rma di Paolo.
Mario made Paolo’s signature
(19) #Mario ha fatto la nuotata di Paolo.
Mario had the swim-ATA of Paolo
4Note, however, that if the applicative integrates the complement in the syntactic representation, no aspectual
e￿ect is expected. Where is the constraint against patients that measure out the event? Folli and Harley posit a
constraint against de￿niteness as part of the diagnostic of light verb darewith creation verbs. The subject of the small
clause would involve a presupposition of existence, incompatible with a non-existent item. This line of reasoning
does not cover contrasts such as (i) vs. (ii), where the base verb is transitive and is not a verb of creation, the light
verb is fare and the internal argument cannot be de￿nite.
(i) Luisa ha fatto una mangiata di funghi.
Luisa had a treat of mushrooms
(ii) *Luisa ha fatto una mangiata dei funghi.
Luisa had a treat of-the mushroom
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Further evidence pointing in the same direction comes from sentences containig relational ad-
jectives. These forms potentially can express one of the arguments, but they never do so, cf.
(20).
(20) (21) Mario ha fatto una chiacchierata paterna con Gianni.
Mario had a paternal chat with Gianni.
(22) Ho colto con grande simpatia la chiacchierata paterna che il nostro Papa ha fatto
con i preti di Albano a Castel Gandolfo qualche giorno fa.
I received with great sympathy the paternal chat that our Pope had with the
priests of Albano in Castel Gandolfo, a few days ago.
(http://www.uncommondescent.com/documentation/ID-in-Italy.pdf)
Coreference with the argument of the relational adjective is never available in (20), and the
adjectives are interpreted intensionally as referring to a kind. Mario doesn’t need to be the
father of Gianni for the sentence (20a) to be true, as (20b) further shows.
2.2.2 Restrictions on the aspectual classes The second piece of evidence is more speci￿c to Ital-
ian and concerns the aspectual class of the verbs whose roots can enter the nominalisation,
as noted by Gaeta (2002) and Tovena (2014), and contra Folli and Harley (2013). Non-dynamic
predicates such as states (23) and inchoative states (24), are excluded. Dynamic telic punctual
predicates such as achievements (25) are equally excluded, unless they undergo a form of coer-
cion. Examples such as (28) illustrate the fact that accomplishments are also banned.
(23) Mario conosce il francese/ *ha fatto una conosciuta di francese.
Mario knows French
(24) Mario si è ammalato/ *ha fatto un’ammalata.
Mario got sick
(25) (26) Mario ha vinto la gara/ *ha fatto una vinta della gara.
Mario won the race
(27) Il vaso si è spaccato/* ha fatto una spaccata.
The vase broke
(28) Mario ha mangiato la torta /*ha fatto una mangiata della torta.
Mario ate the cake
In other words, Ata-nominalisations consistently denote events of the activity type. This
aspectual restriction can be stated also in the following terms: Ata nouns select for predicates
whose only argument is the external one. These predicates, moreover, denote dynamic events,
which are known to be characterised by agentive arguments (Dowty 1979). Building on these
two empirical observations, we suggest the following conclusion: the individual that discharges
the agentive role in the argument structure of the nominalised verb is the only participant of
the event denoted by Ata-noun that may act as a particular for identifying the event. This spec-
ulation is not unmotivated. To say that an event is identi￿ed by the individual who is causally
responsible for it, can be seen as a way of spelling out the assumption that causes identify events
(Davidson 1969).
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2.2.3 Nomina vicis The third empirical argument in favour of the presence of a condition for
the potential realisation of an external argument has also to do with the role of the external
argument in identifyng the event, and concerns the speci￿c reading of these event nouns. Its
cross-linguistics implications are an independent research project on its own and we will not
be able to do them justice here.
Deverbal Ata-nominals are nominals that can refer to speci￿c occurrences of events, not to
types of events (Gaeta 2000, 2002, Tovena and Donazzan 2015, Donazzan and Tovena to appear).
It has been proposed to characterise this reading with the notion of nomen vicis. The forms that
support it might not be specialised for it, and surely do not seem to have a uniquemorphological
makeup across languages. A characterisation of Ata-nominals in Italian that extends to nomina
vicis is provided by Gaeta (2000, 2002), who observes that Ata-nouns do not support generic
readings (29).
(29) Il nuoto/# la nuotata in piscina non è più di moda.
Swimming/the swim-ata in the pool has gone out of fashion
Note that other forms of derived nouns in Italian are not subject to this constraint, cf. (30). This
behaviour is speci￿c to ata nominalisations.
(30) Leggere/la lettura/*la letta è un’attività solitaria.
Read-INF/ the read-URA/ the read-ATA is a private activity
Gaeta’s observation is formulated in negative terms, as a distributional restriction, but is
motivated by invoking a morphological reason. Genericity, says Gaeta, is blocked because the
domain of denotation of these nouns is discretised by perfective aspect and the single units
cannot be used to refer to the process.
We agree with Gaeta’s idea of taking into consideration aspectual information, and we
integrate elements from the morphological derivation with syntactic-semantic considerations.
The su￿x can be derived from that of in￿exional past participial morphology and is subject
to the same morpho-phonological adjustments (Ippolito 1999), but aspect cannot be the only
ingredient. On the one hand, perfective aspect does not block reference per se, and on the other
hand, past participle formation in Italian is not sensitive to aspectual classes in the way we see
for Ata-nominals (Tovena 2014), cf. (23)–(28) in section 2.2.2.
The resistance to generic readings is taken to be a side-e￿ect of the constraints on event
identi￿cation. The external argument of the base predicate cannot be given an arbitrary referent,
but has to be realised by a particular individual.
2.3 The external argument in the su￿x
We have seen that there are empirical reasons for assuming that Ata-nominalisations contain
a semantic trace motivating the realisation of the external argument as the subject of a light-
verb in complex predicates. Aspectual considerations related to the perfective component in
the original in￿exional su￿x have motivated Tovena (2014) to propose that the present days
-Ata ending has specialised into a derivational su￿x. Tovena and Donazzan (2015) have added a
constraint to its content, stating that the events in the denotation of nomina vicis are associated
with an initiator. This is a semantic restriction that applies to the external argument although
this argument is not syntactically realised. The entry of the su￿x is provided in (31).
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(31)  R e[R(e) & INITIATOR(e)=x & DELIMIT(e)]
The derivational su￿x takes as input a Root, contributes a Davidsonian argument and the prop-
erty of delimitedness of the event, and associates it to an individual via the role of initiator. The
event is associated with an initiator by a function that takes the event variable as its argument
and returns an individual that is assigned as a value to variable x. This variable x is not bound by
a lambda operator, because the nominalisation does not have a syntactically realised external
subject. The function INITIATOR works as a semantically active constraint with no syntactic
expression when the nominalisation is used in isolation. The end result is that whenever the
Davidsonian variable gets instantiated, the event is associated with a particular initiator. This
undefeasible and speci￿c association between event and initiator right from the beginning is
at the base of the nomen vicis reading. As we see, the requirement of an initiator is introduced
by the su￿x and, as its immediate consequence, it makes it work as a ￿lter for the candidate
roots. The requirement captures the empirical generalisation that only activity verbs seem to
be allowed as bases for these nominalisations illustrated by the facts in (23)–(28)5 and accounts
for the speci￿city of nomina vicis, because the external argument discharges the Agent role and
is the participant that individuates the event denoted by activity predicates.
The function DELIMIT has been developed by Tovena (2015), according to whom the su￿x
works like an event modi￿er that measures the event using contextual information, see (32).
(32)  P e[P(e) ^ µ( (e)) = d ^ d Min(µ( (e)))]
The measure function for times µ in (32) is a variable over measure functions such as hours or
minutes. The perfective content is captured by applying the contextually determined function
µ to the temporal trace of the event   (e) and assigning its value to a variable d. The predicate of
events P is instantiated by the verb base and restricted to denoting in a homogeneous domain.
Min(µ(  (e)) is the minimal duration of an event of type P, and the value of d is superior or equal
to it.
In this paper, we adopt the idea of a nominalisation obtained with the apport of a suf-
￿x derived from in￿exional past participial morphology, and integrate it with Tovena’s (2015)
aspectual restriction and with Tovena and Donazzan’s (2015) initiator condition.6 Taken all to-
gether, this results in the characterisation of the su￿x given in (33).
(33)  R e[R(e) ^ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(e)=x ^ µ( (e))=d ^ d Min(µ( (e)))]
The next step is to determine how the constraint of the external argument in (33) can be
integrated in a compositional analysis of the complex predicate. Previous analyses have not
considered this issue, but have tackled the more general issue of the arguments of the light verb
construction. We will treat the composition in detail in section 4. Before that, we devote section
3 to the discussion of the Agent role of the causative verb, and the properties required by the
entity that discharges this role.
3 Agentivity and dispositions
As we have pointed out in the previous section, there are reasons to assume that Ata-nominali-
sations are associated with the external part of an argument structure, at least of a conceptual
5See Folli and Harley (2013) for a di￿erent view on the presence of aspectual constraints.
6There is a nominalising head that determines the category of the output as a noun ending by a, but this is not
crucial for the point we are making here.
D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 73
argument structure. There is a long trend of analysis in the literature about the role of par-
ticipants in an event, and various notions and terms have been proposed.7 Several theories of
argument selection can be seen ultimately as attemps to solve the problem of terminological
proliferation, by reducing thematic relations to cluster concepts, such as "proto-roles" (Dowty
1991) or "macro-roles" (Van Valin 2005). An important point for our argument is that the en-
tailments associated with thematic positions determine the attribution of speci￿c properties to
the entity ￿lling the relevant thematic role. In the following sections, we will try to "bridge the
gap", so to speak, between the verbal entailments that characterise the thematic role of Agent
and the properties of the entities that are allowed to ￿t into this role.
3.1 More data illustrating the agent (proto)type
Let us look more closely at the properties of the entity associated with the Agent role by consid-
ering, as a start, the broad categorial property of animacy. The contrast with respect to animacy
is brought up, in our case, by unaccusative verbs. Unaccusativity, in its semantic interpretation,
is the label traditionally used to refer to an intransitive verb whose syntactic argument in sub-
ject position does not discharge a semantic role of agent. Some verbs traditionally classi￿ed as
unaccusative in Italian allow Ata-nominalisation, see (34)–(37).8
(34) (35) Mario è/*ha caduto giù per venti metri.
Mario fell twnty meres down
(36) Mario ha fatto una (brutta) caduta.
Mario had a (bad) fall
(37) (38) Mario è/??ha scivolato giù per venti metri.
Mario slided twenty metres down
(39) Mario ha fatto una scivolata di venti metri giù per il pendío.
Mario slided twenty metres down the slope
Unaccusative verbs can have a subject that is human (40a, 46a) or non-human (43a, 49a). but
the distinction that is relevant for our argument is that when the nominalised verb is inserted
in a complex predication, non-human subjects are not acceptable anymore (43b, 49b).9
(40) (41) Mario è caduto dalla sedia.
Mario fell from the chair
7For instance, ‘deep semantic cases’ (Fillmore 1968) and ‘thematic relations’ (Jackendo￿ 1972), to name just two
milestone references in the semantic production on the topic.
8Here we take auxiliary selection as prima facie evidence for unaccusativity. It is fairly common to assume,
starting from Burzio (1986), that unaccusative verbs select for the auxiliary to be in Italian, while unergative verbs
select for have. It has also become clear however that the auxiliary selection criterion identi￿es not only two core
classes of unaccusative and unergative verbs but also more peripheral ones, where it is possible to observe variation
and context e￿ects within one and the same language.
9A similar observation has beenmade byWierzbicka (1982) with respect to the verb fall in the English light-verb
construction have a fall, cf. (Wierzbicka 1982:796):
Thus Humpty Dumpty could have a great fall from the wall, but an apple could not have a fall from
a tree or a book from a bookshelf.
Wierzbicka (1982) explains the contrast by evoking, for the have a fall construction, a potential experience of the
agent, an intuition that only partially matches our analysis.
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(42) Mario ha fatto una (brutta) caduta.
Mario had a (bad) fall
(43) (44) Il libro è caduto dalla sedia.
The book fell from the chair
(45) #Il libro ha fatto una brutta caduta.
( the book had a (bad) fall)
(46) (47) Mario è entrato nella stanza.
Mario entered the room
(48) Mario ha fatto un’entrata (trionfale).
Mario made a (triumphal) entering
(49) (50) La luce è/*ha entrata nella stanza.
The light entered the room
(51) #La luce ha fatto un’entrata (trionfale).
The light made a (triumphal) entering
Animacy is a categorial property, that is, a property that is attributed to entities indepen-
dently from their relation to an event. Animacy however is often related to more speci￿c proto-
agent entailments (Dowty 1991). One of these is volitionality. It may be argued that volitional
agents are necessarily animate, and thus, if being animate does not entail to act volitionally,
the converse must be true. However, to characterise the role of the agent by volitionality is also
problematic. On the one hand, typically non-volitional ergative verbs are found in nominalised
form, e.g. sudare "to sweat" (52).
(52) (53) Mario *è/ha sudato.
Mario sweated
(54) Mario ha fatto una sudata.
Mario had a sweat
Recall that predicates describing non-volitional events such as bleed and perspire/sweat
posed noticeable problems to philosophers of action. It is a debated issue whether non-volitional
bodily movements should be described as actions or as things that merely happen to their sub-
jects. Thalberg (1972) discusses the problem in some length, and argues that "these episodes
are not things that happen to a person" (because) "if you perspire, it is a contingent matter that
anything acts upon you to make you perspire" (p. 19). In other words, perspiring and bleeding,
when predicated of a person, are non-volitional, but are still actions that depend primarly on
their subject to be brought about.10
10More precisely, Thalberg (1972) considers predicates such as chocke and cough to be of a potentially separate
group that describe "reactions" to stimuli, and therefore non-voluntary acts of a subject. Likewise, sleep is termed a
"breakdown" verb, which implies a lack of control and awareness, but which describes again an action. The problem,
here again, arises when one considers control and volition the crucial notions for teasing apart actors from undergo-
ers. de Lancey notes that categorisation is ultimately language dependent. For example, a predicate like sneeze takes
a subject-form argument in Lakhota but an object-form argument in Lhasa Tibetan (de Lancey 1990). The variation
can be explained, he suggests, precisely because of the di￿erent perspectives which one might take with respect to
these events - viewing it as an internally caused event, or as an external accident.
D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 75
On the other hand, volitionality can be seen as a weaker pragmatic enrichment (Holisky
1987, VanValin andWilkins 1996), since it can be suspended inmost cases with no consequences
on grammaticality.
(55) (56) Mario ha sudato senza volerlo.
Mario sweated without intending to do so
(57) Mario è caduto senza farlo apposta.
Mario fell without doing it on purpose
(58) (59) Mario ha fatto una sudata senza volerlo.
Mario had a sweating without intending to do so
(60) Senza volerlo, Mario ha fatto una brutta caduta.
Involuntarily, Mario had a bad fall.
Finally, note that, when the nominalised non-volitional predicate enters a light-verb con-
struction, the contrast surfaces once again in terms of animacy, but volition then cannot be at
the origin of the contrast.
(61) (62) Mario sta sudando.
Mario is sweating
(63) Mario sta facendo una sudata.
Mario is having a sweating
(64) (65) Il salame sta sudando in questa fase di stagionatura.
The salami is sweating in this phase of the curing
(66) *? Il salame sta facendo una sudata in questa fase di stagionatura.
The salami is having a sweating in this phase of the curing
The notion of control has also been frequently evoked to explain proto-agent entailments.
Contrary to volitionality, the possibility to control an action or a process is not related to ani-
macy by entailment. Complex systems and automata can be understood as controlling a given
process. In particular, a form of control could explain the di￿erence between the examples in
(67) and (70). One can argue that it is easier to attribute the possibility of controlling its own
movement to a self-propelling engine like a motorbike, irrespective of animacy and volition.11
(67) (68) La moto è scivolata/?ha scivolato.
The motorbike slided
(69) ?La moto ha fatto una scivolata.
the motorbike had a slide
(70) (71) La bici è scivolata/#ha scivolato.
The bike slided
11The acceptability of (67) may at ￿rst sight seem marginal, but a quick Google search con￿rmed our intuition.
The ergative pattern in the (a) examples X ha scivolato had the contrasting scores of 240 hits for the motorbike vs.
none at all for la bici ha scivolato. In the complex constructions (b) (X ha fatto una scivolata), the motorbike totalised
8 examples vs. none at all for the bike.
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(72) #La bici ha fatto una scivolata.
the motorbike had a slide
Control, however, is an entailment of the verb, that is, it cannot be considered as a property
that can be ascribed to an entity independently, unlike animacy. The very same Daniel is in
control in (73a) and is not in (73b).
(73) (74) Daniele mi ha promesso di venire.
Daniel promised me he will come
(75) Daniele conosce la risposta.
Daniel knows the answer
Summing up, it looks as if there can be no common ground in the examples we looked at
so far. The property of animacy is not compelling for the subject, since agentivity clines can be
observed between non-animate entities, and it does not imply volition or control. Control can
explain the contrast between (67) and (70), but cannot be at the origin of the di￿erence between
(61) and (64). In other words, the quick survey of the examples proposed in this section makes
the point for trying to solve the notorious problem of linking theories, namely the fact that the
broad inventory of possible thematic roles often assumed in decompositional approaches, and
the even larger number of semantic features associated with these, are sometimes not sharp
enough to capture the selectional restrictions of verbs within one and the same language. In the
following section, we propose a non-restrictive de￿nition of the Agent role, capable of encom-
passing the inventory of features evoked to describe the cases discussed here.
3.2 The Agent role
As noted by de Lancey (1990), the semantic category of Agent must be undertood as intensional.
Agent is a relation that can be predicated only of particular entities with respect to particular
events. It makes sense then to ground the de￿nition of agentivity ￿rst and foremost in the
structure of an event type. The view that we will adopt here is that dynamic events can be
represented essentially by causal chains, and that thematic positions can be de￿ned in terms of
causal relations. The role of agent is then related to causal responsibility and to the status of
￿rst link of the chain.
Cognitive semantics considers causation as the principle that underlies the fundamental
sense of agentivity, since the di￿erent properties of agents can be reduced to their role as im-
mediate ormediate causers in a causal chain (de Lancey 1984, Croft 1998). The conceptualisation
of events as causal chains is supported by several studies in cognitive psychology, where a con-
nection has been established also with respect to linguistic expressions. It has been noted that
the perception of events as wholes or as composite entities parallels the linguistic expressions
(e.g. periphrastic or lexicalized causatives) used to describe them (Wol￿ 2003).
Building on this background, we propose that the main entailment that is relevant for agen-
tivity is a causative entailment, which could be expressed in a decompositional analysis by im-
posing a feature ￿￿￿￿￿ on the Agent role. This role thus represents the causal responsibility of
the subject with respect to the event denoted by the verbal predicate. Being causally responsible
for an event means, in practice, to be "the ￿rst identi￿able cause of the event" (de Lancey 1990:p.
7).12 In terms of entailments, then, this approach implies a less restrictive notion of agentivity
12Cf. also Primus (1999) and Schlesinger (2013), for alternative accounts of the role of causation, as a prominent
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than generally assumed in the literature, where neither animacy nor volition are necessarily
part of the de￿nition.
The non restrictive de￿nition that we adopt allows for cross-linguistic variation in the
choice of which properties are relevant for expressing causal responsibility with respect to
which predicates. Some languages may be more restrictive, imposing a morphosyntactic or
semantic feature of animacy or volition for a certain predicate, and other less. Cross-linguistic
variation however will not be our concern here, since our aim is to build a more general frame
for analysing the interaction of the Agent role feature with the properties displayed by the event
participants.
3.3 Agent-related properties as dispositions
The Agent role is identi￿ed with the ￿rst link of the causal chain that de￿nes an event type. But
then, we may ask what legitimates the assignment of the Agent role to a particular entity in the
causal chain, and which properties an entity has to possess in order to be causally responsible
of a particular event.
There may be di￿erent approaches to an answer. One is to look at the set of entailments
of a particular predicate, and indirectly de￿ne the properties that a possible agent may have.
Another way is to move from entailments with respect to a position to the properties that
entities have inmore abstract causal chains. Agentive properties thenwould be the link between
two independent perspectives—that of the verb with that of the event represented by the causal
chain. A verb has roles, an event has participants. We are interested in the properties of event
participants, and then wewish to link them to the entailments of the verb. Invoking dispositions
enables us to bridge these two domains, and we are going to take dispositions as properties
viewed as relevant for events.
Let’s take stock. We introduced the contrast between the pairs of sentences in (1) and (6)
as an illustration of a linguistic phenomenon that calls for an approach based on dispositions,
and we also argued that, in order to describe this agentive component, we need to depart from
the view on dispositions as conditional statements about entities that was mentioned in the
introduction. This is because, in our view, dispositions express a form of potentiality. To be
more precise, dispositions are properties that "bestow a causal power upon their bearers" (Ellis
2002).13 A more precise de￿nition of causal power is provided by Ellis (2012): ‘Any quantitative
property P that disposes its bearer S in certain circumstances C0 to participate in a physical
causal process, which has the e￿ect E   E0 in the circumstances C0, where E is the actual out-
come and E0 is what the outcome would have been if P had not been operating." As noted by
Ford (2012), this description "outlines two criteria for being a causal power: It must dispose
its bearers to be involved in causal processes that i) involve transfer of energy; and ii) would
therebymake a di￿erence in outcome so long as the circumstances remain constant" (p. 190).We
contend that entities that can discharge the Agent role must be characterised by active causal
powers, acting in causal processes by impressing energy and by determining, by their action,
entailment or semantic feature.
13Traditionally, both dispositional and categorical properties have been put forward in attempts to describe the
manifest world. Categorial and dispositional properties have been opposed in philosophywith respect to their role in
causation, and the debate is whether all or only some of the fundamental properties have dispositional essences. Ellis
(2012) contends that there is an ontological di￿erence between dispositional properties and categorial properties,
that is, properties that do not have dispositional essences. The debate should not concern us directly here, since we
will focus on dispositional properties as related to causation and triggered by speci￿c events.
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the outcome.
Assuming the association of a causal process to an event-type, we argue that dispositions
are those potentialities that attribute to their bearer the power to be an element of the causal
chain leading to a class of events.
(76) disposition = a property that has the status of a power with respect to a manifestation,
and more generally with respect to a characterisation of events, making its bearer an
element in the causal chain leading to this characterisation of events.
In less abstract terms, and linking causal powers to linguistic realisation, we suggest that
"active" and "passive" powers respectively mean the licensing of the role of Agent or Undergoer
with respect to a verbal predicate. It is precisely when taken in a causal relation that dispositions
can be "passive" or "active". In this paper we are discussing in particular the case of "active"
dispositions that we call agentive dispositions. The general de￿nition in (76) is re￿ned as in (77)
for the speci￿c case of agentive dispositions.
(77) agentive disposition = a property that has the status of a causal power with respect to a
manifestation, and more generally with respect to a characterisation of events, making
its bearer the ￿rst element in the causal chain leading to events under this
characterisation.
It is the link between the property and the manifestation that gives to the property the
status of a power, and, in the case of agentive dispositions, this power is a causative power: the
bearer of the disposition has the potential to be the causer of the event.
3.4 Agentive dispositions in language
Let’s see now how this characterisation of agentive dispositions can be useful if applied to
concrete examples. Take the case of (61) vs. (64), repeated below as (78) and (81).
(78) (79) Mario sta sudando.
Mario is sweating
(80) Mario sta facendo una sudata.
Mario is having a sweating
(81) (82) Il salame sta sudando in questa fase di stagionatura.
The salami is sweating in this phase of the curing
(83) *? Il salame sta facendo una sudata in questa fase di stagionatura.
The salami is having a sweating in this phase of the curing
It should be clear that the characterisation that we are pursuing is not concerned with the
actual manifestation of the event, nor are we claiming that dispositions are to any extent a way
to de￿ne thematic roles. Rather, the question we have been addressing is that of ￿nding a way
to express the di￿erence between two potential subjects of the verb sweat in Italian, given the
requirement imposed by the thematic role of the verb. The answer must clarify why it is the
case that both Mario and the salami can be the subject of sweat, but only Mario can be mapped
to the external argument position of the light verb in the complex causative construction.
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The line we are exploring is that an agentive dispositional subject of sweating is viewed
as having some properties that give him the disposition of sweating, i.e. that enable him to be
causally responsible of an event of sweating that realises his disposition, as stated in (84).
(84) Mario has an agentive disposition wrt to [sweat] = Mario possesses the property that is
considered a causal power wrt events of sweating
From the data we have examined, it has turned out that the agentive dispositions that are
relevant in light verb constructions are not necessarily so for the roots in Ata nominalisations.
In other words, the causative light verb in (81) selects for its external argument a causative
feature that has to be checked by an entity with speci￿c causal powers, which are possessed by
Mario but not by the salami.
We have seen that invoking volitionality or control is not really useful for expressing this
causative feature in the light verb construction, since no such constraints are found on theAgent
of the light verb. The contrast recalled in (78) and (81) is suggestive of an animacy opposition.
We have seen, however, that reading the data in this way is also not an optimal solution, for at
least two reasons. First, on an empirical ground, animacy alone cannot explain the contrasts in
acceptability that we observed for Ata-nouns in section 3.1, see in particular (67) and (70). Sec-
ond, and more importantly, animacy is a categorial property, which is ascribed to an individual
independently from its relation to an event.
We manage to defuse both issues by saying that animacy is not relevant per se, but it be-
comes relevant in relation to causal responsibility. In a sense, animacy bestows some causal
powers on its bearer. Mario has a causal power with respect to sweating in (78b) in virtue of his
being an entity self-organised for sweating, and therefore being the primary cause of an event
of that type that has him as an experiencer participant. Similarly, a motorbike is a self propelling
entity and a bicycle is not. The fact of being an entity with (respectively without) this property,
makes it an entity with (without) the power to be causally responsible of a motion event, and
the contrast between (67) and (70) is expected.
In sum, assuming that entities have properties, what we call requalifying a particular prop-
erty as a disposition is precisely the move of characterising such a property relatively to its
causal powers with respect to an event type. In the next section, we analyse light verb con-
structions with Ata nominals as constructions that require this type of requali￿cation.
4 Integrating semantics and syntax
4.1 A hybrid predicate
The view of dispositions as characterisations of properties relativised to the causal power they
can have with respect to an event type, has something to o￿er to a theory of argument selection.
For one thing, it opens the possibility to appeal to the notion of agentive dispositions in order
to account for the contrasts between (67) and (70), repeated here as (85) and (86), abstracting
away from the problematic notion of animacy and from speci￿c entailments such as volition or
control.
(85) ?La moto ha fatto una scivolata.
the motorbike had a slide
(86) #La bici ha fatto una scivolata.
the bike had a slide
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As pointed out above, the contrast is explained in our account by the fact that an engine—as
a motorbike—has the power to be causally responsible of a motion event, whereas a bicycle can-
not be easily seen as self-moving or self propelling. Property requali￿cation brings with it some
speci￿c assumptions with respect to the structure of the light verb construction. The motorbike
in (85) is the subject of a causative light verb, yet it is licensed for this function in virtue of
its disposition to be causally responsible of an event of a speci￿c type, namely a motion event.
However, the characterisation of the event type is provided by the nominalised verb, not by
causative fare.14 Moreover, the nominalisation is not alone in characterising the event. As said,
the causative light verb imposes a constraint on this external argument position that is stronger
than the one imposed by the nominalisation. In other words, the event of sliding (scivolare) is
an event of change of place when the root is realised as a verb, but when it is described via an
Ata nominalisation (i.e. as scivolata) embedded in the light verb construction, the entity that
undergoes the change of location must also be actively implicated in the event. The task is
therefore to explain how these components combine to yield the strengthened requirement on
the external argument.
The issue of the embedding of Ata-nominalisations in light verb constructions has been
tackled by previous analyses in di￿erent ways. Samek-Lodovici (2003) has proposed that the
complex predicate has a unique argumental structure inherited from the base verb, via a system
of transfer and suppression of thematic indices. His proposal cannot predict contrasts such as
(78) and (81), nor that between (85) and (86). Indeed, the contrast between (86) and (87) shows
that the causative light verb does contribute a speci￿c constraint, and that the thematic role of
its external argument cannot simply result from a transfer from the argument structure of the
nominalised verb.
(87) La bici è scivolata.
The bike slided down
Folli and Harley (2013) have taken the opposite route and dealt with the argumental struc-
ture of the two predicates independently. More speci￿cally, they claim that the external argu-
ment of the light verb is not transferred from the nominalised verb, rather ‘the complex predi-
cates formed with both fare and dare are agentive, and both these light verbs select an external
argument of their own’ (p. 102). The nominalisation does not select arguments. Their proposal
too does not make the right predictions. The causative entailment imposed by the light verb
turns out to be relevant relatively to the speci￿c event denoted by the nominalisation, not in
general terms, as it could be expected if the constraint were projected independently by the light
verb alone, see again the contrast between (85) and (86). More generally, the assumption of a
constraint independently projected goes against the idea that we try to spell out here, namely
that the nominalising su￿x itself contributes a piece of information concerning the realisation
of the external argument.
Our approach is justi￿ed in the light of clear empirical data, and, we claim, is sound from a
theoretical point of view.Ata-nominalisations in light verb constructions are nominal predicates
that denote in the event domain, i.e. their type is <  , t > and not < e, t >, where   is the type
of events. One implication of our analysis is that information concerning the structure of the
event denoted by the nominalised verb, and of its conceptual argument structure, must still be
14Recall that this remark and the content of the whole section apply to the light verb construction with dare too.
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accessible at the level of the composition between nominalisation and light verb. This means
that the nominalisation, when it is complement of f are , is not by itself a closed interpretive
phase. If we assume that the interpretive phase closes o￿ at the DP level15, the event noun
should not be analysed as a DP but as a property. It is interesting to note that the nominalisation
can hardly be a de￿nite or quanti￿ed over, when it is complement of a light verb, see (88).
(88) Gianni oggi ha fatto *la scivolata/*tutte le scivolate/*ogni scivolata.
Gianni today has made THE slide-ATA/ all the slide-ATA.PL/ each slide-ATA
But in other syntactic contexts, it is possible for Ata-nouns to be complement of determiners.
In such cases, the DP can be used independently as argument of a lexical verb or a preposition,
and can be quanti￿ed over (89), albeit with some restrictions coming from the interpretation of
the external argument.16
(89) L’allenatore ha trattenuto il respiro ad ogni scivolata/a tutte le scivolate/durante la
scivolata del pattinatore.
The trainer has held the breath at every slip/ at all the slips/ during the slip of the skater
The trainer held his breath every time/when the skater slipped
Thus, the light verb construction is a somewhat hybrid structure. On the one hand, con-
trasts such as (85) and (86) show that the thematic role associated to the external argument
position of the light verb fare is determined also by entailments projected by the nominalised
verb. The dispositions that legitimate the denotatum of the subject DP as Agent in (85), and
not in (86), are de￿ned with respect to a verb of motion. On the other hand, the light verb fare,
which has become semantically bleached and acts as a purely functional head, still contributes
the semantics of a causative verb. This contribution determines a strengthening of the causative
entailment for the thematic role associated with the subject position of the complex predicate,
cf. (86) vs. (87).
The causative entailment is an essential piece of information for the saturation of the sub-
ject position. In order to be causally responsible of the event denoted by the nominalised verb,
the entity that discharges the role of Agent must possess at least a property that can be requal-
i￿ed as an agentive disposition for the type of event. In the next section, we will propose a way
to build this hybrid structure.
4.2 Building the predicate
The task of the light verb is understood as to bring the event denoted by the nominal–with
its properties–into the main predication. Tovena and Donazzan (2015) have proposed that the
nominalisation that occurs in a light verb construction merges with the head v via the special
rule in (90), and we adopt this analysis.
(90) Event Identi￿cation with Role Composition
If Z is a binary branching structure with daughters X and Y, and X is of type
< e, <  , t >> and Y is of type <  , t >, then:
[[ Z ]] =  x  e [ [[X]](x) (e) & [[Y]](e) ]
15Cf. e.g.Frascarelli (2006) for discussion.
16See section 2.2.3 for an explanation of these constraints with respect to the nomen vicis interpretation of Ata-
nouns.
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(91) [[X]] =  x e[Agent(e,x) & event(e)]
(92) [[Y]] =  e[R(e) & INITIATOR(e)=x & DELIMIT(e)]
(93) [Z]] =  x  e[R(e) & DELIMIT(e) & event(e) & Agent(e,x)]
The ￿rst node X in (90) contributes the possibility of having an external argument via the agen-
tive role, the Davidsonian argument, and a characterisation of the eventuality as an activity. This
is the contribution of the light verb. The second sister node Y in (90) contributes the Davidsonian
argument, the characterisation of the event, by providing a root R for predicates of events. It
contributes to aspect via constraints on the event atelicity and boundedness17, and contributes
a characterisation of the eventuality as an activity via the requirement that it be associated with
an entity that is an initiator. This is the contribution of the nominalisation. In the mother node
Z, one gets the complex predicate that can apply to the external argument. The requirements
on the event coming from the two sisters are combined. The free individual variable in Y is
identi￿ed and brought into the domain of the lambda operator that binds the individual vari-
able argument of Agent in X. The role composition in (90) is licensed in virtue of the fact that
the role contributed by the nominalisation is (either equal or) subsumed by the role contributed
by the head daughter. Thus, the weaker speci￿cation gets deleted. Next, the complex predicate
built via (90) composes with the expression that provides a value for the external argument
position associated with the agentive role, provided it has the required disposition.
Let’s dwell on rule (90). The role composition turns out to be a sort of ￿lter, because only
entities with agentive dispositions can provide the value for the agent argument position. As
just said, the role contributed by the nominalisation is subsumed by the role speci￿ed by the
light verb, but is not identical to it. This situation results from the hybrid nature of the complex
predicate. Let’s proceed in a bottom up way. First, the nominalisation states a more general role
of initiator. The external argument cannot be overtly realised, but it is conceptually present and
a constraint is imposed on its interpretation. Three cases can be envisaged. When the root R
would derive a verb that imposes a stronger constraint on the realisation of the thematic role
associated with the external argument, it can also derive an Ata nominalisation. For instance, a
verb like nuotare ‘swim’ requires an Agent, and initiator is a more general constraint. When the
root R imposes a weaker constraint, such as Experiencer with psych verbs, the nominalisation
cannot be derived, e.g. *amata ‘love-Ata’, *conosciuta ‘know-Ata’. Finally, when the root Rwould
derive a verb that does not imposes an agentive role but is dynamic, and therefore potentially
associated with a causal chain, the nominalisation can be derived, e.g. caduta ‘fall-Ata’. Second,
the light verb strengthens the general role introduced by the nominalisation by imposing the
more speci￿c role of Agent, which subsumes the initiator role.
Summing up, i) there is only an initiator in the nominalisation step, whether or not the
root R would derive a verb that imposes an Agent role; ii) the light verb is a functional head
that performs the syntactic operation of introducing the external argument, whose semantic
counterpart is the operation of imposing an agentive requirement. It must be a true agent that
must be able to be the ￿rst link of a causal chain.
From the composition of roles, and the status of ￿rst link of a causal chain, it follows that
the subject of the light verb must refer to the same entity that is the initiator of the event de-
scribed by the nominalisation, as illustrated in section 2.2.1. The conceptualisation of the event
17As said in section 2.3, aspectual constraints have been spelled out by Tovena (2015), but we use a simpli￿ed
version because the focus of the discussion in this section is not on aspect.
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described by the complex predicate as a unique causal chain allows us to integrate the en-
tailments projected by the nominalisation into the complex predicate. The existence of such a
unique causal chain shows in the relevance of agentive dispositions. When one considers the
properties that are relevant for discharging the role of Agent of the light verb, these proper-
ties are those that are relevant for the event described by the nominalisation. Dispositions are
properties ascribed to an entity that are perceived in the perspective of a manifestation. Assume
the association of a causal chain to an event-type. Talking of agentive dispositions is a way of
telescoping two pieces of information. On the one hand, agentive dispositions are properties
ascribed to an entity and, on the other hand, those properties are seen as the ￿rst element of a
causal chain leading to a class of events.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have o￿ered a new argument for introducing dispositions in the analysis of
natural language. We presented data drawn from complex predication in Italian that show the
need for a ￿ner-grained characterisation of the properties associated with the Agentive role.
These ￿ne-grained agentive properties were described as agentive dispositions. In the context
of argument selection, an agentive disposition is a property that holds of the instantiator of
the external argument position and is understood to be a power for the realisation of the event
described by the event predicate of the clause.
The empirical case of Ata-nouns o￿ers an interesting case for exploring the constraints
imposed by verbal meaning on thematic positions. In nominalisations, traditionally the external
argument is deemed suppressed, but in Ata nominalisations it is still semantically active. When
the nominalisation is part of a complex predication, the semantic requirement within it is to be
combinedwith the requirement of the external argument of a light verbwith causativemeaning.
Assuming that the light verb has undergone semantic bleaching, at least to a certain ex-
tent, and that it only preserves its causative meaning, it is then possible to reduce the (proto-
)entailments of the light verb to a single entailment, namely that the subject of the verb be
responsible for causing the event.
To conclude, let us stress that our argument for "active" (or rather, agentive) dispositions
is not an argument against the "passive" dispositions analysis. We are not saying that -able
adjectives such as breakable and their counterparts across languages shouldn’t be analysed as
expressing dispositions ascribed to an entity in a patient role. In our view, a theory of disposition
can be considered, from the point of view of a linguist, as a theory of the di￿erent ways in which
languages express dispositions. In this paper we take a speci￿c empirical fact as our starting
point, and we show that the notion of disposition can be useful to deal with a more general
phenomenon, which is that of argument selection.
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Partial Manifestations
Nick Kroll
There has been a movement, growing over the last twenty years, to
treat dispositionality as irreducible and, in turn, o￿er dispositional ac-
counts of important metaphysical matters such as causation, the laws
of nature, and modality. However, unlike the earlier turn towards pos-
sible worlds in metaphysics, the turn towards dispositions hasn’t had
much impact in semantics. But this is largely because semanticists
have yet to consider what dispositional analyses of (say) tense, aspect,
conditionals, generics, or modals would look like. My aim in this paper
is to push the movement forward on both the metaphysics and seman-
tics front by taking the ￿rst steps towards a dispositional account of
events in progress (the metaphysics front) and the progressive aspect
(the semantics front).
Keywords: Progressive Aspect, Dispositions
1 Introduction
Bad news. You just ingested some poison. Worse news. The poison is lethal: it is disposed to kill
those whose ingest it. And the poison’s disposition is manifesting. You are sweating, nauseous,
and feel the end approaching quickly.
Good news. I have the antidote. Better news. I administer it and save your life.
The antidote prevented the manifestation of the poison’s disposition. Sure enough, the
poison was killing you. But it didn’t kill you–thanks to the antidote.
In the literature on dispositions, something that prevents a disposition from either partially
or fully manifesting (without taking away the disposition) is called a mask, and a disposition
is said to be masked when a mask does its job. So, the antidote is an example of a mask, and it
masks the poison’s disposition to kill.1
This case is also an example of something those working on the semantics of the progres-
sive aspect are familiar with: the imperfective paradox. The imperfective paradox is simply the
observation that an event in progress need not culminate, and so the inference from a past pro-
gressive to its perfective correlate is not, in general, a valid inference.2 The past progressive The
poison was killing you is true but its perfective correlate The poison killed you is false.
And so we might wonder:
• When events in progress fail to culminate, is it always in virtue of something interfering
the manifestation of a disposition?
Further re￿ection might give rise to the more general question:
• Are events in progress simply partial manifestations of dispositions?
For helpful comments and discussion, I’d like to thank Bennett Helm, Glenn Ross, and participants of the
Workshop on the Morphological, Syntactic and Semantic Aspects of Dispositions at University of Stuttgart.
1The poison example is due to Bird 1998. Masks owe their name to Johnston 1992.
2Dowty 1977 was the ￿rst to stress the importance of the imperfective paradox in the semantics of the progres-
sive. He also coined the phrase.
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Let’s suppose the answer is “Yes” to our more general question. Should semanticists work-
ing on the progressive care? Probably not that much if orthodoxy is correct. According to or-
thodoxy, both dispositions and progressives are to be analyzed in terms of possible worlds and
so a tight connection between the progressive and dispositions might be somewhat interesting
but overall not much of a surprise.3
Many theorists, however, have started to take seriously the view that dispositionality is
irreducible.4 If this view is correct, then semanticists working on the progressive should care
about whether events in progress are just partial manifestations of dispositions. For if events in
progress are just partial manifestations of dispositions and dispositionality is irreducible, one
would hope for, and expect, a dispositional analysis of the progressive.
Now I’m going to just assume that the view that dispositionality is irreducible should be
taken seriously. My primary goal, then, is to get you to hope for, and expect, a dispositional
analysis of the progressive by arguing that an account of events in progress as partial manifes-
tations of dispositions is plausible and worth taking seriously. My secondary goal is take some
steps toward satisfying your newfound desire for a dispositional analysis of the progressive. In
short, my aim is to make some progress towards a dispositional account of events in progress
and the progressive aspect.
2 Events in progress
Let’s start with an initial attempt at an account of events in progress as partial manifestations
of dispositions.
(1) Necessarily, e is a   event in progress at t i￿ e is, at t , disposed to become a   event and
this disposition is activated at t .
There are two features of this account of events in progress that immediately stand out. First, it
ascribes dispositions to events. Second, it appeals to the notion of a disposition being activated.
First things ￿rst. Dispositions are usually taken to be properties of objects. Certainly, the
standard philosophical examples of dispositions (fragility, solubility, irascibility, etc.) are prop-
erties of objects. So, it might seem a bit odd to think of events as having dispositions. Some
might even claim that it is a category mistake to ascribe dispositions to events.
However, if we think of dispositionality as a special sort of potentiality, then there shouldn’t
be a problem with ascribing dispositions to events.5 Consider a well-worn example for the lit-
erature on the progressive. Suppose Mary went for a walk and in doing so partially crossed
the street only to be run over by a bus.6 Now Mary’s walk has variety of properties. And one
property it has, during a certain stretch of time anyways, is the property of being a crossing the
street event in progress. And this property is one that involves potentiality. Indeed it seems to
involve partially actualized potentially. To put it another way, if e is an event of Mary crossing
the street in progress, then e has the potential to become an event in which Mary crosses the
3See Asher 1992, Bonomi 1997, Dowty 1979, Higginbotham 2009, Landman 1992, and Portner 1998 for a sampling
of the orthodoxy concerning the progressive. See Choi 2008, Goodman 1954, Lewis 1997, Manley and Wasserman
2008, and Steinberg 2009 for a sampling of the orthodoxy concerning dispositions.
4See Bird 2007 , Ellis and Lierse 1994, Molnar 2003, Mumford 1998, and Vetter 2015 for a sampling.
5Thinking of dispositionality as a special sort of potentially doesn’t imply a reduction of dispositionality any
more than thinking of knowledge as a special sort mental state implies a reduction of knowledge (which it doesn’t).
Also, see Vetter 2015 for a reduction of modality to potentiality.
6This example, I believe, begins with Dowty 1979.
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street, a potentiality which has been partially actualized. This should be relatively uncontro-
versial. But if it is, then it shouldn’t be controversial to think of events as having dispositions:
Mary’s walk, for a certain stretch of time, has the property of being disposed to become one in
which she crosses the street.
But one might object that I’m moving too quickly. Potentiality, after all, doesn’t imply
dispositionality. A coin may have the potential to land heads without being disposed to land
heads. So, I shouldn’t be moving so quickly from an event having a certain potentiality to an
event having a certain disposition.
Well, take the coin. It is disposed to land heads or tails even though it is not disposed to
land heads or disposed to land tails. But for any coin, if it has the potential to land heads or
tails, then it must be that either the coin has the potential to lands or the coin has the potential
to land tails. In general, if x is disposed to F or G, then it doesn’t follow that x is disposed to F
or disposed toG; but if x has the potential to F orG, then it does follow that x has the potential
to F or the potential to G. This is one of the ways in which dispositionality is a special kind of
potentiality.
But Bonomi’s multiple choice paradox shows that events bear this mark of dispositionality.
Here’s Bonomi’s illustration of the paradox.7 Suppose Leo has decided to drive to Paris or Metz
and is using the ￿rst part of his drive, the part before the road forks, to make his ￿nal decision.
Then, during the ￿rst part of his drive, Leo is driving to Paris or Metz even though he’s not
driving to Paris or driving to Metz. Thus, we also ￿nd an important mark of dispositionality
in the case of events in progress. I conclude, then, that it isn’t some kind of category mistake
to ascribe dispositions to events. In Bonomi’s example, we have an event that is disposed (at
a certain time t ) to become a Leo drives to Paris or Metz event even though this event isn’t
disposed (at t ) to become a Leo drives to Paris event or disposed (at t ) to become a Leo drives
to Metz event.
Let’s now turn the other feature of (1) that immediately stands out: the notion of a dispo-
sition being activated. Some salt is stored in a jar. It’s taken out, placed in water, and dissolves.
When the salt was in the jar, its disposition to dissolve was dormant. When it was placed in
water, its disposition to dissolve was activated. And this is all that is meant by “activated”: a
disposition is activated just in case it isn’t dormant.
A further clari￿cation might be necessary to avoid a possible misunderstanding. It is often
assumed that any given disposition is associated with a manifestation type and a stimulus con-
dition. So, for example, solubility is associated with the dissolving, its manifestation type, and
being submerged in water, its stimulus condition. Following Vetter 2015, I’m skeptical of the
claim that a disposition must have a stimulus condition. But let’s put that aside. The important
point is that one shouldn’t assume that a disposition is activated whenever its stimulus con-
dition obtains. Some salt can be submerged in water without its disposition to dissolve being
activated. Just suppose it is encased in plastic. The stimulus condition for the salt’s disposition
to dissolve obtains. But the plastic prevents the disposition from being activated. Generalizing,
a mask can prevent a disposition from manifesting even though it is activated (e.g., the poison
case). And it can prevent a disposition from manifesting by preventing it from being activated
in the ￿rst place (e.g., the salt case). Let’s now see why we need the activation condition in (1).
We need the condition that the disposition be activated because it seems possible for an
7Bonomi 1997 o￿ers more than one illustration of the paradox. The example that follows involves an agent. But
Bonomi o￿ers another example without agents to show that the paradox doesn’t crucially involve agency.
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event to be disposed to become a   event even though this disposition is dormant. I’m not sure
if I have a completely convincing example of such a scenario. But here’s a try.
Suppose you need your computer to run a large number of tasking processes. However,
you know that the computer is disposed to overheat when it runs such processes. So you take
extreme measures: you rent a commercial air-conditioner and set it at its lowest setting. You
are now freezing but at least the the computer can do its work. Suppose it does. It seems to me
that this event of the computer running such and such processes is an event disposed to become
one in which the computer overheats. However, the air-conditioner masks this disposition: it
prevents the disposition from being activated in the ￿rst place and so prevents even a partial
manifestation of the disposition.
As I said, I’m not sure if this is a completely convincing example. Thinking about it, how-
ever, convinces me that it should be possible to come up with a completely convincing example.
But if I wrong, we could drop the activation condition on the grounds that whenever an event
is disposed to become a   event, this disposition is activated.
In any case, it is time to address the problemwith (1). To state the problem, we need to brie￿y
describe a distinction made in the study of lexical aspect. This is the distinction between telic
and atelic verb phrases (VPs). The distinction is sometimes characterized in terms of culmination
or temporal boundedness. Simplifying somewhat, the idea is this. Take a simple sentence in the
simple past. If the sentence describes a situation as one that involves a culmination/temporal
bound, then its (unin￿ected) VP is telic. Otherwise, its VP is atelic. For example, Willa built
a house describes a situation as one that involves a culmination/temporal bound: namely, the
point at which Willa ￿nshes building the house. So, the VP build a house is telic. On the other
hand, Mirah walked doesn’t describe a situation as one that involves a culmination/temporal
bound.8 So, the VP walk is atelic. Another feature of atelic VPs is that they, unlike telic VPs, are
homogeneous in the sense that if   is a sentence with an atelic VP and   is true of a su￿ciently
extended situation s , then s can be divided in sub-situations (with no remainder) such that   is
true of each these sub-situations. In short, if Mirah walked is true of an su￿ciently extended
event, then that event can be divided into smaller events such thatMirah walked is true of each
of the smaller events. This is not the case withWilla built a house or any other sentence with a
telic VP.9
To extend the telic/atelic distinction event types, we can say that   is a telic event type just
in case what it is to be a   event involves having a culmination/temporal bound; otherwise  
is an atelic event type.
Now for the problem with (1). I’ve been careful with the examples I used in clarifying (1).
Each example has been a telic event in progress. But consider an atelic event in progress like
one of Mirah walking. There is something odd saying that such an event is disposed to become
a Mirah walks event. What’s odd is that any su￿ciently extended event in progress of Mirah
walking is already a Mirah walks event. So how can it be disposed to become one if it is already
one?
In previous work, I appealed to resultant states to get around a similar issue.10 I’ll do the
same here. A resultant state is a state of an event having taken place. So, if Willa built a house,
8Of course, the VP walk could be true of an event that has a culmination. For example, if an event of Willa
walking to the store is one that has a culmination, and walk would be true of such an event. But walk doesn’t
describe the event as involving a culmination.
9See Rothstein 2004 for a much richer overview and discussion of telecity.
10See Kroll 2015.
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then there is a state ofWilla having built a house. Such a state is a resultant state of the respective
Willa builds a house event. Likewise if Mirah walked, then there is a state of Mirah having
walked. Such a state is a resultant state of the respective Mirah walks event.11
To see how resultant states help, observe that a su￿ciently extended Mirah walks event is
made up of other Mirah walks events, each of which has a corresponding resultant state. For
example, suppose Mirah walked from point A to point D. Then there is, among others, a Mirah
walks event that begins at point A and stops at point B and another one that stops at point C.
The one that stops at point C is temporally larger than the one that stop at B. So, the resultant
state of the one the stops at point C is a resultant state of a Mirah walks event that is larger
than the one that ends at point B.
Here’s the idea then: at any time during Mirah’s walk, the event is disposed to bring about
a resultant state of a “larger” Mirah walks event. More formally:
• e is a Mirah walks event in progress at t i￿ (i) e is, at t , disposed to bring about a resultant
state of a Mirah walks event at some t 0 > t , and (ii) this disposition is activated at t .
It follows from this proposal that an event in progress of Mirah walking brings about resultant
states of ever (temporally) larger Mirah walks events. So, we have a nice way capturing the
“progress” of such an event in progress.
Generalizing from this treatment of Mirah’s walk, we get a dispositional account of events
in progress that covers both atelic and telic events in progress.
(2) Necessarily, e is a  event in progress at t i￿ (i) e is, at t , disposed to bring about a resultant
state of   event at some t 0 > t , and (ii) this disposition is activated at t .
To see how this proposal handles telic events in progress, note that when   is replaced by a
telic event type, the manifestation of such a disposition would be the culmination of the event
in progress and so the manifestation would not only amount to the event becoming a   event
but also serve a temporal bound for the event in progress.
We have, then, a dispositional account of events in progress that covers both telic and atelic
events in progress. While I haven’t o￿ered a thoroughgoing argument for this account of events
in progress, I hope to have made a fairly convincing case that the account is plausible and worth
taking seriously. So, given our earlier assumption that irreducible dispositionality is a position
worth taking seriously, you should suddenly ￿nd yourself with a desire for a dispositional anal-
ysis of the progressive aspect.
3 The progressive
Here’s the analysis one gets from the above account of events in progress. Let   be a variable
over base clauses (i.e., simple sentences stripped of tense and aspect) that denote event types.
And let [[ ]] =  . Then:
(3) Necessarily, Prog[ ] is true at t i￿ there is an event e such that e is, at t , disposed to bring
about a resultant state of a   event at some t 0 > t , and (ii) this disposition is activated at
t .
11Resultant states might seem like “ghostly” entities. Maybe they are. But that’s not a serious objection to their
existence. In any case, Parsons 1990 was the ￿rst to bring resultant states to light. Since then they have been put to
a variety of uses in semantics and metaphysics. See Parsons 1990, Szabo 2006, and Zimmerman 2011.
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(3) predicts thatMary is crossing the street is true i￿ there is an event with an activated disposi-
tion to bring about (at some later time) a state of Mary having crossed the street. And it predicts
that Maeva is dancing is true i￿ there is an event with an activated disposition to bring about
(at some later time) a state of Maeva having danced.
Let me stress again that we are working under the assumption that dispositionality is ir-
reducible and so not to be given a modal analysis. We are also working under the assumption
that events in progress are to be understood as partial manifestations of dispositions. Given
these two assumptions, I’m not going to argue for (3) by comparing it to the orthodox modal
analyses of the progressive. This is because, given the two assumptions, modal analyses of the
progressive are already o￿ the table.
I will, however, argue for (3) by highlighting some virtues of the analysis of the progressive.
First, the analysis o￿ers an explanation of the imperfective paradox. Simplifying matters,
an event can have an activated disposition to become a   event without ever becoming a  
event. So, the inference from a progressive to its perfective correlate will not, in general, be
valid.
Second, the analysis o￿ers an explanation of the multiple-choice paradox. As was already
mentioned, an event can be disposed to become a Leo drive to Paris or Metz event without being
disposed to become a Leo drive to Paris event or a Leo drive to Metz event. So, the analysis
predicts that Leo was driving to Paris or Metz does not entail either Leo was driving to Paris or
Leo was driving to Metz.
Third, the analysis o￿ers an explanation of the apparent opacity of the progressive. Just
as Sven, when pumpkin picking, can be disposed to pick a large pumpkin even though there is
no particular large pumpkin such that Sven is disposed to pick it, an event can be disposed to
become one in which Sven picks a pumpkin even though there is no particular pumpkin such
that the event is disposed to become one in which Sven picks that pumpkin. So, (3) can account
for the (default) reading of Sven is picking a pumpkin under which the sentence does not entail
that there is a pumpkin such that Sven is picking it.12
Lastly, the analysis provides substance to the main rival to possible world analyses of the
progressive: partitive analyses. The most interesting partitive analysis is the partial realization
analysis considered, but not endorsed, in Landman 1992 . The basic idea of the analysis is that
Prog[ ] is true i￿ there is an event that partially realizes the event type  . The main problem
with this analysis is that it gives rise to the question: just what is it for an event to partially
realize an event type? Sure enough, one could analyze partial realization in terms of possible
worlds: roughly, e partially realizes   i￿ e would fully realize   if it were to continue without
interruption. But then the partial realization analysis collapses into a modal analysis of the
progressive. (3), however, is a non-modal analysis of the progressive that provides the right
kind of answer: for an event to partially realize an event type   is for the disposition of the
event to become a   event to be partially manifested. In other words, partial realization is to be
understood as partial manifestation.
In closing, let me brie￿y say why I take this last virtue to be the most interesting virtue of
the analysis.
12The pumpkin picking example is found in Stechow 1999, who credits the example to Angelika Kratzer.
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4 Concluding remarks
The movement to treat dispositionality as irreducible and, in turn, o￿er dispositional accounts
of important metaphysical matters (such as causation, the laws of nature, and modality) hasn’t
had much impact in semantics. But this, it seems to me, is largely because semanticists have
yet to seriously consider what dispositional analyses of tense, aspect, conditionals, generics,
modals, and so on would look like. Now (3) might only be the ￿rst step towards a proper dis-
positional analysis of the progressive. Nonetheless, it allows us to appreciate partitive analyses
of the progressive in a new and interesting light. Indeed, it strikes me that (3) serves the most
substantive and illuminating partitive analysis of the progressive to date. Thus, the analysis
serves not only as a ￿rst step towards a dispositional analysis of the progressive but also as a
motivation to develop dispositional analyses in other areas of semantics.
In any case, with (2) and (3), I hope to have made some progress towards a dispositional
account of event in progress and the progressive; and, in doing so, pushed the dispositionalism
movement forward on both the metaphysics front and the semantics front.
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1 Introduction 
Several classes of derived forms have been argued to make reference to dispositions; for 
instance, -able adjectives (soluble, breakable), and names for jobs or activities like teacher, 
jogger. Here we focus on English -er nominals, of which there are two morphosyntactically 
distinct kinds: phrasal -er nominals (saver of lives) and compound -er nominals (life saver). In 
both cases there seems to be a reference to a disposition for the action to occur under normal 
circumstances. That is, a life saver and a saver of lives both have some sort of disposition to 
save lives under appropriate, normal, or stereotypical circumstances.1  
We consider these because while they have similar dispositional meaning, their different 
grammatical structures have been argued to affect their interpretation, and in particular the 
                                                            
1 This notion of disposition is a little less complex than the usual philosophical notion of disposition, only in 
that the circumstances are not specified other than being appropriate, normal, or stereotypical. Cf. fragile, in 
which something breaks when struck, where when struck is a rather precise specification of the circumstances.  
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In this paper we consider how grammatical and conceptual 
knowledge affect children’s and adults’ interpretation of derived -er 
nominals such as cutter of branches (a phrasal -er nominal) and 
branch cutter (a compound -er nominal) in English. While they both 
make reference to dispositions, their different grammatical 
structures affect their interpretation: phrasal -er nominals make 
reference to dispositions that only agents can have, while compound 
-er nominals make reference to dispositions that either agents or 
instruments can have. This study presents three experiments, based 
on picture selection and definition tasks. Our findings reveal a 
difference between structurally-derived and non-structurally-
derived (i.e., purely conceptual) meaning, and in the nature of 
linguistic reference to dispositions — namely, that such reference is 
possible in both a structurally-derived and a non-structurally-
derived fashion, associated, we hypothesized, with different, namely 
automatic vs. controlled, cognitive processes.  
Keywords: dispositions, derived -er nominals, agent, instrument, 
English, grammatical knowledge, conceptual knowledge.  
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way in which they make reference to events. The most striking interpretive difference 
between them is that phrasal -er nominals can only refer to agents, while compound -er 
nominals can refer to either an agent or an instrument used to perform the event.  
Though it is generally agreed that this interpretive difference is driven by differences in 
grammatical structure, there has been much discussion about the precise cause. Rappaport 
Hovav & Levin (1992) suggest that this difference in judgments stems from the idea that only 
phrasal -er nominals have an underlying event argument, associated with the presence of an 
agent: their claim is that phrasal -er nominals are eventive and compound -er nominals are 
non-eventive (see Grimshaw 1990). Following recent theories on nominalizations (van Hout & 
Roeper 1998, Borer 1999, 2003, Alexiadou 2001, among others), the source of the difference 
between eventive/non-eventive nominals in general is related to a structural difference: 
eventive nominals are derived from verbal structures that involve verbal and aspectual 
layers, whereas non-eventive nominals are derived from roots directly and therefore do not 
exhibit properties associated with verbs, such as the ability to have arguments or the ability 
to take aspectual and temporal modifiers.   
 
(1)    a. eventive nominals:      [NP N    [vP/AspP   [root ]]] 
   b.  non-eventive nominals: [NP N                 [root ]] 
 
While most subsequent work on -er nominals agrees that there is a correlation between 
having an event interpretation and the presence of complex internal verbal and/or aspectual 
structure (Alexiadou & Schäfer 2008, 2010; Roy & Soare 2012, 2014; but see Borer 2013: chap. 
12 for a contrastive view), authors disagree on whether the distinction between phrasal vs. 
compound -er nominals should be explained simply in terms of this correlation. Alexiadou & 
Schäfer (2008, 2010) argue, contra Rappaport Hovav & Levin, that -er nominals always have 
an event interpretation, and that any differences between readings, and specifically whether 
or not an actual event is entailed to have occurred, derive from a fundamental split between 
episodic vs. dispositional eventive -er nominals. Only the former entail that an actual event 
has taken place (e.g., a saver of lives must have saved lives). The dispositional meaning does 
not (e.g., lifesaver, who does not need to have saved lives but need only have a disposition to 
save lives). However, for Alexiadou & Schäfer, all -er nominals are cases of grammatical 
event nominals. 
Roy & Soare (2012, 2014), too, argue that animate phrasal -er nominals are complex 
event nominals, and that the dispositional reading results from binding by a generic 
operator. However, they argue that the Alexiadou & Schäfer’s episodic/dispositional 
distinction alone cannot account for the structural and interpretational properties of -er 
nominals. Instead, they use that distinction in combination with Rappaport Hovav and 
Levin’s eventive/non-eventive distinction.  
Crucially, unlike Alexiadou & Schäfer, Roy & Soare account differently for the readings 
of compound -er nominals (branch cutter). For Alexiadou & Schäfer, instruments share the 
same internal structure as dispositional animate nominals, and hence represent a further case 
of grammatical dispositions. For Roy & Soare, this is not the case. They argue that compound 
-er nominals do not exhibit any of the event-related properties exhibited by dispositional 
animate  -er nominals. We refer the reader to these papers for the precise arguments based 
on the distribution of adjectival modification (of the type frequent/constant and old/happy) 
with an event reading, related to the inner event contributed by a putative verbal base. 
Compound -er nominals, it is concluded, are not complex event deverbal nominals, but rather 
mere nominalizations of a root (and verbal/aspectual layers are therefore not realized). 
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Consequently, compound -er nominals do not involve an event variable, and accordingly 
there is no event variable in the structure to be bound by a dispositional or generic operator.  
The crucial point here is that the dispositional meaning of compound -er nominals cannot be 
linked to grammatical properties. Thus, the two kinds of -er nominals, though they both 
make reference to dispositions, do not make reference to dispositions in the same way. For 
phrasal    -er nominals the reference to dispositions is calculated through grammatical 
structure, while compound -er nominals make reference to dispositions merely through 
conceptual knowledge. 
These two sources of dispositional meaning differ in the kind of knowledge they presume. 
Grammatical (or structural) knowledge is the knowledge of grammatical structure, which 
plays an essential role in calculating the truth-value of phrases, for instance; conceptual (or 
real-world or lexical) knowledge, on the other hand, is associated with what is commonly 
thought of as lexical or encyclopedic knowledge. Structurally, both types of knowledge are 
by assumption associated with radically different representations. Grammatical knowledge is 
contributed by functional structure that is visible to syntax; in recent decompositional 
analyses it typically involves dedicated functional heads, or the presence of a variable in 
structure. Conceptual knowledge is not concerned with functional structure, but rather with 
the meaning of roots (Borer 2005 among many others). It is the meaning shared, for instance, 
by a series of words like ‘forest’, ‘forestry’, ‘deforestation’, that share a common concept 
‘forest’, but whose categorical and grammatical properties may differ.  
Compound -er nominals involve reference to objects and agents that are seen as having 
(mere) ‘conceptual’ dispositions: the dispositional sense comes from our knowledge of the 
world, and it is not associated to any piece of structure or semantic component that the 
grammar perceives and computes. For instance, names for instruments are simple names of 
entities, just as other words like table, flower, notebook, which happen not to have a 
particular association with a disposition. We adopt this analysis here (but see Roy & Soare 
2013 for a more detailed discussion of the distinction between conceptual vs. grammatical 
event nominals more generally). 
To summarize, our starting point for understanding the interpretations assigned to 
phrasal and compound -er nominals is that, as Rappaport Hovav & Levin argued, phrasal and 
compound -er nominals have similar conceptual meaning, but different grammatical 
properties, resulting in an interpretive difference. Dispositional meaning can arise either 
grammatically or conceptually. Phrasal -er nominals require their referent to have an agent 
and a disposition that is constrained by the grammatical information, while the referent of 
compound -er nominals may have a mere conceptual disposition. 
Phrasal and compound -er nominals thus provide a good minimal pair to test to what extent 
adults use grammatical information in phrasal -er nominals as a source of meaning. 
Specifically, we predict that if grammatical information is used exclusively, dispositional 
animate phrasal -er nominals and instruments will be treated differently. On the other hand, 
if conceptual knowledge is prevalent, we expect to see less difference between animate 
dispositions and instruments. The aim of the current study is, thus, to test -er nominal 
judgments experimentally as a case study for conceptual vs. grammatical knowledge. 
However, in so doing we will attempt to control for dispositional meaning, a possibility now 
afforded by new understanding based on recent research on dispositions in -er nominals. We 
test adults – whom we know have fully acquired the requisite grammatical knowledge – to 
understand what factors influence the use of conceptual and grammatical knowledge for 
reference to dispositions. 
 GRAMMATICAL AND CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF -ER NOMINALS   95 
2 Prior work  
Only a few experimental studies have investigated interpretations of -er nominals, and they 
have taken primarily an acquisition perspective; no experimental study has been done so far 
on adults with the goal of understanding reference to dispositions. Clark & Hecht (1982) used 
an elicited production task to encourage children to produce novel -er nominals by asking, 
e.g., “What would we call someone who / something that opens things?”, finding, as 
predicted, that children used -er nominals such as “opener” to refer to agents more often than 
instruments. Randall (1982) used a picture selection task to explore children’s agentive 
interpretations of     -er nominals like “a biker with no hands”, finding that 5-year-olds 
incorrectly allowed the modifier “with no hands” to modify the event of riding rather than 
the agent himself; that is, they sometimes chose a picture in which the biker had hands but 
did not apply them to the bike. These results were interpreted to mean that children encode 
different information in the structure of -er nominals than adults. In a follow-up, van Hout & 
Bos (2004) tested 5-year-olds and adults to ask more precisely how children’s interpretations 
of these nominals might differ from adults’. Specifically, they asked whether participants 
restricted phrasal -er nominals to agents, as their structure requires. First, in a picture 
selection task, they tested only phrasal -er nominals (e.g., catcher of flies), and asked 
participants to choose between an agent picture (e.g., a man swatting at flies with a 
flyswatter), and an instrument picture (e.g., a flyswatter). Their results were surprising: 
while both children and adults preferred agent interpretations for phrasal -er nominals, 
neither group did so 100% of the time. Children chose agents on 71% of trials, and adults on 
88%. Recall that according to the traditional linguistic description of phrasal vs. compound 
nominals, phrasal nominals are ungrammatical with an instrument interpretation (i.e., a 
catcher of flies can only refer to an agent). 
To follow up on this unexpected result, van Hout & Bos introduced both phrasal and 
compound -er nominals in a truth value judgment task; they asked adults and children 
whether agent and instrument pictures were appropriate depictions of these nominals. 
Again, the results were surprising: in the phrasal condition (e.g., catcher of flies), adults 
accepted the agent interpretation 50% of the time and the instrument interpretation 32% of 
the time. In the compound condition (e.g., fly catcher), they accepted the agent interpretation 
67% of the time and the instrument interpretation 57% of the time. Thus, although they did 
show the expected decrease in acceptance for instrument as compared to agent 
interpretations of phrasal nominals, they still accepted these one third of the time. This is 
even more striking given that overall they were quite conservative, in general only accepting 
any picture to represent the referent of an -er nominal a little over half the time.  
Children showed a different pattern, accepting both agent and instrument interpretations for 
both phrasal and compound nominals at similar (high) rates; their acceptance rates for all 
four conditions were between 84% and 89%, suggesting that they did not discriminate 
between the linguistic conditions. van Hout & Bos concluded that by 5 years of age, children 
are not yet able to use structural information to correctly map phrasal -er nominals to agents, 
and that their syntactic representations for phrasal and compound nominals are the same.  
However, we think this conclusion is too hasty. The poor performance of adults, whom 
we expect to have full structural knowledge, suggests that participants were not accessing 
this knowledge for some reason. We propose that the experimental materials did not control 
for dispositional meaning, and that this hindered adults’ success. Therefore in the current 
study, we take their results as a starting point for further exploring adults’ interpretations of 
-er nominals. Our goal was to advance the methods used by van Hout & Bos by taking into 
account dispositional meaning (Roy & Soare, 2012, 2014). Thus, in the present study, we 
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aimed to examine adults’ interpretations when we control for the contribution of 
dispositions. In Experiment 1, we aimed to increase to a comparable level the conceptual 
information about dispositions of both the instrument and agent. We hypothesized that by 
controlling for conceptual information about disposition, by making both dispositions 
conceptually salient, we would be able to isolate effects of structural knowledge. However, 
this was not what we found; instead, conceptual information still played a role. Therefore, in 
Experiment 2, we pursued the opposite course: we aimed to decrease the conceptual 
information about dispositions we provided to an absolute minimum, again seeking to 
control for such information to allow structural knowledge to drive adults’ interpretations of 
-er nominals. Our findings reveal that, indeed, when conceptual information is absent, 
structural knowledge drives interpretation. Taken together, these two experiments offer a 
new way of thinking about how adults derive interpretations for -er nominals, and in turn, 
suggest that the question of how this grammatical knowledge fares in acquisition cannot be 
pursued without a full understanding of how conceptual and dispositional information 
contribute.  
3 Experiment 1: Increasing the Salience of Agent Disposition 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to determine if increasing the salience of the dispositions of 
the agent would improve performance, allowing adults to perceive the agent as dispositional 
and therefore a better candidate for the referent of a phrasal -er nominal than they have in 
previous research. We used very similar methods as in the picture-selection experiment in 
van Hout & Bos (2004), but with different stimuli and incorporating both phrasal and 
compound conditions in a single design.  
One primary change we made to the paradigm used by van Hout & Bos was in the visual 
stimuli we chose to depict the potential referents of the phrasal and compound -er nominals. 
As van Hout & Bos themselves surmised, the pictures they used to depict agents seemed to 
favor an episodic reading rather than a dispositional one, because the agents were depicted 
performing the action at the time, but were not necessarily canonical agents of the action. 
This would introduce another difference between the depicted agents and instruments, 
namely, that the instruments had strong, clear dispositions in the real world, while the 
agents did not. Accordingly, we used stimuli that did not represent the agent as performing 
the event, but rather as being someone who typically performs the event, and wearing the 
typical attributes related to the event with no representation of dynamicity (a uniform, for 
instance). Additionally, before asking participants to choose the appropriate picture, we 
described both the agent and object in such a way that each of their dispositions was 
explicitly identified. For example, for the nominal branch cutter or cutter of branches, before 
making a judgment participants were told, “Here’s someone whose job is to take branches of 
trees so the sun can shine through” about the agent, and “This is something you can use to 
get branches off trees” about the instrument. By controlling for conceptual information about 
dispositions, our goal was to tease apart the contribution of the grammatical knowledge in 
assigning a referent to the pictures. We predicted that the participants relying primarily on 
grammatical knowledge would distinguish between dispositional agents and instruments, as 
they have different internal structure, and would thus show a strong preference for assigning 
agent interpretations to phrasal -er nominals. However, if the participants rely primarily on 
conceptual knowledge, they should make no distinction, as both dispositional agents and 
instruments have conceptual dispositions (although the source of the dispositional reading 
varies in both cases, as agents but not instrument can also have grammatically-expressed 
dispositions). The outcome would be similar preferences across syntactic conditions. 
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3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen adults, recruited from in and around Boston, MA, were included in the final sample. 
All were native speakers of English, speaking or hearing other languages less than 35% of the 
time, and provided informed consent according to procedures approved by Boston 
University’s Institutional Review Board. 
3.1.2 Materials 
Visual stimuli were pictures, drawn by an artist, of people and objects. See Fig. 1 for an 
example. The agent and instrument pictures for each trial appeared side-by-side, with left-
right positioning counterbalanced across trials. The auditory stimuli consisted of a script 
read by an experimenter to the participant, described below. 
 
Figure 1. Example stimuli from one trial (cutter of branches / branch cutter)  
3.1.3 Apparatus and Procedure 
The experiment was presented in PsyScope (Cohen et al., 1993) on a desktop computer. The 
experimenter sat beside the participant. A second experimenter sat off to the side and hand-
coded all responses. 
The experiment consisted of two training trials, 10 target trials, and 10 filler trials. 
Target and filler trials were interleaved. Target trials always depicted an agent and 
instrument dispositionally related to the event described.  
Because we wanted to establish a procedure that could eventually be extended to 
acquisition research, given that this has been the focus of prior experimental work on this 
topic, we embedded the task in a game in which the participant is to help a puppet from 
outer space who is learning English. On each trial, the experimenter read from a script that 
introduced both a person (on half of the trials) and an object (on half of the trials), and 
described the dispositions of both. For example: “Here’s someone whose job is to take 
branches of trees so the sun can shine through. And this is something you can use to get 
branches off trees.” The order in which the person and object were introduced was 
counterbalanced across trials. Next, the experimenter asked the test query, for example, 
“Now we’re going to teach Alvin the Alien. Can you show Alvin the cutter of branches?”). 
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The experimenter told the participant that the game was designed for children and that they 
would be asked to “show Alvin” on each trial. 
Training and filler trials also always depicted a person and an object, and the story 
related them, but the test query was always a label for one of the two depicted entities, e.g., 
“Where is the clown?“. Some filler trials included multimorphemic referents (e.g., “Where is 
the fairy princess?“) to make them more similar to the target trials. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four presentation lists. The set of pictures 
was identical in all lists. In two of the lists, the item queried on target trials differed from the 
other two lists; in lists A and B, the experimenter asked “Where is the cutter of branches?” 
and in lists C and D, “Where is the branch cutter?”. In each list, half of the target trials 
queried phrasal nominals, and half queried compound nominal. Lists A and C differed from B 
and D only in order; lists B and D presented the trials in reverse order.  
Participants’ pointing responses were recorded by both experimenters: the first 
experimenter pressed the “f” or “j” key for the participant’s left or right point, respectively, 
and keystrokes were recorded by PsyScope; the second experimenter recorded all points on a 
paper coding sheet. The two coding responses were cross-checked, with 100% agreement. 
3.1.4 Predictions 
Idealized performance is depicted in Table 1. If participants use only structural information 
to guide their responses, then they should choose the agent picture 100% of the time on 
phrasal nominal trials, and 50% of the time on compound nominal trials.   
 
 Agent Instrument 
Phrasal 100% 0% 
Compound 50% 50% 
 
Table 1. Idealized performance 
3.1.5 Results 
Participants gave correct responses on 100% of training and filler trials. On 11 out of the 160 
trials in total, they responded that both pictures were correct; these trials were excluded 
from analysis. On the remaining trials, as shown in Table 2, on phrasal nominal trials, 
participants chose the agent picture 73% of the time, and on compound nominal trials, 21% of 
the time. Because this is a forced-choice task, instrument selection is the inverse. We used a 
chi-square test to determine if they chose the agent picture more or less often than chance 
performance in each condition. In the phrasal condition, they chose the agent picture 
significantly more often than chance (X2(1) = 15.6, p < .0001), and in the compound condition, 
significantly less (X2(1) = 24.7, p < .0001), and performance in the two conditions differed 
significantly from each other (Fisher’s exact test, p < .0001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Agent 
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Phrasal 73% 
Compound 21% 
 
Table 2. Actual results from Experiment 1. The percentage of trials on which participants 
chose the agent on phrasal and compound nominal trials.  
3.1.6 Discussion 
The results reveal that while, as predicted, adults are sensitive to the structural differences 
between phrasal and compound nominals, their performance is far from the idealized 
predictions in Table 1. We interpret this to mean that factors other than grammatical 
structure are informing their judgments. Our approach in this experiment was to highlight 
the real-world dispositions of both agent and instrument in order to ensure that both were, 
at least with regard to conceptual disposition, appropriate referents for the nominal. 
However, this approach did not result in greater sensitivity to structural information than 
seen in van Hout & Bos. We suspected that this was because participants were using real-
world knowledge to inform their interpretations, and that this real-world knowledge biased 
them to select instruments because the canonical nominal formations we used bring to mind 
real instruments such as potato peelers, window wipers, and potato mashers. Even in the 
phrasal condition, then, this real-world knowledge may have overridden structural 
knowledge to lead participants to focus on those real-world objects. Thus, in Experiment 2, 
we took the opposite approach: we reduced the amount of lexical/conceptual information 
available, and provided no information about dispositions, in order to block access to 
conceptual information as a relevant source for interpretation.  
4 Experiment 2  
In Experiment 2, we presented adults with phrasal and compound nominals, but absent any 
visual stimuli, in order to minimize the availability of conceptual/real-world knowledge. 
Instead of a picture selection task, we used a definition task. The definition task offers 
several advantages over picture selection; it allows us to present the linguistic stimuli 
without visual stimuli, which reduces the amount of conceptual/real-world information, and 
it also allows participants to imagine any referent, rather than being constrained to two 
choices. We hypothesized that this task would encourage adults to use structural knowledge 
to inform their definitions.  
In Experiments 2b and 2c, we used novel nominal formations like flattener of cushions 
(Experiment 2b), and with novel words like gazzer of towels (Experiment 2c). These novel 
nominals allowed us to minimize conceptual/real-world knowledge even further by blocking 
access to lexical cues. But first, in Experiment 2a, we had to ensure that response patterns 
would not change simply as a function of the change in task from picture selection to 
definition. Therefore, Experiment 2a presented the exact same linguistic stimuli as in 
Experiment 1.  
Experiment 2a 
The goal of Experiment 2a was to see if we would replicate the results of Experiment 1 with 
a definition task. We presented the same items as in Experiment 1, but in a questionnaire in 
which they were simply asked to provide definitions for the nominals. 
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4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-four adults, recruited as in Experiment 1, completed a definition task in the form of 
an offline questionnaire. All were native speakers of English, none of whom had participated 
in Experiment 1. 
4.1.2 Materials 
The items used in Experiment 1, -er nominals presented in either a phrasal (e.g., peeler of 
carrots) or a compound condition (e.g., carrot peeler), were used in this experiment as well, 
except that no pictures were presented. In addition to the target items, 21 filler items were 
included to distract participants from the true purpose of the study. Fillers were known 
compound words (e.g., carwash) or of-phrases (e.g., lily of the valley), half of which referred 
to objects, and the other half to people. As with Experiment 1, two presentation lists were 
constructed; each target item was presented in either the phrasal or compound nominal 
form, but participants saw items of each type. Filler trials were interspersed.  
4.1.3 Procedure 
The participants completed the questionnaire online, via the Internet-based platform 
IbexFarm (Internet Based EXperiment, http://spellout.net/ibexfarm/). They were instructed to 
carefully read each item and “to define it as you would for a dictionary or for someone who 
doesn’t speak English very well”. Each item was followed by a prompt with a blank line, and 
subjects had to fill in the blank with a definition. Items appeared on the screen one by one, 
and participants could not return to earlier items. Completing the online questionnaire took 
less than 30 minutes. 
4.1.4 Results 
Responses were coded according to whether participants chose an agent or an instrument 
interpretation. On 20 of the 240 total items across all participants, both agent and instrument 
interpretations were evident (e.g., “a person or thing that …”), and on an additional 32 items, 
neither was evident (e.g., “I don't know”, or “a retail outlet where one can buy wipers” for 
the item window wiper). These trials were distributed fairly evenly across conditions (52 in 
the compound nominal condition; 62 in the phrasal nominal condition). 
Of the remaining responses, in the phrasal nominal condition, an agent interpretation was 
given 79% of the time, and in the compound nominal condition, an agent interpretation was 
given only 29% of the time. Chi-square tests revealed that these differences were significant; 
in the phrasal condition, they chose the agent interpretation significantly more often than 
chance (X2(1) = 29.225, p < .0001), in the compound condition, significantly less (X2(1) = 
17.021, p < .0001), and performance in the two conditions differed significantly from each 
other (Fisher’s exact test, p < .0001). (Note: To avoid inflating the apparent effects, we 
included “both” and “neither” responses in the chi-square analyses here and below.) 
4.1.5 Discussion 
Performance was strikingly similar to Experiment 1. Again, participants preferred the agent 
interpretation for phrasal -er nominals, and the phrasal and compound conditions differed 
from each other, but their agent preference in the phrasal condition is far lower than the 
100% predicted preference. The fact that instruments express dispositions seems to allow 
them to be selected in the phrasal condition, even though this interpretation is 
ungrammatical. This suggests that subjects were in part led by their conceptual knowledge, 
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associated to the lexical/referential meaning of words, even though the task relied on 
structural, and hence grammatical, decisions.  
Recall that the goal of this experiment was in fact to determine a baseline level of agent 
preference in each condition in this definition task, in contrast to the picture selection task. 
We now proceed to the subsequent experiments, hypothesizing that because conceptual 
meaning arises from what we know about the referents of words, we would be able to 
encourage use of structural cues to meaning by decreasing lexical/referential cues. We do so 
in Experiments 2b and 2c by introducing novel -er nominals for which adults do not already 
have referents.  
Experiment 2b 
First, in Experiment 2b, we created a second questionnaire, comprised of compound and 
phrasal derived -er nominals for which neither the agent nor the instrument are real-world 
people or objects. Our motivation for using these unattested nominals is to prevent 
interference from pre-existing dispositions of the agent or instrument. We predicted that 
these unattested nominals would increase the agent preference in the phrasal condition. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
Thirty adults completed a definition task in the form of an offline questionnaire. All were 
native speakers of English who had not participated in the previous experiments.  
4.2.2 Materials 
Ten new experimental items were constructed for this questionnaire. The same two critical 
conditions manipulated in Questionnaire 2a were used for this experiment: a phrasal (e.g., 
labeler of bottles) vs. a compound condition (e.g., bottle labeler). 
As in Questionnaire 2a, in addition to the experimental items, 21 filler items that also are 
unattested in English (e.g., juice chair, data team) were included. Again, participants saw one 
of two presentation lists such that they saw each target trial in either the phrasal or 
compound nominal form. Filler trials were interspersed. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2a. 
4.2.4 Results 
Responses were coded as in Experiment 2a. Responses that indicated both agent and 
instrument interpretations (16 out of the total 300) as well as responses that indicated neither 
(26 of 300) were again similarly distributed across conditions (19 in the phrasal condition and 
21 in the compound condition). Of the remaining responses, in the phrasal condition 90% 
showed an agent interpretation (significantly more than chance, X2(1) = 83.851, p < .0001) 
while in the compound condition, 73% did so (significantly more than chance X2(1) = 25.290, 
p < .0001). Performance in the two conditions differed significantly from each other (Fisher’s 
exact test, p < .0007). 
4.2.5 Discussion 
As we predicted, in the phrasal condition, the agent preference increased, closer to the 
idealized 100% preference. We claim that this is because we used nominals that did not refer 
to existing instruments, which therefore reduced the influence of world knowledge for 
102 ISABELLE ROY, BRIDGET COPLEY, SAVARIA COLONNA & SUDHA ARUNACHALAM 
conceptual dispositions. We hypothesized that we could reduce this influence still further if 
we used nonce words, and not just unattested nominals with real words. Therefore, in 
Experiment 2c, we replaced both of the content morphemes in the nominals with nonce 
morphemes.  
In the compound condition, the agent preference also increased compared to our 
previous manipulations. We are not sure what to make of this – perhaps the clear preference 
for the agent on phrasal nominal trials influenced performance on the compound trials. In 
any case, our crucial predictions, that performance in the phrasal condition would approach 
100%, and would differ significantly from performance in the compound condition, were 
realized. 
Experiment 2c 
In Experiment 2c, we aimed to reduce the influence of real-world conceptual knowledge still 
further by using nonce morphemes. We predicted that the percentage of agent responses 
would increase even more in the phrasal nominal condition, approaching the idealized 100% 
preference, but that responses in the compound nominal condition would remain similar to 
the baseline we established in Experiment 2a. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Participants 
Twenty-two adults completed a definition task in the form of an offline questionnaire. All 
were native speakers of English who had not participated in the previous experiments. 
4.3.2 Materials 
As in the previous questionnaires, ten experimental items were constructed for this 
questionnaire. As replacing all the lexical items with invented words (e.g., nerger of shricks) 
was judged too difficult for participants, we used invented words only for the verb. The same 
two different conditions were tested: a phrasal (e.g., wongler of groups) vs. a compound 
condition (e.g., group wongler). As before, in addition to the experimental items, 21 filler 
items without -er (e.g., book shinging, huppation of faxes) were included to distract 
participants from the true purpose of the study. Two presentation lists were constructed so 
that participants would only see the experimental items in one of the two conditions. 
4.3.3 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in the previous two questionnaires. 
4.3.4 Results 
Responses were coded as before. Responses in favor of both interpretations (22 out of 220) or 
neither interpretation (88 out of 220) were distributed relatively evenly across conditions (66 
in the phrasal condition and 44 in the compound condition), and were excluded from 
analysis. Of the remaining responses, in the phrasal condition participants provided an agent 
interpretation 94% of the time (significantly more than chance, X2(1) = 58.299, p < .0001) and 
in the compound condition, 76% of the time (significantly more than chance, X2(1) = 24.045, p 
< .0001). Performance in the two conditions differed significantly from each other (Fisher’s 
exact test, p < .0025). 
4.3.5 Discussion 
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As predicted and shown in Table 3, the results for the compound condition are comparable to 
Experiment 2b, but in the phrasal condition, the agent preference was higher than in 
Experiment 2a, and even more so than in Experiment 2b. Experiments 2b and 2c show that 
adults approach the expected 100% preference for agents as referents of phrasal -er nominals 
as we removed more lexical content, that is, when lexical sources of world knowledge are 
removed (Experiments 2b and 2c). 
 
Questionnaire 2a 2b 2c 
Phrasal 79% 90% 94% 
Compound 29% 73% 76% 
 
Table 3. Percentage of agent interpretations as a function of condition for Experiment 2. 
5 General discussion 
The results of our experiments reveal that while adults are sensitive to the structural 
differences between compound and phrasal nominals, the dispositional meaning of -er 
nominals is not always solely driven by structural information. Rather, adults also have 
access to and use conceptual knowledge to the extent that it sometimes can override 
structural knowledge. We found that for adults, the more we limited the availability of 
conceptual knowledge, the more structural knowledge came to the forefront.  
Given this interpretation of the results, some interesting questions remain. First, given 
that both conceptual and grammatical information can be used to constrain a subject's 
mental model of the situation being discussed, the question arises as to why conceptual 
information can sometimes apparently trump grammatical information. In linguistic theory, 
this result is unexpected. To understand why this happens, we propose to make use of a 
distinction between automatic and controlled cognitive processes (Posner & Snyder, 1975). We 
hypothesize that accessing conceptual knowledge is automatic, while using grammatical 
information with conceptual information to construct a mental model is not necessarily 
entirely automatic; that is, it may involve some non-automatic process. Thus, deciding 
whether something has a mere conceptual disposition invokes only world knowledge, but 
deciding whether something has an event-related grammatical disposition invokes both 
conceptual knowledge and structural knowledge; some controlled, and therefore slower and 
more cognitively costly process must be involved. It might even be speculated that the 
combinatorial nature of grammar is more costly than simply accessing stored knowledge by 
virtue of its combinatorial complexity. We are not claiming that accessing grammatical 
knowledge, in and of itself is non-automatic, but that combining conceptual and grammatical 
information to construct a mental model leads to a more costly cognitive process. 
Speculations aside, note that on this account there is only one specific use of 
grammatical information, namely using it to constrain a mental model, that must involve a 
non-automatic process. So this idea does not entail that other processes involved in language 
processing are not generally automatic. And in fact there is independent evidence that non-
automatic processes are invoked in constructing adequate mental models. For instance, when 
asked whether the truth of (2a) and (2b) together entail the truth of (2c), many people will 
say that it does (Evans, Barston, & Pollard 1983). 
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(2) a. All roses are flowers. 
 b. Some flowers are roses. 
 c. Some roses are flowers. 
 
However, on reflection, one constructs a mental model that includes some non-rose flowers, 
and it is clear that the truth of (2c) is not entailed. So evidently, it is perfectly possible to at 
first automatically construct a mental model that erroneously would lead one to give the 
wrong answer for (2). This case does differ from the -er nominal cases in that here it is not 
grammatical knowledge that is being underutilized, but rather the set-theoretical knowledge 
of all and some, as well as the ability to override a “closed world” assumption that roses are 
the only objects in the mental model being constructed. The point nonetheless remains that 
constructing models based on fine-grained relationships expressed by non-lexical 
morphology need not be automatic, fast, and easy. 
In the case of -er nominals, we propose that matching a non-event-related disposition to 
a referent in the world, as one does when picking a referent for a compound -er nominal, is 
an automatic process, as it only involves conceptual knowledge. On the other hand, 
matching an event-related (grammatical) disposition to a referent in the world, as for phrasal 
-er nominals, is not entirely automatic. Since controlled processes are slower and have a 
greater cognitive cost than automatic processes, speakers may use automatic, conceptual 
matching instead of non-automatic, grammatical matching, in an experimental setting. If a 
speaker does use automatic matching for phrasal -er nominals, they will pick out an 
appropriate referent that has a mere conceptual disposition, that is, either an agent or an 
instrument. Some speakers seem to do exactly this, eschewing the more costly controlled 
process, which would constrain the referent to be animate (via the grammatical disposition, 
which apparently requires animacy). This would explain why we did not observe 100% agent 
selection by adults in the phrasal condition in Experiment 1 and 2, but nearly did in 
Experiment 2c where conceptual knowledge cues were essentially absent. 
The fact that structural knowledge can be present (implicitly) but not used thus 
confounds attempts to decide whether speakers have or do not have structural knowledge, 
especially if the task involves some controlled processes. Methodologically, it appears crucial 
to distinguish grammatical and conceptual knowledge, controlling for the interference of 
conceptual knowledge, in order to understand what role structure may or may not play to 
resolve interpretational problems at the syntax-semantics interface. This point leads us to 
believe that it would be worthwhile to probe grammatical knowledge using measures that 
specifically target automatic processing to be able to better determine the extent to which 
adults (and children) have structural knowledge. Thus, on the basis of our results, we cannot 
conclude that van Hout and Bos’s previous acquisition research on this issue necessarily 
demonstrates that children lack the structural knowledge necessary to correctly interpret -er 
nominals and that adults are assumed to have. Rather, just as conceptual knowledge 
interfered with adults’ abilities to use structural knowledge, it likely does so for children as 
well.  
Another question raised by this research is whether this account, in which conceptual 
information interferes with grammatical information, conflicts with a view of semantics as 
interpretive of syntactic structure. Our response to this question is that it does not. The 
semantics that is interpretive of syntactic structure is logical form, and is included in what 
we mean by “structural information”. The interfering semantic information is conceptual in 
nature; it relates to the encyclopedic content of words and their relation to the real world, 
i.e., to knowledge that is related to the lexicon. Just because the conceptual information 
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interferes with the use of logical form (i.e., structural information) does not mean that logical 
form is not interpretive of syntactic structure. 
In this context, it is also important to note that, both Alexiadou & Schäfer’s and Roy & 
Soare’s accounts of -er nominals prove useful in distinguishing conceptual from grammatical 
information. Alexiadou & Schäfer use grammatical dispositions, for instruments as well as 
agents; while Roy & Soare argue that instrument dispositions are simpler than event-related 
agent dispositions. The theoretical difference here is what has led the present study to 
distinguish grammatical vs. conceptual dispositions, and by extension to investigate the 
relative role of grammatical and conceptual knowledge and how they may interact or not.  
With this distinction in mind, it becomes clear how the judgments predicted by 
linguistic theories may vary from the actual results arising from the experimental settings. 
The goal of theoretical linguists in providing judgments is very often to exclude mere 
conceptual information, i.e., world knowledge, to the benefit of structural information. This 
is why binary judgments of the type ‘grammatical’ / ‘ungrammatical’ are in fact possible at 
all: in essence the linguist judges a structure as conforming to the grammar or not, and world 
knowledge does not intervene in deciding if a particular combination may or may not be the 
product of a particular grammatical system. Participants in our picture-naming tasks and 
questionnaires, however, may or may not distinguish structural information and 
grammatical information. There are different cues to the dispositional reading, but they do 
not necessarily separate them; they may not even be explicitly aware that there are two 
different sources of information. 
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A dispositional semantics for ‘can’
Barbara Vetter
Metaphysicians of modality are increasingly critical of possible-worlds
talk, and increasingly happy to accept irreducibly modal properties
– and in particular, irreducible dispositions – in nature. The aim of
this paper is to provide the beginnings of a modal semantics which
uses, instead of possible-worlds talk, the resources of such an ‘anti-
Humean’ metaphysics. One central challenge to an anti-Humean view
is the context-sensitivity of modal language. I show how that challenge
can be met and a systematic modal semantics provided, given an inde-
pendently plausible metaphysics of dispositional properties or poten-
tialities
Keywords: Dispositions, modality, semantics, modal semantics, anti-
Humean
1 Humean and anti-Humean Metaphysics
The world as I see it is a world of potentials: it consists of individual objects that have powers,
dispositions, abilities, and capacities. I have the ability to write this paper, and the capacity for
rational thought. The computer in front of me has the power to connect to the internet, and the
cup from which I am drinking my coffee has a disposition to break if dropped on a hard surface.
On one level, there is nothing controversial in what I have just said. Everyone can agree
on the truth of the sentences I wrote. Philosophical disagreement comes when we consider the
underlying metaphysics in which their truth-conditions are ultimately to be formulated. I believe
that these sentences wear their truth-conditions very much on their sleeves: they are true just in
case (in fact, they are true because) I, my computer, and my cup have certain properties – abilities,
capacities, powers, dispositions – and that’s all there is to it. The world contains irreducibly modal
properties, among which are the properties just mentioned; all it takes for the ascription of such
a property to an object to be true is for the object to possess the property. David Lewis, to pick
an obvious opponent of my view, thinks otherwise: while all our talk of modal properties is fine,
it is far from being the ultimate analysis of such statements as ‘I have the ability to write this
paper’. Ultimately, what is needed in such an analysis is reference to possible worlds: my having
an ability to write this paper amounts to nothing more than my or my counterparts’, in some
relevant possible worlds, doing just that: writing (a counterpart of) this paper.
The world (the actual world, which we inhabit), for Lewis and his followers, is modally
empty: it contains ‘a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then
another. ... we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all.’ (Lewis 1986:ix f.) Modality,
This paper is a reprint of my “ ‘Can’ without possible worlds: semantics for anti-Humeans”, which appeared in
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for Lewis and Lewisians, has to come from outside that mosaic if it is to be real: it has to be
outsourced to other possible worlds. Following Lewis, this thesis has come to be known by the
name ‘Humean supervenience’, and its adherents as Humeans.
My own view is anti-Humean: I believe that this, the actual, world abounds in modality, or
more precisely: in modal properties possessed by individual objects. I have no need to outsource
modality to other possible worlds. In recent years, the anti-Humean view has found an increasing
number of defenders coming from the philosophy of science.1 The metaphysics of science thus
joins forces with a more traditional Aristotelian outlook in rehabilitating a metaphysics that is, on
the one hand, deeply engrained in our ordinary, everyday view of ourselves and the world around
us, and which provides, on the other hand, a better understanding of the natural sciences.
Lewis’s own stated motivation for Humean supervenience was ‘to resist philosophical ar-
guments that there are more things in heaven and earth than physics has dreamt of’ (Lewis
1994:474), but it is precisely this naturalistic motivation that has come under attack. As Maudlin
2007 has argued, contemporary physics itself provides cogent arguments that there is more, in
both heavens and earth, than Humean supervenience has dreamt of. Moreover, the Humean her-
self seems committed to more than physics has dreamt of, namely, purely qualitative properties
or ‘quiddities’ with no dispositional profile. The assumption of such quiddities has little basis in
scientific practice; science, as Simon Blackburn has put it, ‘finds only dispositional properties all
the way down’ (Blackburn 1990:632).
Given this motivation, it should not come as a surprise that anti-Humeanism has proved quite
fruitful in the metaphysics of science. Its most pronounced proponents in recent years have been
‘dispositional essentialists’3, who hold that the laws of nature are grounded in the essentially
dispositional properties of the fundamental physical objects. Anti-Humeans have also begun to
put dispositional properties or ‘powers’ to use, for instance, in thoroughly actualist theories of
modality4 and dispositional theories of causation5.
These anti-Humeans have in common that, rather than reducing dispositions or explaining
them in terms of something else, they try to explain a variety of other phenomena in terms of
dispositions. They may appeal, for heuristic purposes, to such notions as that of necessity or of
a possible world – thus, the dispositional essentialists are prone to say that fundamental proper-
ties have their dispositional profile necessarily, or in every possible world. But at bottom, their
metaphysics is not going to contain possible worlds or irreducible necessities. It contains, rather,
irreducible dispositions.6 (The metaphysics of irreducible dispositions will be spelled out in some
more detail in section 3.)
I am not going to discuss the merits of the various anti-Humean projects in metaphysics here.
Instead, I am going to focus on an area that is as yet unexplored in the growing anti-Humean
literature: the semantics of natural language. I have said that in accepting such modal properties
as dispositions or powers, the metaphysics of science joins forces with a more everyday view
1They include Bird 2007, Molnar 2003, Ellis 2001, and Cartwright 1989, to name but a few.
2See also Molnar 2003 and Bird 2007.
3Prominently, Ellis 2001 and Bird 2007.
4Proponents include Borghini and Williams 2008, Jacobs 2010, Contessa 2009; see also Vetter 2011.
5See Mumford and Anjum 2011, Bird 2010.
6The claim is not that every disposition is irreducible. A glass’s fragility, for instance, can presumably be reduced
to properties of the glass’s constituents and relations between them. The claim is that the basis of this reduction will
itself be dispositional. What is claimed to be irreducible is not this or that particular disposition, but dispositionality
itself.
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of ourselves and the world as deeply modal, or as Goodman (1954) put it, ‘full of threats and
promises’, possessing a variety of abilities, powers, capacities and dispositions. Our everyday
view is expressed in everyday language, which contains an abundance of modal expressions such
as ‘can’ and ‘would’, ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’, and various other expressions. One of the
major achievements of the apparatus of possible worlds is its success in the semantics of such
modal expressions. If the anti-Humean is to do without such tools as possible worlds, she will do
well to develop a modal semantics of her own, linking everyday statements of a modal character
to what she takes to be the fundamental modal character of the world: the modal properties of
individual objects.
The aim of this paper is to take the first steps towards such an anti-Humean modal semantics.
My aim is constructive, not destructive. I do not aim to refute possible-worlds semantics, or any
other candidate modal semantics (whatever that would mean). Rather, I want to show what can be
done if we allow ourselves the very different resources of an anti-Humean metaphysics. Section 2
prepares the ground by delineating the scope of the theory and its main challenge. I argue that the
most congenial starting point for an anti-Humean semantics is what linguists often call ‘dynamic’
modality, and in particular the modal auxiliary ‘can’; and that its most formidable challenge is
to provide the materials for the well-known flexibility and context-sensitivity of ‘can’ (and, in a
second step, of other modal expressions). Section 3 examines the anti-Humean metaphysics in
more detail to show that it provides the materials required to meet the challenge. Sections 4-5
present the core of the semantic account: it specifies the truth-conditions for ‘can’ statements and
an account of their context-sensitivity (4), and subsequently extends them to other expressions of
dynamic modality (5). Section 6 briefly discusses further issues that arise in spelling out the se-
mantics that I present: the relation between de re and de dicto modality, and the relation between
the different types of modality. My aim is to present the view, not to argue for its superiority.
Its chief attraction lies in linking our modal language to the modal reality which, according to
anti-Humean metaphysics, it must be about.
2 Setting the stage
Before we begin to formulate the semantics, we should get a clearer view of its target. Modal
language is a ubiquitous and variegated phenomenon; to make it tractable, we need to define the
scope of our theory and set out its main explanandum.
2.1 The scope
Modality is a many-headed beast. Where should an anti-Humean semantics begin? I hold that the
best starting point is dynamic possibility, and in particular, the modal auxiliary ‘can’. My reasons
for starting here are pragmatic: it is the starting point that best suits the anti-Humean metaphysics.
I will explain why this is so in three steps: first, explaining why the semantics should focus on
dynamic modality; second, explaining why it should focus on a modal auxiliary rather than, say,
the adverb ‘possibly’; and third, explaining why it should focus, among the modal auxiliaries, on
‘can’ rather than, say, ‘would’ as it occurs in counterfactual conditionals.
Why choose a starting point at all? Should we not try to cover all of linguistic modality at
once? As we shall see at the very end of the paper, the anti-Humean semanticist has reason to
believe that not all of linguistic modality is of one kind. Linguistic modality, on the approach
advocated here, is a complex and semantically heterogeneous phenomenon, which has to be
understood in a piecemeal fashion. So let us begin by isolating the best starting point for this
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piecemeal approach.
First, why dynamic modality?
Linguistic modality is standardly partitioned into epistemic, deontic, and dynamic.7 Roughly,
epistemic modality is about what is compatible (or not) with our knowledge, deontic modality is
about permission and obligation, and dynamic modality – or ‘circumstantial modality’, as it is
sometimes called – is about developments that are open (or not) given how things really are. Let
me briefly illustrate these three types of modality with three typical examples.
First example: a detective reviews the inconclusive evidence in a murder case and says ‘John
might be the murderer’. The detective expresses an epistemic possibility of John’s being the mur-
derer; it is compatible with the detective’s evidence that John is the murderer. Second example:
a mother tells her son ‘you may go out and play now’. ‘May’ here, as often, expresses deontic
possibility: the son is permitted to go out and play. Third example: a botanist analyses the soil in
a foreign country, thinking about which plants to import. She informs her colleague ‘Hydrangeas
can grow on this soil’, thus expressing that given the circumstances there is a real possibility
of hydrangeas growing on the local soil, even though she is fully aware that no hydrangeas are
growing on it now. This is a dynamic or circumstantial possibility.
The natural province of the anti-Humean semanticist is dynamic modality. Dynamic modal-
ity arises from how things actually are, and this is precisely where the anti-Humean wants to
locate the modal properties of her metaphysics. Epistemic modality concerns our knowledge of
things, with which the anti-Humean semantics has no special connection. Deontic modality, fi-
nally, requires an element of normativity that the metaphysics, so far, is in no shape to offer. This
is not to deny that the anti-Humean semantics might eventually be extended to cover deontic and
epistemic modality as well; I will sketch some options for doing so at the end of this paper. But
a natural place to start is dynamic modality.
Second, why a modal auxiliary?
I am going to focus on a modal auxiliary, rather than on the philosopher’s preferred idioms
‘possibly’, ‘necessarily’, ‘it is possible/necessary that ...’. One very simple reason for this is
that I will be concerned with the semantics of ordinary language, and it is the modal auxiliaries
that dominate our ordinary modal discourse. (They have also been the subject of a number of
systematic empirical inquiries, on which I shall draw occasionally8.) LikeMondadori andMorton
(1976), I think this is reason enough to focus on the ‘studier laboring class of idioms’ (Mondadori
and Morton 1976:237) that are the modal auxiliaries.
But there is a more systematic reason for this focus. Modal adverbs and adjectives of the
kind that is wide-spread in philosophical discourse do not express dynamic modality in ordi-
nary English. They are typically used to express epistemic modality. Sentence-adverbs such as
‘possibly’ and sentence-modifying constructions such as ‘It is possible that’ are used, outside the
philosopher’s vernacular, to express that something is compatible with what we know. 9 Dynamic
modality is expressed primarily by modal verbs and auxiliaries, such as ‘can’ and ‘be able to’.
Syntactically, these expressions function not as sentence modifiers but as predicate modifiers. To
form a declarative sentence, they require a noun phrase and a verb phrase. Sentence-modifying
7See Kratzer 1991, Palmer 1990, Collins 2009.
8Coates 1983 and Collins 2009 report the results of corpus-linguistic surveys on the English modals; Palmer
1990, as well as Palmer 1974 and Palmer 2001, provides helpful overviews.
9Or, perhaps, what we could easily come to know (as argued in DeRose 1991). See also Kratzer 1981, who
observes the same pattern in the case of German: ‘Sentence adverbs like wahrscheinlich or möglicherweise [‘perhaps’
and ‘possibly’] always express epistemic modality – if they express modality at all.’ (Kratzer 1981:56)
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adjectives such as ‘possibly’, on the other hand, require a complete sentence of any form. Where
an expression such as ‘possible’ is used to express dynamic rather than epistemic possibility, it
tends to have predicate-modifier structure as well, as in the construction ‘it is possible for ... to
...’.
Compare the following four sentences (the example is Keith DeRose’s):
(1) a. It is possible that Frank runs four-minute miles.
b. Possibly, Frank runs four-minute miles.
c. It is possible for Frank to run four-minute miles.
d. Frank can run four-minute miles.
(1-a)
and (1-b) express an epistemic possibility of Frank’s running a four-minute mile, while (1-c)
and (1-d) express a dynamic possibility. As DeRose (1991) points out, when Frank’s new friends
begin to suspect that he is a track star, they may truly and adequately utter (1-a) or (1-b) even
though Frank in fact, and unbeknownst to them, is quite incapable of running a four-minute mile
(‘his only event is throwing the javelin’, DeRose 1991:602). But given Frank’s incapability to
run four-minute miles, (1-c) is false. Conversely, (1-c) and (1-d) may be adequately asserted
by someone who knows that Frank has never run a four-minute mile, judging merely from the
constitution of his legs, lungs etc. (1-a) and (1-b), on the other hand, are not adequately asserted
by a subject who knows that Frank does not actually run four-minute miles.
The contrast between sentence-modifying adverbs or adjectives and predicate-modifying
verbs or auxiliaries has double impact for our purposes. First, it supports the exclusion of those
adverbs and adjectives from an account that is, as we have seen, aiming to account for dynamic
modality. Second, it provides further motivation for the anti-Humean to focus on dynamic, rather
than epistemic, modality. For the predicate-modifying expressions are naturally construed as
ascribing to the sentence’s subject (Frank, in (1-c) and (1-d)) a modal property appropriately
related to the property expressed by the verb phrase (in our examples, the ability to run a four-
minute mile). Sentence-modifying expressions, on the other hand, are best construed as ascribing
a certain status to the propositions expressed by the sentences in their scope (e.g., the proposition
that Frank runs four-minute miles). But it is precisely the ascription of modal properties that an
anti-Humean semantics should take as basic in its modal semantics: after all, modal properties
such as dispositions, powers, or potentials, are precisely what the anti-Humean metaphysics has
to offer.10
Third, why ‘can’?
‘Can’ is one of the most common modal auxiliaries, matched only by ‘would’11. It is, more-
over, the modal that is most closely associated with dynamic modality. According to a recent
corpus survey, ‘can’ was used dynamically in 81% of its occurrences throughout a large cor-
10The contrast as I have drawn it is a syntactic one. The anti-Humean semantics argues that it is also a semantic
one. The syntactic contrast only takes us so far. Some modal auxiliaries, which syntactically function as predicate
modifiers, express epistemic modality – ‘might’ is a case in point. Conversely, a semantics that treats modal expres-
sions uniformly as sentence modifiers – such as standard possible-worlds semantics – may argue that the semantic
structure of dynamic modals differs from their syntactic surface structure. I cannot pursue this question in any more
detail here. See, however, Brennan (1993), who provides genuinely linguistic evidence that the contrast is a semantic
one, and that all dynamic modality ascribes modal properties to individuals.
11Collins 2009:5.
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pus.12 It has a deontic reading (‘Can I go now?’) and, especially in its negated form, an epistemic
reading (‘This cannot be true!’), but those are the minority of cases. Other modals, such as ‘may’,
‘might’, or ‘must’, are primarily deontic or epistemic. So, if the anti-Humean semanticist wishes
to focus on dynamic modality, ‘can’ is the paradigmatic case.
To those familiar with the literature on dispositions, the focus on ‘can’ may still come as a
surprise. Dispositions are generally held to be closely connected to counterfactual conditionals.
Thus a fragile glass is one that would break if it were struck or dropped, an irascible person is one
who would get angry if provoked, and the fundamental dispositions – take electric charge as an
imperfect approximation – are dispositions to respond in a lawful way to certain circumstances:
for instance, to attract positively charged particles when in their vicinity. So why not start with
these counterfactual conditionals, and give their semantics in terms of the dispositional properties
which – on the anti-Humean view – are their grounds or truthmakers?
The problem with this approach has been noted by Eagle (2009). The possession of a dispo-
sition by some relevant object is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a corresponding
counterfactual conditional. It is not sufficient because the disposition may be masked: pack a
fragile glass in styrofoam, and it is no longer true that it would break if struck; sedate an irascible
person with a drug, and it is not true that she would get angry if provoked; place another particle
close to the electrically charged particle, and it may no longer be the case that it would attract
a positively charged particle if that particle were to come into its vicinity. Nor is a disposition
necessary for the truth of the conditional, for conditionals can be mimicked: place a non-fragile
block of concrete at the edge of a windowsill on the 50th floor, and it would break if struck
(because it would fall down to the street 50 floors below); let a good-tempered person go with-
out sleep for three nights, and it may well be true that she would get angry if provoked; place a
sufficient number of electrons close to a positively charged particle p, and it is true that another
positively charged particle would be attracted if it were in p’s vicinity. In general, it appears that
while a disposition is typically an intrinsic and relatively durable property of an individual, the
truth of a counterfactual conditional is highly sensitive both to matters extrinsic to the object in
question, and to its momentary condition.13
Dispositionalists themselves have used such counter-examples to resist a reductive account
of dispositions in terms of conditionals (starting with Martin 1994); but the same problems frus-
trate their own efforts at a reduction or explanation that goes in the opposite direction. In fact,
the Humean is in a better position since she can produce a more complex conditional that does
capture the disposition. The anti-Humean, if she wants to come up with a semantics for counter-
factual conditionals, should not make the same move: after all, the semantics is meant to apply
to all counterfactual conditionals, or else it is of little use.
I will suggest a solution to this problem later in the paper. In the meantime, it seems, again,
that a better place to start is ‘can’. Unlike the counterfactual conditional, ‘can’ has a well-
established use in which it ascribes to individuals relatively intrinsic and durable modal prop-
erties: abilities. In saying ‘Sally can play the piano’ or ‘Linda can run a mile in five minutes’, we
12Collins 2009:98. In contrast, ‘may’ was used dynamically in only 8.1%, ‘must’ in 6.3 %, and ‘would’ in 22.9 %
of occurrences (Collins 2009:pp. 34, 92, 140).
13Further, it is not so obvious that conditionals do provide the best parallel to dispositions. As Manley and Wasser-
man (2008) have noted, the idea that each disposition has a stimulus condition corresponding to the antecedent of a
conditional ‘is plausible only given a paltry diet of examples’ (Manley and Wasserman 2008:72). I have argued else-
where that dispositions are closer to statements of possibility than to counterfactual conditionals (Vetter 2013, Vetter
2014).
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are most naturally understood to ascribe to Sally or Linda an intrinsic property, which is acquired
and sustained by practice and exercise. Abilities of this kind are modal, and they are intrinsic
properties of the individuals concerned – they are just the kind of property in terms of which the
anti-Humean semantics is to be framed. Thus the modal auxiliary ‘can’ is more congenial to the
anti-Humean semantics from the start.
In section 4, therefore, I will start by outlining in some detail the semantics of ‘can’. Other
expressions of dynamic modality will be treated more briefly, and mostly by reference to the
paradigmatic case of ‘can’. I have given some pragmatic, and some linguistic reasons for pre-
ferring ‘can’ as a starting point. None of these considerations is decisive, but they should be
sufficient to motivate the approach that I am recommending. The proof, as so often, is in the
details.
2.2 The challenge
The modal auxiliary ‘can’, I have said, is a congenial starting point for anti-Humean semanticists,
due to its ability-ascribing uses. This observation leads directly to a first challenge. ‘Can’ is
used, not only to ascribe an ability (‘I can play the piano’), but also to express that an ability
is possessed and conditions are suitable for its exercise (‘You can buy a kettle in that store’), or
just that there is a possibility of something coming about (‘You can fall off the cliff if you’re not
careful’).
The anti-Humean approach to semantics, while tailor-made for the ability uses, appears by
the same token to be ill-equipped to account for most others. While ‘I can play the piano’ plausi-
bly ascribes to its subject (the speaker) an intrinsic modal property, the other two sentences and
myriads like them do not. How is the anti-Humean semantics to account for such sentences?
Moreover, not only do different sentences with ‘can’ express different things. One and the
same sentence can express all these different things in different contexts. Is it true to say of me,
right now, that I can swim? Yes and no. Yes: I have learned to swim, my muscles are in working
order, of course I can swim. Then again, no: there is no body of swimmable water anywhere
near me. How should I swim if there’s no water? Clearly, I cannot swim. Or suppose that I am
celebrating my birthday on the beach and have had one glass of wine too many. Can I swim? Yes
and no. Yes: not only have I learned to swim, but there is plenty of water around for me to swim
in. Then again, no: given the amount of wine I have had, I would certainly drown if attempting
to swim here and now, so I cannot swim.
The same sentence (‘I can swim’), applied to the same situation, may with equal right be
either affirmed or denied, held true or false. This is witness to the fact that ‘can’ is context-
sensitive: it is used to express different things in different contexts. We have shifted the context
of assertion by focussing, first, on my muscles etc., and second on the availability of swimmable
water; or in the second case, by first focussing on my training and the opportunity to exercise it,
and second, on my temporary state of inebriation. Some of these aspects appear to be a matter of
my intrinsic abilities, but others concern matters that are extrinsic to me (such as the presence or
absence of water in the vicinity) or too temporary to count towards or against my abilities (such
as the fact that I have had too much wine). If the semantics offered by anti-Humeans has only
intrinsic modal properties such as my abilities at its disposal, it will fail to account for the latter
two kinds of aspects. And if it fails to account for them, then a fortiori it will fail to account for
the context-sensitive variation regarding which of these aspects are relevant.
According to the anti-Humean metaphysics, modal properties such as dispositions and abil-
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ities are real properties of individuals. They themselves cannot, therefore, be context-sensitive:
context-sensitivity is a matter of language, not the world. So what happens when the same sen-
tence, applied to the same situation, seems to change its truth-conditions from one context to
another? In general, such contextual variations are modelled against the background of some-
thing that is not itself subject to such variation. Contexts supply criteria for relevance, and it is
only the relevant parts of the background that go into the truth-conditions of the sentence as ut-
tered in a context. The anti-Humean semantics, if it is to follow this general strategy, must supply
a sufficiently rich background against which contextual variation can take place. Abilities alone
cannot do the job.
‘Can’, of course, is not a a special case; our modal language is context-sensitive through and
through.14 If we develop an account for ‘can’, it must be applicable to other cases as well.
Indeed, this is precisely where the standard, possible-worlds based approach to modal se-
mantics gets its force: it offers an elegant and unified account of the shifting and context-sensitive
meaning of modal expressions. A sentence ‘S can F’, in possible-worlds semantics, says that S
(or S’s counterpart) Fs in some possible world where certain contextually selected facts hold.
Different contexts select different facts: in its ability-ascribing use, ‘I can swim’ says that I swim
in a possible world that holds fixed certain intrinsic features of me; in its ability-plus-opportunity
use, it says that I swim in a possible world that holds fixed those same features plus certain as-
pects of my environment, such as the fact that I am not near any swimmable body of water; and
so on. If the anti-Humean semantics is to be a serious competitor, it has to find some way of
matching the flexibility of possible-worlds semantics.
We have set a challenge to the anti-Humean semantics we are about to formulate. The se-
mantics has to provide the materials for the opportunity- or possibility-expressing sentences, and
generally for non-ability-ascribing sentences with ‘can’, to come out true. In addition, those ma-
terials must be suited to explain the context-sensitivity of sentences such as ‘I can swim’; it must
be such as to make sense of our focussing on one kind of truth-conditions in one context, and on
a different kind in another context.
I hold that the anti-Humean metaphysics, once it is spelled out in sufficient detail, has all the
resources to answer this challenge. The next section will be devoted to providing those details.
Section 4-5 will then put them to use in formulating, first, a semantics for the dynamic ‘can’
(4); and second, applying the insights gained from this paradigmatic case to give sketch of the
semantics for other modal expressions, such as ‘could’, ‘might’ and ‘would’ where they are
used dynamically (5). For the reasons given above, I will focus on dynamic uses of those words,
excluding epistemic and deontic ones. This exclusive approach will be explicitly addressed again
only once the semantics is formulated, in section 6.
But first, the metaphysics.
3 The metaphysics of potentiality: Three observations
The anti-Humean metaphysics sketched in section 1 affords the materials for modal semantics;
but it needs to be worked out in considerably more detail. The aim of this section is to provide
those details. I will develop the metaphysics at an intuitive level, beginning with the familiar
examples of dispositions and abilities that we started with, and gradually generalizing from them
14For a classic exposition, see Kratzer 1977.
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to highlight certain general features of potentiality on the anti-Humean framework.15
Objects, I have said earlier, have a host of modal properties: dispositions, abilities, capacities,
powers, tendencies, propensities, and so forth. I see no point, at the moment, in trying to draw
sharp distinctions between these kinds of modal properties. Rather, I trust that we can all agree
that these kinds of modal properties, if they differ from each other at all, are species of a common
genus. I call that genus potentiality, so as to have a name for it. As potentiality is going to be
my metaphysical primitive, I shall give no reductive definition of it. It has been introduced by
example. It can be introduced by analogy too, though the analogy is of a purely heuristic value:
potentiality is to possibility as essence, on a prominent contemporary position, is to necessity. The
contemporary position I have in mind is Kit Fine’s: Fine (1994) has argued that essence does not
reduce to necessity, and suggested instead that necessity rests on essence. The important point for
my analogy is that essence, unlike necessity, is always bound to one or more particular objects: it
is the essence of a particular object to be so-and-so, while a necessity is simply a necessity that
... . Similarly, a potentiality is always the potentiality (the power, capacity, disposition, etc.) of a
particular object to do so-and-so, while a possibility is simply the possibility that ... . Possibility
and necessity attach to whole states of affairs (or propositions, or sentences) regardless of their
finer structure; potentiality and essence attach to, or relate, an object and a property.
I will now offer three observations about potentiality, which are based on the examples I
have given in introducing the term and will prove crucial for the semantics.
3.1 First observation: Potentialities come in degrees.
Most glasses are fragile, but a delicate champagne glass is more fragile than an ordinary tumbler.
Gasolene is more flammable than vegetable oil. An object’s mass, which many philosophers
think of as a disposition, can be greater or lesser. Some of us have the ability to play the piano
to a greater degree than others. In general, rational capacities and practical skills can not only
be acquired, but also improved with practice: that’s why we take maths or piano lessons, even
long after we have achieved the capacity to calculate a differential or the ability to play the piano.
Likewise, tendencies towards certain behaviour can be strengthened or weakened by behavioural
therapy, or by self-education.
Noting that potentialities come in degrees, we can also see that there are more potentialities
than we would normally name. Take fragility. A champagne glass is more fragile than a tumbler,
the tumbler in turn is more fragile than, say, a plant pot; the plant-pot is more fragile than my
desk. We can go on: the desk is more fragile than a rock, the rock more fragile than a chunk of
diamond. But surely, a chunk of diamond is not fragile? And come to think of it, neither is the
rock or my desk, or at least we would not call it so in an ordinary context.
This illustrates two points. First, what counts as fragile depends on context. Under normal
circumstances, we may be just about still prepared to call a plant-pot fragile, but not my desk.
Move my desk to a building site, and it becomes much more plausible to call it ‘fragile’. Second,
the background for this variation over contexts is a spectrum from the more to the less fragile
things on which we can order the champagne glass, the tumbler, the plant pot, etc. in descending
order of their degree of fragility; and this spectrum goes well beyond the range of things which we
would be prepared to call ‘fragile’ in any easily conceivable context, as is witnessed by the chunk
15Note that I am not here concerned with arguing for the superiority of this metaphysics as compared to, say,
Lewisian modal realism. My concern is merely to develop the anti-Humean semantics in a way that will provide the
materials for a viable semantics, but is plausible – by the anti-Humean’s lights – independently of such a semantics.
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of diamond at the very bottom of the line. Given that spectrum, a particular context can operate
for ‘fragile’ as it does, for instance, for ‘tall’: by setting a threshold such that everything above
that threshold counts as fragile (in the context at issue) but nothing below it does. Reserving the
term ‘fragile’ for this context-dependent property, I would like to call that which all things on the
spectrum have in common, and by whose degrees they are ordered, their potentiality to break.
(Compare: in the case of ‘tall’, that which all things on the spectrum have in common, and by
whose magnitude they are ordered, is height.) I shall later suggest that a similar mechanism is at
work in the semantics of ‘can’.
3.2 Second observation: Potentialities may be intrinsic or extrinsic.
While it had long been assumed in the debate about dispositions that all dispositions were intrin-
sic properties, McKitrick (2003) has successfully challenged that assumption. McKitrick adduces
a list of intuitive cases that we would classify as dispositional properties, but the possession of
which depends on circumstances extrinsic to the object possessing the property. Her examples
include vulnerability (a city may become less vulnerable to attacks, without changing intrinsi-
cally, when it is surrounded by a defense system), a key’s power to open a particular door (which
the key possesses only so long as the door, an entirely distinct object, exists and has a lock of a
particular shape), and weight (which, unlike mass, depends on the gravitational field in which an
object is situated).
It is safe to assume that the same kinds of example can be construed for other kinds of
potentiality. In the case of ability, the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is similar to, though not en-
tirely coextensive with, the well-known distinction between general and specific abilities. I may
have the general ability to swim, but if I am tied to a chair 100 miles away from the nearest
swimmable body of water, I lack the specific ability to swim. In this case, the general/specific
distinction aligns nicely with the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction: being tied to a chair and being
far away from the nearest body of water are external conditions that affect my ability to swim
as things stand, but intrinsically I am no less able to swim. Suppose, however, that I have the
general ability to swim but am drugged or drunk so that I would perform pathetically to the point
of drowning if I were to be immersed in a body of water. If we ascribe to me, in this situation,
the general but not the specific ability to swim, this distinction does not align with the intrin-
sic/extrinsic distinction. I will say more in a moment about how to understand such cases. First,
let me return to the easier cases of extrinsic vs. intrinsic potentiality.
How does an object come by its extrinsic potentialities? Here’s a very simple picture. It
comes in two steps.
Step 1: objects can have potentialities jointly. You and I both have the ability to see; to-
gether, we have the ability to see each other. A fragile glass, when wrapped in styrofoam, is still
fragile, i.e. disposed to break; but the glass and styrofoam together are not disposed to break,
nor are they disposed to be such that one of them, say the glass, breaks. There are two kinds
of jointly possessed potentiality here. One has as its manifestation a relation between all of the
potentiality’s possessors: such is your and my potentiality to see each other. The other kind has
as its manifestation a property possessed by only some of the potentiality’s possessors: such is
the glass-cum-styrofoam’s potentiality to be such that the glass breaks.16 Both kinds of jointly
16The two cases also contrast in that the first, but not the second, involves what C.B. Martin has called ‘dispo-
sitional partners’. You and I are dispositional partners – or ability partners – in that we provide for each other an
opportunity for the exercise of the abilities in question. The glass and styrofoam are not dispositional partners; the
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possessed potentiality can be understood in parallelism to the potentialities of complex objects.
Take a biological organism, such as ourselves. We have parts – organs, bones, muscles, etc. –
which have their own potentialities. Put them together just so, and their potentialities ‘combine’
(I wish I knew how to cash out that metaphor!) to yield potentialities of the whole: the potentiality
to walk, to metabolise, or to raise one’s hand. Some of these potentialities have manifestations
that concern the entire organism: such, it would seem, is the ability to metabolise. Some have
manifestations that concern only part of the organism: such is the potentiality to raise one’s left
hand. To be sure, a biological organism is a much more closely-knit whole than a glass wrapped
by a piece of styrofoam. But the principal model appears to be the same.
Step 2: jointly possessed potentialities give rise to extrinsic potentialities. Jointly possessing
a potentiality is one relation in which objects can stand to each other. Relations generally give
rise to extrinsic properties: if you and I stand 2m apart, that relation gives rise to my possessing
the extrinsic property of being 2m from you. I do not know exactly what the metaphysics of
that ‘giving rise to’ is. But as the example illustrates, it is something which, one way or another,
we need to have in a metaphysics of extrinsic properties anyway. It is not a special need of
the anti-Humean metaphysics of potentiality. Now I want to utilize it to give a metaphysics of
extrinsic potentialities: by virtue of having, jointly with you, the potentiality to see each other, I
have an extrinsic potentiality to see-and-be-seen-by you. By virtue of the glass and the styrofoam
together not being disposed (or only very slightly disposed) to be such that the glass breaks, the
glass is not, or only very slightly, extrinsically disposed to break; its intrinsic disposition to break
remains, however, unaffected by this.
With this picture in hand, we can generalize beyond the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. We
have the following picture: objects come together, each equipped with its own potentialities;
given those potentialities and the objects’ relations, the whole will have certain potentialities of its
own. The same picture, however, can be applied within any of the objects, at least given a certain
level of complexity. Remember the drunk swimmer: she is equipped with an ability to swim,
but her drinking has also induced certain more temporary dispositions, such as the disposition
to get disoriented and erratic in her movements. Perhaps, indeed very plausibly, these different
potentialities belong to different parts of the individual. But we may think of her simply as a locus
of various potentials, which combine, much like the component forces of physics, to yield the
‘resultant force’ or overall potentialities of the individual. This suggests that the ‘intrinsic’ part
of our intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions was over-simplified: there are finer structures of potentiality
within the intrinsic makeup of most objects.
The same goes for the ‘extrinsic’ part of the distinction. Suppose I raised my arm. Did I have
an ability not to raise my arm? Plausibly, I possess the general ability to not raise my arm; very
likely, I also have an overall (intrinsic) ability not to raise my arm, since no disposition that is
intrinsic to me prevents me from not raising my arm. Did I have an extrinsic ability not to raise
my arm? That depends: which jointly possessed potentiality is to ground the extrinsic potentiality
at issue? If it is just potentialities that I possess jointly with everyone and everything in this room,
and if no one in this room was intrinsically necessitated to make me raise my arm, then I did have
the extrinsic ability not to raise my arm. But we may think bigger. In particular, we may wonder
whether I had an extrinsic ability not to raise my arm grounded in my joint potentialities with
everything else; could I have not raised my arm, given the way the world is as a whole? That
is (one version of) the question of determinism, and nothing in my metaphysical story answers
styrofoam detracts from, rather than providing an opportunity for the exercise of, the glass’s disposition to break.
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it. The important point is that extrinsicality comes, as it were, in degrees: the possession of an
extrinsic potentiality may depend on more or less of the world surrounding the object in question.
It appears, then, that we have another spectrum: from the most finely-grained potentialities of
individual objects through their overall (normally so-called) intrinsic potentialities, to the extrin-
sic potentialities arising from their joint potentialities with bigger and bigger parts of the world.
Let us call this the spectrum from fine-grained (intrinsic) potentialities to the coarse-grained (ex-
trinsic) potentialities. Granularity is a matter of degree, with a minimum and maximum value.
The picture remains the same: starting with the individual, fine-grained potentialities as our ‘com-
ponent forces’, we build up more and more complex combinations yielding ‘resultant forces’. The
picture fits well with the anti-Humean metaphysics I have introduced in section 1.
3.3 Third observation: Potentialities change over time.
Potentialities are lost and gained: I once had the potential to be a child prodigy, but having grown
up I have sadly lost that potentiality without ever realizing it. When the internet was introduced
over 20 years ago, humans gained the ability to communicate by e-mail. When an apple turns
from green to red, it loses the disposition to cause sensations of green in normal human observers,
while gaining the disposition to cause sensations of red.
But change in potentialities is not restricted to gaining and losing them. The degree to which
a potentiality is possessed may increase or decrease. Thus by practising the piano we increase
our ability to play it; if we neglect to practise, or (more drastically) lose a finger, that ability is
decreased in degree. In educating children or ourselves, we aim to increase the degree of some
dispositions – such as the disposition to tell the truth or feel empathy – while effecting a decrease
in the degree of others – such as the disposition to act rashly or egoistically.
Extrinsic potentialities, too, are subject to change. McKitrick’s city becomes more vulner-
able when the defence system ceases to operate, a key may lose its disposition to open a door
when the door has its lock changed, the vase’s extrinsic disposition to break is decreased in degree
when it is wrapped in styrofoam, and increased again when it is unpacked; and so on.
In fact, as a general rule, the more coarse-grained a potentiality, the more likely it is to
change. For first, anything that leads to a change in an object’s intrinsic or more fine-grained
potentialities will affect the more extrinsic or coarse-grained potentialities as well, but many
factors that affect the coarse-grained potentiality have no effect on the more fine-grained one.
The more coarse-grained a potentiality is, the more numerous and diverse are (typically) the
factors on which it depends. Second, the external factors that affect only the more coarse-grained
extrinsic potentialities are typically less stable than the intrinsic factors that affect both types of
potentialities. It is easier to pack or unpack a glass than to change its internal structure; the former
affects its extrinsic disposition, but only the latter would affect its intrinsic disposition to break.
My intrinsic (‘general’) ability to swim remains the same, whether or not I am near a swimmable
body of water; my extrinsic (‘specific’) ability to swim is easily increased in degree by taking me
to a lake, and decreased again by my going back into town.
In general, the extrinsic circumstances of an object – its position in space and time, its
external relations to other objects – are typically more changeable than its intrinsic make-up –
the constitution of the vase’s materials, or the constitution of a swimmer’s brain and muscles.
Cambridge change is easier to come by than real change. Typically, not necessarily: a caterpillar
about to transform into a butterfly is likely to undergo an intrinsic change that is more radical than
most Cambridge changes which may befall it in the same period of time. But typically things are
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the other way around.
Because they are subject to change, both the possession and the degree of a potentiality
must be specified relative to a time. Objects do not have their potentialities timelessly; they have
them at a time. It is important, however, to distinguish this relativity to times from another way
in which times can enter into the specification of a potentiality: by modifying its manifestation,
rather than the potentiality ascription itself.
Being a moderately skilled typist, I have the ability to type one page in two minutes. Some
people have the ability to run a mile in 4 minutes, though I do not. Some radium atoms have a
disposition to decay within five years. In these cases, a time interval is part of the potentiality’s
manifestation. In one sense, these potentialities are more specific than the potentialities to type,
to run, or to decay simpliciter. But they are not ‘specific abilities’ in the sense outlined earlier.
Specific abilities are coarse-grained or extrinsic abilities; they are abilities whose possession
depends on objects other than their possessor. My ability to type a page in two minutes, on
the other hand, is an intrinsic or general ability. What is specific about it is not the possession
conditions but the manifestation.
The temporal specifications in the previous paragraph concerned intervals, and were per-
fectly compatible with the potentiality itself being intrinsic. Other temporal specifications can be
made sense of only in the context of extrinsic potentiality. Given that I am now sitting, unim-
peded, in front of a functioning computer, and given my intrinsic ability to type a page in 2
minutes, I now possess the extrinsic ability to type a page within the next 2 minutes. Supposing
that Frank has the ability to run a four-minute mile, and given that he is now situated, unimpeded,
at a distance of one mile from the finishing line, Frank now has the extrinsic ability to reach the
finishing line within the next four minutes. Further, if it is now 4.00pm, then we may redescribe
Frank’s extrinsic ability as an ability to reach the finishing line by 4.04pm. That description, to be
sure, ceases to be adequate within a few seconds if Frank does not start running. But at 4.00pm,
it seems fine.17
Potentialities come in degrees; they may be intrinsic or extrinsic; and they change over time.
With these observations in hand, we can now proceed to the formulation of a potentiality-based
semantics for modal language.
4 Modal semantics with potentiality: the paradigmatic case of ‘can’
4.1 The account in outline
The basic idea of the anti-Humean semantics is that ‘can’ is used to ascribe potentialities. But not
any potentiality is relevant in any context. So, more precisely, ‘can’ is used to ascribe relevant po-
tentialities, and context determines which potentialities are relevant. We will examine conditions
for relevance in more detail below. But it is worth stating outright what the three observations
from the metaphysics of potentiality will be good for in the semantics of ‘can’.
Potentialities come in degrees: this observation has a double purpose. First, it helped us
introduce potentialities that we would not ordinarily ascribe as dispositions: for instance, my
desk’s potentiality to break. So we can count the sentences ‘My desk can break’ as true in virtue
17Or perhaps it ascribes to Frank an especially fleeting potentiality, the potentiality to reach the finishing line
by 4.04pm on 2nd August 2012. I have not given identity conditions for potentialities, and I will not do so in what
follows. I am concerned only with the truth of the potentiality ascriptions, and some general explanatory relations
between them.
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of the desk’s potentiality to break, even if ‘The desk is fragile’ seems false. Second, degrees
account for some contextual variation. A potentiality that is ascribed in a given context may need
to have a certain minimum degree. ‘The bridge cannot break’ may be true in a number of practical
contexts where we do not encounter greater risks to the bridge than trucks crossing it, but false
in a wartime scenario where the risks include bombs and such-like dangers.
Potentialities can be intrinsic or extrinsic: this observation will play a key role in accounting
for the contextual variation of ‘can’ statements. In particular, it accounts for what is often referred
to as the distinction between ability-ascribing and opportunity-ascribing uses of ‘can’, or general
and specific ability. The basic idea is that what would ordinarily be counted as a possibility or
opportunity-ascribing use of ‘can’ is simply an ascription of an extrinsic potentiality. And as
there are gradations in the distinction between intrinsicality and extrinsicality – I have called the
spectrum one of granularity above – so there are gradual variations in uses of ‘can’, from the
ascription of a maximally fine-grained potentiality to that of the most coarse-grained extrinsic
potentialities.
Potentialities change over time: this, and the related observations, will serve a double role.
First, it goes into the formulation of the truth-conditions themselves, which need to take account
of time and tense. Second, it helps us understand why some contexts favour the ascription of
intrinsic, and others the ascription of extrinsic potentialities: at least in some cases, this is a
matter of our interests being long-term or short-term.
Before we look at these points in more detail, we should consider the general form of the
truth-conditions for ‘can’ statements relative to contexts. Let a context include, as is usual, at
least the speaker, time, and place of the utterance, but also some facts about the interests and
informational backgrounds of the participants, and let tC be the time parameter of a given context
C. Then
(POT) ‘x can F’ is true in a contextC iff, at tC, x has a potentiality to F that is relevant inC.
The context-sensitivity of ‘can’ is captured by varying conditions for a potentiality to count
as relevant.
On its simplest reading, (POT) exhibits the same quantificational structure that a possible-
worlds semantics for ‘can’ does: existential quantification. The difference is that (POT) quantifies
over a special class of properties, potentialities, where possible-worlds semantics quantifies over
a special class of objects, worlds. To make this more explicit, we might rephrase (POT) as
(POT*) ‘x can F’ is true in a context C iff, at tC, the following holds: there is a property P such
that P is a potentiality to F, P is relevant inC, and x has P.
Meta-linguistic talk of relevance in (POT*) is merely a way to capture the varying restric-
tions on the domain of the existential quantifier. It is open to the defender of (POT*) to formalize
this quantification over properties as either first-order quantification over abstract objects, or as
second-order quantification. In the former case, but not in the latter, a special relation of ‘having’
or instantiation will be needed.
For those who object quite generally to quantifying over properties, first- or second-order,
an alternative paraphrase of (POT) can be provided: take ‘has a potentiality to be F’ as an un-
analysable predicate with no quantificational structure indicated by ‘a’, or alternatively reformu-
late it as ‘is potentially F’. The relevance restriction, instead of being part of the quantificational
structure, then becomes adverbial: we cannot predicate contextual relevance of a potentiality, but
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we must rather say of x’s having-the-potentiality that it happens in the contextually relevant way.
Say that x is C-relevantly potentially F just in case x’s being potentially F happens in the right
way to be relevant in contextC. Then (POT) becomes
(POT**) ‘x can F’ is true in a context C iff, at tC, x is C-relevantly potentially F. (or: x C-
relevantly has a potentiality to F).18
A further noteworthy feature of (POT) and its reformulations is their relativization to times.
As we have seen, objects lose and gain potentialities with time. For instance, I once had some
potential to become a child prodigy, but I no longer have that potential; before the invention of
the computer, no one had the ability to access the internet, but now most of us do. The degrees
of potentialities change too – a glass becomes more fragile when it acquires a small crack, and
practice increases the degree to which we possess various abilities.
It is vital, then, that the potentiality ascribed is possessed and of the relevant kind at the time
of the ascription, not before or after that time. In saying ‘The vase can break’, I am ascribing to
the vase a potentiality to break, of the relevant kind, possessed now, at the time of utterance; in
saying ‘I can play the piano’, I claim that I possess the relevant ability now. The truth-conditions
for ‘can’ statements take care of this by relativizing to the time parameter of the context of
utterance, tC.
In so doing, the truth conditions given in (POT) and its reformulations also provide for tensed
‘can’ statements. For the past tense, simply replace the temporal clause ‘at tC’ with ‘at a time t
prior to tC’; for the future tense, replace ‘at tC’ with ‘at a time t after tC’. Or else, if you are an
A-theorist and reluctant to capture the tenses of ‘can’ with time-indices t and tC , prefix the whole
right-hand side of (POT) or its successors with the relevant tense operator ‘it was the case that ...’
or ‘it will be the case that ...’. The potentiality semantics can go either way.
How, then, do we express tensed ascriptions of potentiality? For the past tense, we have two
options: ‘could’ and ‘could have’. (‘Could’ has a second and distinct function as the subjunctive
form of ‘can’, more about which in section 5.19) The two expressions differ in that the latter,
but not the former, appears to carry an implication (or perhaps only an implicature) of the past
potentiality not being exercised, as is witnessed by the following pair of statements:
(2) a. Mozart could play the piano while blind-folded (and he did so on many occasions).
b. ?Mozart could have played the piano while blind-folded (and he did so on many
occasions).
18The question whether to adopt (POT*) or (POT**) is not simply the question whether to be a realist or a nom-
inalist about potentialities. Most anti-Humeans are realists, but Whittle (2009) has recently suggested that there is
a nominalist version of the anti-Humean ‘causal theory of properties’ available, which reduces each property to a
causal profile as expressed in a Ramsey sentence. Note that Whittle’s causal nominalist is not afraid to quantify over
properties since she is ‘not denying the existence of properties, [she is] just claiming that they are not sui generis
entities. Consequently, since Ramsey sentences do not presuppose any particular ontological analysis of properties,
causal nominalists can utilise them just as other causal theorists can.’ (Whittle 2009:247) However, causal nominal-
ism, since it relies on the notion of a causal or modal profile in reducing properties, is in tension with the idea driving
the anti-Humean semantics I am presenting: that our modal talk ultimately comes down to the ascription of modal
properties.
19That the two uses really are distinct, can be seen from the fact that they have distinct translations in other
languages (e.g., ‘konnte’ and ‘könnte’ in German). Note that ‘could’ also has a life of its own as an expression of
epistemic possibility, as for instance in ‘She could be home by now.’
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If (2-b) is semantically bad, then the assumption of non-exercise is part of the truth-conditions
of ‘could have’ statements and should be included in them. If (2-b) is only pragmatically bad,
then the assumption is a mere implicature and should, accordingly, not be written into the truth-
conditions. Again, the potentiality semantics can go either way.
There is no distinct future tense for ‘can’, but like other English verbs, ‘can’ itself sometimes
functions as a future tense, as in (3-a), which is paraphrased by (3-b):
(3) a. This time next year, I can go on a long vacation.
b. This time next year, I will be able to go on a long vacation.
Where ‘can’ is semantically future-tensed, the right truth-conditions will, of course, have to be
appropriately tensed or time-indexed too.
We must, again, be careful to track the scope of a temporal modifier. In (3-a), the expression
‘this time next year’ modifies the ‘can’ statement as a whole. It is therefore construed to date the
time of the potentiality’s possession. But temporal modifiers may occur in the scope of ‘can’, as
for instance in
(4) a. I can type a page in two minutes.
b. I can be home by 8pm.
In these examples, the temporal modifiers are naturally read to specify what exactly it is that
the speaker can do: typing a page within two minutes, of being home by 8pm. The potentialities
ascribed must therefore have a temporally specified (or specifiable) manifestation. We have seen
examples of such potentialities in section 3: (4-a) ascribes a potentiality of the same type as
Frank’s ability to run a mile in four minutes, while (4-b) ascribes a potentiality of the same type
as Frank’s ability to be at the finishing line by 4.04pm. The former specify a time interval, the
latter only an end-point.20
So much for the general form and structure of the truth-conditions. A crucial factor in (POT)
as well as the reformulations was the appeal to relevant potentialities. We will now go on to
consider these in some more detail.
4.2 Relevant potentialities
We have seen in section 3 that potentialities vary along at least two axes: their degree, and their
fineness of grain. Both turn out to be crucial in understanding the context-sensitivity of potential-
ity ascriptions. I will take them up in turn.
On a potentiality-based semantics, ‘x can break’ works in much the same way as does ‘x is
fragile’, sketched in the previous section. Both ascribe to x a potentiality to break, but both are
selective about the kind of potentiality that they ascribe. Just as ‘My desk is fragile’ is false in
many contexts, so ‘My desk can break’ will not be true in all contexts: both statements require the
20(4-b) and similar examples might seem to spell trouble for the potentiality semantics: it specifies, within the
scope of ‘can’, what looks like a dated event rather than a general property. But the manifestation of a potentiality, on
a standard anti-Humean metaphysics, should be a property. I cannot fully address that worry here but I have indicated
a response at the end of section 3: the potentiality with an apparently dated manifestation is just a redescription of (or,
at any rate, based on) a potentiality with a non-dated manifestation, whose manifestation involves doing something
within a given interval. In the case of (4-b), this might be, say, a (specific/extrinsic) ability to run one’s errands and
cover a distance of 10km within 6 hours, if the sentence is uttered at 2pm at a distance of 10km from the speaker’s
home.
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ascribed potentiality to have a certain minimal degree. It would seem, however, that the threshold
set by ‘x can break’ is lower than that for ‘x is fragile’. In many ordinary contexts, I would
be prepared to say that my desk can break though it is not fragile. Perhaps a closer analogy is
with more regularly formed disposition terms such as ‘breakable’. I, at any rate, cannot detect
any difference in the threshold degree required for ‘x is breakable’ and that required for ‘x can
break’.
A more notable difference between ‘can’ and disposition ascriptions relates to intrinsical-
ity or granularity. Typically, dispositional terms (terms of the form ‘F-able’ and related terms)
ascribe potentialities that are very close to the intrinsic or maximally fine-grained end of the
spectrum I have described towards the end of the last section: ‘x is breakable’ does not become
false when the object x is packed in anti-deformation packaging, nor does it become true when
the object is put in front of a bulldozer, but in some contexts the truth value of ‘x can break’ may
change with such circumstances. Dispositional terms, it seems, typically come with a strong and
relatively stable implication of intrinsicality which is held fixed across contexts. Even terms for
extrinsic dispositions, such as ‘vulnerable’, will be quite selective and, more importantly, quite
fixed in the kinds of external circumstances that are relevant for the property they are used to as-
cribe. ‘Can’ is much more flexible in this respect, and accordingly more sensitive to our interests
in a given situation.
Suppose I am moving to a new flat and considering where to store my valuable vase on the
moving van. Since I have taken care to pack the vase in anti-deformation packaging, it is perfectly
natural to say ‘the vase cannot break, it is so safely packed’, thus denying the vase an extrinsic
(and otherwise relevant) potentiality to break. In another context, say, considering where to put
the vase in my new flat, I may then switch to the more intrinsic potentialities and say ‘The vase
should be in a safe place, it can break so easily’. In the first case, my practical interest is in
the extrinsic or relatively coarse-grained potentialities of the vase. After all, the more extrinsic a
potentiality, the more possible interferences with its manifestation are taken account of. My vase
may have the potential to break to a great degree but since it is so safely packed, I need not worry
about its breaking for the moment. As things stand, we interact not with the vase on its own
but with the vase plus packaging; and it is our interactions with the things I am moving that are
currently of significance. In the second case, on the other hand, the long-term interest brings with
it an interest in the vase’s more fine-grained (intrinsic) potentialities because these are generally
more permanent. As we have seen in section 3, intrinsic (or more fine-grained) potentialities are
typically more stable over time than extrinsic (or more coarse-grained) potentialities. So it is not
surprising that the nature of our interests – long-term or short-term – is one determining factor in
selecting the fineness or coarseness of grain that is required of a relevant potentiality in a given
context.
In some cases, our practical interests underdetermine the requirements on relevant poten-
tialities. In such contexts, the guiding principle may simply be what Lewis has called a ‘Rule of
Accommodation’: ceteris paribus, context fixes the relevant values so that the utterances made
in it come out true (Lewis 1979:347). Thus of a drunk swimmer, we may say ‘She can swim’,
ascribing to the swimmer the maximally fine-grained (and otherwise relevant) potentiality to
swim; or we may say, ‘She cannot swim’, denying her the overall intrinsic (and otherwise rele-
vant) potentiality to swim. Of a well-trained and sober swimmer who is tied to a chair we may
say ‘She can swim’, ascribing to her the intrinsic (and otherwise relevant) potentiality to swim,
or we may say ‘She cannot swim’ denying her the extrinsic (and otherwise relevant) potentiality
to swim that is based in her joint potentialities with relevant objects of her surrounding. Finally,
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as philosophers interested in determinism we may say of a competent, sober, and unimpeded
swimmer who did not, at a particular occasion, swim: ‘She could have swum’, ascribing to her
an intrinsic or a mildly coarse-grained potentiality, taking into account only objects of her closer
surroundings at the time. Or we may say that, assuming truth of determinism and the fact that
she did not in fact swim, ‘She could not have swum’, denying her the maximally coarse-grained
potentiality to swim.
Not all sentences vary as freely in the required granularity as does our example ‘She can
swim’. Consider our earlier examples of intuitively opportunity- or possibility-expressing sen-
tences:
(5) a. You can buy a kettle in that store.
b. You can fall off the cliff if you’re not careful.
Neither of these has a plausible reading that ascribes to the sentence’s addressee an intrinsic
potentiality (to buy a kettle or to fall off the cliff). But that should not come as a surprise. Both
sentences ascribe potentialities whose manifestations consist in a particular relation (buying a
kettle in ..., or falling off ...) to a particular object (‘that’ store, the cliff that is contextually
relevant). Potentialities of this kind are generally extrinsic. Consider a key’s potentiality to open
a particular door d, or my potentiality to see you. The key would lose its potentiality if the
door ceased to exist or merely had its lock changed, and I would lose my potentiality if you no
longer existed or became invisible. A potentiality to stand in relation R to a particular object b,
as possessed by an object a distinct from b, is always extrinsic, for it depends on the existence of
b, on the intrinsic potentialities that b has, and on the relations that hold between a and b. (As I
have argued in section 3, such an extrinsic potentiality of a must arise from a potentiality that is
possessed jointly with b.) Both our examples are of this kind: they ascribe extrinsic potentialities
that depend on the existence and the potentialities of another object (the store and the cliff), as
well as the relation in which the addressee stands to them. In general, the present approach treats
‘can’ statements that appear to express opportunities or possibilities as ascriptions of extrinsic
potentiality.
Degrees and, more importantly, fineness of grain account for a great deal of context-sensitivity,
but not for all. A third factor that is of great importance may be labelled agency.
In a great many contexts, when confronted with a sentence ‘S can F’ where ‘S’ denotes
an agent and F is a verb of action, we understand ‘can’ to ascribe to an agent not just any
potentiality, but an ability, capability or rational capacity in a stronger sense. Thus when I say ‘I
can play the piano’, what I say is at least misleading, and more likely false, if I possess merely
the general potentiality to play the piano but not the skill or know-how that is acquired by lessons
and practice. And when I say ‘I can hit the bull’s eye’, what I say is taken to be false if I’m a
hopeless darts player who hits the bull’s eye every now and then by sheer accident (Kenny 1976).
This way of construing the relevant ‘can’ sentences (with agentive subject terms and pred-
icates) is natural but not mandatory. Consider David Lewis’s well-known discussion of the sen-
tence ‘I can speak Finnish’:
An ape can’t speak a human language—say, Finnish—but I can. Facts about
the anatomy and operations of the ape’s larynx and nervous system are not com-
possible with his speaking Finnish. The corresponding facts about my larynx and
nervous system are compossible with my speaking Finnish. But don’t take me along
to Helsinki as your interpreter: I can’t speak Finnish. (Lewis 1976:77)
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Unlike an ape, Lewis has the potentiality to speak Finnish. The contrast together with a
principle of accommodation manipulates the context so that Lewis’s potentiality to speak Finnish
counts as relevant. Without the contrastive preparation, it would be difficult to hear the sentence
as true; in ordinary contexts, the presumption that an ability in the stronger, agentive sense – a
capacity, a skill – is ascribed with a sentence such as ‘I can speak Finnish’ is very strong.
Abilities in this strong sense, on the anti-Humean metaphysics that I have sketched, are a
kind of potentiality. But what kind? What sets them apart? This is a difficult question, which cuts
across the distinction between Humean and anti-Humean metaphysics.
On one tradition that goes back at least to G.E. Moore, abilities are related to conditionals
of the form ‘If x wanted (decided, chose, intended, or tried) to F, then x would F’. The condi-
tional approach has faced a number of objections, most famously from Austin (1961) and Lehrer
(1968). It has recently made a comeback in the form of a ‘New Dispositionalism’, defended by
Vihvelin (2004) and Fara (2008). For the New Dispositionalism, an ability is tantamount to a
disposition to F if one wants (decides, chooses, intends, or tries) to F. The dispositional ap-
proach solves some of the problems that the original conditional account faced, but it is a matter
of dispute whether it solves all of them.21 If it does succeed, then its success is independent of
whether it is read in a Humean fashion – with the preferred analysis of dispositions – or in an
anti-Humean fashion with irreducible dispositions.
Another tradition, which goes back at least to Ryle (1949), holds that abilities are charac-
terized by being particularly multi-track. An ability is not simply an ability to do one thing; it is
systematically related to abilities to do similar things, and to abilities to do the same thing in a
number of different circumstances. As Smith (2003) points out, if I have the ability to answer one
logic question correctly, I will have the ability to answer other logic questions. I will also have
the ability to answer the question in a number of different kinds of circumstances. While Smith
spells this out in terms of possible worlds, the anti-Humean metaphysics can easily accommodate
the basic idea: to have an ability (to F) is not just to have one potentiality (the potentiality to F),
but to have a cluster of related potentialities (the potentialities to F0 and the potentiality to F00,
the potentiality to F in conditionsC and the potentiality to F in conditionsC0, and so forth).
A third tradition, going back at least to Thomas Reid and more recently championed by
Steward (2012), thinks of abilities as ‘two-way powers’. To have an ability to F requires having
an ability not to F, or an ability to refrain from Fing. Again, this can be spelled out in terms of
possible worlds or in terms of potentialities. For the anti-Humean proponent of this view, to have
an ability to F is not just to have a potentiality to F but also to have a potentiality not to F, or to
refrain from Fing.
It does not matter for present purposes which, if any, of these conceptions is correct. What
matters is that some potentialities – such as a dart player’s ability to hit the bull’s eye – count
as abilities in some stronger sense, while others – such as my own potentiality to hit the bull’s
eye – do not. Exactly how that distinction is captured is a question independent of the choice
between Humean and anti-Humean metaphysics. And whatever it is that sets abilities apart from
other potentialities will, in some contexts, be among the conditions for a potentiality to count as
relevant. This I call the factor of agency.
We thus have three factors that make for the relevance of a potentiality in a given context:
degrees, granularity, and agency. There may be other factors. But those three are certainly central,
and they account for a great deal of variation in the truth-conditions of ‘can’ statements.
21For a thorough criticism, see Clarke (2009), who also introduces the label ‘New Dispositionalism’.
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5 Dynamic modality beyond ‘can’
I have so far focussed on ‘can’ for two reasons. First, it is most favourable for a potentiality
semantics due to its use in ascribing (intrinsic) abilities. Second, it is the most common expression
of dynamic modality, and dynamic modality is the species of modality on which an anti-Humean
semantics ought to focus. The discussion of ‘can’, however, has provided the resources to deal
with other expressions of dynamic modality: the modal auxiliaries ‘might’, ‘may’, ‘must’ and
‘would’, the modal verbs ‘be able to’ and ‘have to’, the suffixes ‘-able’/‘-ible’, and the adjectives
‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ as they occur in ‘it is possible/necessary for ... to ...’. I will not treat
sentence adverbs and other sentence-modifying constructions (‘possibly’ and ‘it is possible that
...’). As we have seen in section 2, those typically express epistemic, not dynamic, modality. (The
relation between dynamic and epistemic modality will be considered in section 6.) Throughout
the discussion of this section, the paradigmatic case of ‘can’ will serve as a useful point of
reference and contrast. Many considerations that we have developed with a view to ‘can’ will
carry over to other modal expressions, so we can be much briefer in this section.
We begin with expressions of dynamic possibility other than ‘can’. These include: the modal
verb ‘be able to’, the suffixes ‘-able/-ible’, the adjectival construction ‘it is possible for ... to ...’,
and some uses of ‘may’ and ‘might’. Like ‘can’, these will be treated as ascribing potentialities
to the sentence’s subjects; the truth-conditions for sentences including them follow (POT) and its
reformulation. They will, that is, be of the general form
(POT’) ‘... ’ is true in a contextC iff, at tC, x has a potentiality to F that is relevant inC,
with the right kind of construction replacing the blank ‘...’. Where these other expressions
differ from ‘can’ and from each other, they do so in the general conditions that they impose on
relevant potentialities. Such differences, as we shall see, lie mostly in the dimension of agency,
though sometimes also in the requirements concerning granularity.
The verb ‘be able to’ is closest to ‘can’ and sometimes even used to supply grammatical
forms that the auxiliary ‘can’ does not have22. We made use of that fact above in paraphrasing
sentence (3-a). However, there are some differences between ‘can’ and ‘be able to’, both with
respect to agency and with respect to fineness of grain. ‘Be able to’ seems more closely tied to
agency than ‘can’: it sounds infelicitous when used with non-agentive subjects or predicates (wit-
ness (6)). It also appears to be more closely tied to extrinsic potentialities, where ‘can’ is neutral
or, in the absence of further context, more naturally read as ascribing an intrinsic potentiality
(witness (7)):
(6) a. The vase can break.
b. ?The vase is able to break.
c. The boy can fall off the cliff.
d. ?The boy is able to fall off the cliff.
(7) a. John can swim, though he is not able to right now.
b. ?John is able to swim, though he cannot swim right now.
Next, we turn to the suffixes ‘-able’ and ‘-ible’. These are not discussed much in the philo-
sophical literature on modal semantics, but rather form the topic of a separate debate on dispo-
sitional predicates. As Mondadori and Morton (1976) and Kratzer (1981) note, however, they
22See Palmer 1974:116, Coates 1983:126.
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constitute an expression of modality which combines compositionally with other expressions,
and should fall within the purview of a more general modal semantics. In general, the suffixes
are appended to a verb (wash, (dis)solve, read) to yield an adjective (washable, soluble, readable).
These adjectives in turn are naturally read as expressing potentialities: washability, solubility, and
readability. Thus the Oxford English Dictionary tells us that the suffixes form ‘adjectives denot-
ing the capacity for or capability of being subjected to or (in some compounds) performing the
action denoted or implied by the first element of the compound’.
The semantics of these suffixes differs from that of ‘can’ in two crucial ways, again con-
nected to the two dimensions of agency and fineness of grain.
First, where ‘can’ through the dimension of agency has a certain affinity to what are tradi-
tionally called active powers, adjectives on ‘-able’ or ‘-ible’ are closely linked to passive poten-
tialities or dispositions. To be F-able, typically, is to have a potentiality to be Fed. Thus to be
washable, soluble, or readable, is to have a potentiality to be washed, dissolved, or read; and so
on for most (not for all23) adjectives of the kind.
Second, the suffixes tend to be tied to intrinsic potentialities. A text does not become unread-
able in the dark, though it becomes true to say of it that it cannot be read; a sugar cube does not
become more or less soluble by being at greater or lesser risk of being immersed in water. A little
contextual variation is to be expected in their meaning; to be readable is to be capable of being
read under normal conditions, to be washable is to be capable of being washed under normal
conditions, and so forth. As normal conditions change, so do the meanings and extensions of
those adjectives. But this contextual change is nowhere near the extreme flexibility exhibited by
‘can’.
Further expressions of dynamic possibility include the ‘possible for ... to...’ construction
as well as the modals ‘may’ and ‘might’. The latter two modals only rarely express dynamic
modality. They are mostly used for epistemic possibility24. ‘Might’, in particular, is the primary
modal of epistemic modality. But as Stalnaker (1981) and others have noted,
might sometimes expresses some kind of non-epistemic possibility. John might
have come to the party could be used to say that it was within John’s power to come,
or that it was not inevitable that he not come. (Stalnaker 1981:99)
On this reading, ‘might have’, like ‘could have’ ascribes a potentiality but it does so in the
past tense (and with an implication or implicature of non-manifestation).
On the potentiality semantics, all of these expressions ascribe potentialities where they are
used dynamically. They vary with regard to intrinsicality and extrinsicality in much the same
way as ‘can’ does; but unlike ‘can’, they have no connection to the factor of agency. Contrast the
following variations on sentence (8-a):
(8) a. She can play the piano.
b. It is possible for her to play the piano.
c. She may play the piano.
d. She might play the piano.
e. She might have played the piano.
23Exceptions include: ‘honorable’ and ‘payable’, which appear to have a deontic meaning, the latter atypically
expressing deontic necessity; and ‘capable’, ‘feasible’ and others that have lost, as it were, their compositional nature.
24Collins 2009:92, Table 4.2; 118, Table 4.10.
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(8-b)
-(8-e) do not have the strong association with skill or ability that (8-a) does. (It is difficult to
hear (8-c) and (8-d) as dynamic at all; (8-c) seems to express permission, and (8-d) an epistemic
possibility, of her playing the piano. But even if they are read dynamically, however, there is no
strong implication of skill or ability.) Apart from tenses, sentences (8-b)-(8-e) seem semantically
equivalent.
The modals that I have looked at so far were modals of what is generally classified as dy-
namic possibility. But what about dynamic necessity?
Again, we must be careful to prize apart the dynamic reading from epistemic and deontic
ones. The auxiliary ‘must’ and the verb ‘have to’ are most often used deontically (as in (9-a)) or
epistemically (as in (9-b))25:
(9) a. He must/has to go to school.
b. This must/has to be where she lives.
But they have some dynamic readings. Consider, for instance,
(10) a. I must sneeze.
b. She is obsessive-compulsive; she just has to wash her hands once every hour.
c. Like-charged particles must repel each other; it’s a law of nature.
Especially where the subject is agentive, a natural paraphrase uses ‘can’: what an individual must
do is what she cannot help doing, or what she cannot refrain from doing. The aspect of agency,
which we have seen to arise with ‘can’, is relevant here too. Here, however, it is not the agent’s
control over her actions but her lack of control that is expressed in sentences (10-a) and (10-b).
What the subject of these sentences is said to lack is the (intrinsic or extrinsic) ability to do other
than sneeze or wash her hands. (10-c) does not carry such an implication of agency, but it too
can be understood as the negation of a ‘can’ statement: like-charged particles cannot fail to repel
each other; they lack the potentiality to do so.
A natural treatment for expressions of dynamic necessity, then, is via their duality with
modals of dynamic possibility. A sentence of the form ‘x must F’ or ‘x has to F’ is true just in
case x lacks a contextually relevant potentiality not to F. The requirements on relevant potential-
ities will be much the same as they are for ‘can’.
We now turn, finally, to counterfactual conditionals. In section 2, we had set aside the
attempt to provide a semantics of ‘would’ counterfactuals in terms of a disposition’s stimulus and
manifestation. The problem, recall, was that the disposition was neither sufficient nor necessary
for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual conditional: a fragile vase may be wrapped in
styrofoam, so that it is not true that it would break if it were struck; a non-fragile concrete block
might be attached to an explosive so that it is true that it would break if it were struck. We now
have the resources to answer this challenge: the ‘would’ counterfactual is tied not to the vase’s or
the block’s intrinsic dispositions, but to suitably extrinsic ones. Thanks to its joint potentialities
with the packaging material, the vase lacks an extrinsic disposition (of a high enough degree) to
break if struck; thanks to its joint potentialities with the attached explosive, the concrete block
has such an extrinsic disposition. The moral to draw is not that counterfactuals do not ascribe
25See Collins 2009:34, Table 3.2; 60, Table 3.12.
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dispositions, but that they do not (or only rarely) ascribe intrinsic dispositions.
What about another species of subjunctive conditionals, the ‘might’ or ‘could’ counterfac-
tuals? On one approach26, these are simply the dual or the corresponding ‘would’ conditional.
Consider the three sentences in (11):
(11) a. If John came to the party, he would enjoy himself.
b. If John came to the party, he might enjoy himself.
c. If John came to the party, he could enjoy himself.
(11-a)
ascribes to John a relevantly extrinsic disposition to enjoy himself if he came to the party. On the
duality approach, (11-b) and (11-c) (when read dynamically) are equivalent to
(12) It is not the case that: If John came to the party, he would not enjoy himself.
For the potentiality semantics, this is to say that (11-b) and (11-c), like (12), deny to John the rel-
evantly extrinsic potentiality not to enjoy himself if he came to the party. However, this approach
sits uneasily with other uses of ‘could’ and ‘might’. We have treated those locutions as ascribing,
not as denying, potentialities. A more congenial approach for the potentiality theorist is to read
(11-b) and (11-c) as paraphrased in (13):
(13) If John came to the party, it would be that: he might/could enjoy himself.
On this approach, ‘might’ or ‘could’ counterfactuals are treated not as duals of ‘would’ coun-
terfactuals, but effectively as ‘would’ counterfactuals whose consequents are ‘might’ or ‘could’
statements. This reading is less widely accepted than the duality reading, but it is advocated (as
one available reading) by Lewis (1973:63-65) and Eagle (2007).27 (13), on the potentiality se-
mantics, says that John has a relevantly extrinsic potentiality whose stimulus condition is coming
to the party, and whose manifestation is the possession of another potentiality: the potentiality to
enjoy himself. The potentiality ascribed by (13), in other words, is an iterated potentiality: it is a
potentiality for the acquisition of another (relevant) potentiality.
This section has provided no more than the bare outlines of an anti-Humean semantics be-
yond ‘can’. But it should give a feeling for how the semantics goes, and some hope that it will
go well. Much work remains to be done. But the task looks to be rewarding.
6 Further issues
I have argued that the anti-Humean metaphysics of potentiality, when spelled out in sufficient
detail, affords the materials to meet the main challenge formulated in section 2: to give an ac-
count of context-sensitivity that is general enough to cover, not only the ability uses of ‘can’,
but also its possibility (or opportunity) uses, as well as contextual shifts between and within
these. Given the dimensions of degree, granularity, and agency, I believe such an account can be
given. Granularity, or in general the observation that there are extrinsic potentialities, has proved
particularly useful in meeting the challenges. Using ‘can’ as a paradigm case, the prospects for
26Advocated, for instance, in Lewis 1973.
27Eagle (2007) labels this reading ‘ontic’ and suggests that it is ‘more widespread than this single citation [Lewis
1973] suggests’ (Eagle 2007:4, fn.5).
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an anti-Humean semantics of dynamic modality in general look hopeful. In this final section, I
want to address what I take to be the two main remaining issues for the proposed semantics. One
concerns its expressive limitations, the other its systematic connection with flavours of modality
other than dynamic.
6.1 All modality is de re
For the anti-Humean, the chief advantage of the semantics that I have so far described is the link
that it provides between our modal talk and the underlying structure of modal reality – the modal
properties that constitute the bedrock of anti-Humean metaphysics.
It is a consequence of this link that the anti-Humean semantics treats all (dynamic) modality
as de re. In this, it is in sharp contrast with the more familiar approaches to modal semantics. For
possible-worlds semantics, the smallest unit to which a modal operator (such as ‘can’) is applied
is a sentence, such as ‘ I play the piano’, to yield a complex sentence with the structure ‘Can (I
play the piano)’. For the potentiality semantics, a modal verb such as ‘can’ is embedded more
deeply in the structure of a sentence: it is applied first to a predicate (‘play the piano’) to yield a
complex predicate (‘can play the piano’), which is then applied to a singular term (‘I’) to yield a
sentence (‘I can play the piano’). What we do with such modal terms is ascribe modal properties
to individuals. In this sense, all dynamic modality is de re.
As may be expected, problem cases for the potentiality semantics arise where there are no
individuals for the modal properties to be ascribed to. This may be so because, while the sentence
is syntactically of the right form, its subject is not best understood as denoting an object. Consider
(14):
(14) a. The debt rate can rise next year.
b. My great-granddaughter can be a painter.
While (14-a) appears to ascribe a potentiality to an object referred to by ‘the debt rate’, many
will doubt that there is any such object, or that, if it exists, it can function as a bearer of po-
tentiality. And while (14-b) appears to ascribe a potentiality to an individual denoted by ‘my
great-granddaughter’, it would seem again that there is no such individual, and there might never
be. Nevertheless, it may be said, both sentences have a dynamic reading, and both sentences may
well be true on that reading. So, the objection goes, not all ‘can’ statements that express dynamic
possibility can be construed as ascribing a potentiality (or any other property) to an object.
A second type of problem concerns not so much the absence of suitable individuals for the
ascription of modal properties, but targets the construal of modal statements as ascribing such
properties more generally. For the potentiality semantics, all dynamic modality is de re; but, the
objection goes, there are de dicto statements of dynamic modality, which are not concerned to
ascribe a modal property to some individual or other. Consider
(15) Someone can see us.
(15) has a de re reading. On that reading, it says that there is someone of whom it is true that
they can see us; someone, that is, who has a potentiality (of suitable grain and degree) to see us.
But (15), it may be said, also has a de dicto reading. On that reading, it says that it is possible for
there to be someone who sees us. The de re reading is committed to the existence of someone, the
potential seer; the de dicto reading is not. But if (15) was used, as the potentiality semantics has it,
to ascribe a modal property, it cannot be neutral on whether or not there is someone to possess the
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relevant property. Moreover, the de dicto reading requires ‘can’ to take scope over the quantifier
in ‘someone’. A sentence modifier such as ‘possibly’ can do that; but a predicate-modifying verb
cannot. So, the objection goes, ‘can’ must be a sentence-modifier after all, in which case it is,
again, less naturally construed as ascribing potentialities (or any other properties).
The two worries seem to be related, since modal sentences with the wrong kind of subject
– as in (14) – are often analysed as de dicto modal sentences. That strategy, of course, is not
available to the potentiality semanticist.
In responding to these worries, the potentiality semanticist has three basic options: accep-
tance, analysis, and rejection.
Straightforward acceptance of the examples in (14) entails ontological commitments: to ab-
stract objects such as debt rates, to possible future objects such as my great-granddaughter (who
may never be born), and to whatever else further examples may commit us to. Such liberalism is
not unheard of. The debate about abstract objects is well-worn. The existence of mere possibilia
has more recently found an eloquent defender in Timothy Williamson28. For Williamson (2002),
an object is ‘essentially a locus of potential’. The accepting potentiality semanticist may take this
literally.
With respect to de dicto quantified statements, straightforward acceptance is not an option.
But the Williamsonian, believing as she does in the Barcan equivalence, has a de re substitute for
each de dicto statement, and she may take to analysing the latter in terms of the former.
Analysis, quite generally, is an option that may be applied to both kinds of case. Let us begin
with (14) again. True sentences with ontologically suspect subjects are not limited to modal lan-
guage. Those who reject abstract objects will want to analyse not only (14-a), but also sentences
such as
(16) The debt rate is rising.
They may do so by substituting, in the analysans, a different subject or subjects – debtors and
creditors, in our case – for the suspect subject of the analysandum; and accordingly, a different
but related predicate – e.g., lending and owing larger sums of money – to preserve the sense of
the sentence. The same strategy may be applied, then, to our sentences above. In the analysans,
we will refer to respectable objects – debtors and creditors, or myself – and ascribe to them
suitably related properties. Only now the related properties will have to be potentialities: the joint
potentiality to lend and owe larger sums of money, respectively; or my (iterated) potentiality to
have a daughter with a potentiality to have a daughter with a potentiality to have a daughter with
a potentiality to be a painter. Corresponding analyses can be applied to the allegedly de dicto
statements.
Rejection is the final option, which may be applied judiciously or sweepingly. To reject the
examples, we need not reject them as ungrammatical or false – we do say such things as (14) and
(15). It is, rather, to reject them as falling within the purview of the proposed theory: dynamic
modality. We have seen earlier that sentence modifiers tend to express epistemic modality. If a
de dicto reading of statements such as (15) and, by the right analysis, (14) requires that ‘can’ be
read as a sentence modifier, then so be it! But then the sentences must have an epistemic reading
after all; or so the strategy of Rejection has it.
Rather than choose between the three strategies, I would like to end by following on a theme
of the third, the relation between dynamic and epistemic modality. For this, it seems, is another
28See Williamson 1999, Williamson 1998, Williamson 2002, Williamson 2010.
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challenge to the potentiality semantics: to situate dynamic modality within the broader frame-
work of linguistic modality in general, including as it does the epistemic and deontic flavours.
6.2 Situating dynamic modality
I have been careful throughout the paper to distinguish dynamic modality from other species of
modality, and in particular from epistemic modality. The potentiality semantics has been devel-
oped for dynamic modality alone. But it is well known that the different species of linguistic
modality – dynamic, epistemic, and deontic – are closely related. Most modal expressions can be
used to express two or all three types of modality. That is hardly a coincidence. So what can the
anti-Humean, potentiality semanticist say about linguistic modality in general?
There are certainly ways of fitting epistemic and deontic modality into an anti-Humean
framework. Consider, by way of example, DeRose (1991)’s truth-conditions for a typical state-
ment of epistemic modality:
S’s assertion "It is possible that P" is true if and only if (1) no member of the
relevant community knows that P is false, and (2) there is no relevant way by which
members of the relevant community can come to know that P is false (DeRose
1991:593f., my italics).
We need not accept DeRose’s account, but we can use it as an example to illustrate the re-
lation between epistemic and dynamic modality. Clause (2) contains the dynamic modal ‘can’.
The potentiality semanticist will construe the sentence as denying members of the relevant com-
munity the relatively coarse-grained (extrinsic) ability to come to know that P is false. Both the
relevant community and the exact extent of the ability’s extrinsicality, as well as the ability’s re-
quired degree, will be contextually specified and, presumably, highly flexible, thus accounting for
some of the context-sensitivity of epistemic possibility claims. In this way, epistemic possibility
becomes a matter of our extrinsic abilities to rule out a hypothesis. Knowledge itself, the core of
clause (1), is sometimes linked to abilities. Virtue epistemologists such as Greco (2007) or Sosa
(2007) take knowledge to be the exercise of certain abilities, while others, such as Hyman 1999,
think of knowledge itself as an ability. Even when no appeal to abilities is made, virtually any
account of knowledge appeals to some aspects of dynamic modality: the reliability of a method
in process reliabilism, counterfactual conditionals in safety and sensitivity conditions, or easy
possibility in Williamson 2000.29
Obligations and rights, the subject of deontic modality, have recently been linked to dispo-
sitions in a series of papers by Luke Robinson30. According to Robinson,
the metaphysical grounds of our moral obligations are dispositions (or powers),
rather than (say) rules or laws. Specifically, they are obligating dispositions: real,
irreducibly dispositional properties (powers, capacities, etc.) of moral persons—
agents and patients—that can and do ground the moral obligations of moral agents
without the metaphysical backing (so to speak) of duty-imposing moral rules or
other moral laws. (Robinson 2013:6)
29Alternatively, the relevant potentialities might be ascribed not to epistemic agents, but to their belief states. Thus
p’s being epistemically possible for me might consist in my overall belief state’s having a potentiality to update so as
to include p. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
30See Robinson 2011, Robinson 2013, Robinson forthcoming.
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If statements of deontic modality could be construed as ultimately ascribing such obligating
dispositions, we would get a thoroughly anti-Humean semantics of deontic modality to accom-
pany the anti-Humean semantics of dynamic modality which I have presented.
Even if other species of modality can be incorporated in some such way, the anti-Humean
semantics remains a disunified one. Take, for instance, the following sentences:
(17) a. Frank can run a four-minute mile.
b. It is possible that Frank runs four-minute miles.
c. Frank might run four-minute miles.
The first, which is clearly dynamic, ascribes to Frank – the sentence’s subject – a potentiality to
run a four-minute mile. The latter two, both statements of epistemic possibility, deny the sen-
tence’s speaker and her community an ability to rule out that Frank runs four-minute miles. Sim-
ilar considerations will apply to alternative construals of epistemic modality. Epistemic modality
applies to a sentence as a whole (‘Frank runs four-minute miles’) and relates the proposition ex-
pressed by it to the epistemic state of the speaker or other subjects; dynamic modality is embed-
ded into the very structure of the sentence, relating the object that is referred to by the sentence’s
subject to the property that is expressed by the following verb phrase. Even if both are a matter
of potentialities, they differ fundamentally from each other.
This is in striking contrast to the more entrenched approach to modal semantics based on
possible worlds. For possible-worlds semanticists such as Lewis and Kratzer, the distinction be-
tween dynamic and epistemic modality is no more a deep distinction than that between, say, the
ability use and the possibility use of ‘can’. Both are a matter simply of how we restrict the pos-
sible worlds over which a modal expression is taken to quantify: those which hold fixed certain
actual facts (dynamic), those which hold fixed everything that is known by relevant subjects (epis-
temic), or those in which everything goes as it ought to go (deontic).31 Possible-worlds semantics
provides unity where potentiality semantics sees deep differences. Unity may seem preferable,
given that we use the same words for different types of modality. Is the price for the anti-Humean
semantics therefore too high?32
I do not think so. Metaphysically speaking, dynamic and epistemic modality appear to be
two very different kinds of animals: one concerns reality, the other concerns, roughly, our knowl-
edge of it. The distinction is not an artefact of the anti-Humean semantics. Rather, it was what
motivated the semantics’ initial focus on dynamic modality. In sharply distinguishing between
the two (as well as between the dynamic and the deontic) types of modality, the anti-Human
semanticist is guided by metaphysical considerations.
Unity of linguistic expression may have different sources. One source is unity in the under-
lying reality: all the phenomena described with the relevant type of expression have something
in common. Another source may be unity in the pragmatic significance of the underlying reality:
31In Kratzer’s semantics, this is complicated by the distinction between modal base and ordering source: dynamic
and epistemic modality concern the former, deontic modality only the latter. But for our purposes, no such subtlety is
needed.
32Some developments in linguistics may suggest that the price is not high at all: many linguists see a deep divide,
syntactic and semantic, between epistemic modality on the one hand and ‘root’ modality (including dynamic and
deontic) on the other, and have argued that the difference is indeed one of scope: epistemic modals take scope over
the sentence as a whole, while root modals are embedded ‘further down’ inside a sentence. This is precisely what the
potentiality semantics would predict, at least for the case of dynamic and epistemic modality. See Brennan 1993 and
Hacquard 2010 for discussion of the difference between root and epistemic modality.
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while the phenomena described with the relevant type of expression differ from each other sub-
stantially, they play the same role for our deliberation, planning, and action. If we take possible-
worlds semantics seriously, its diagnosis of the unity in modal language is of the first type. The
anti-Humean semanticist should instead opt for the second type of diagnosis. Knowing that the
vase can break (dynamic modality) or not being able to rule out that it will break (epistemic
modality) both lead to the same result: I will pack the vase safely. A child’s knowing that she
is unable to do a cartwheel in the classroom (dynamic modality), and her knowing that she is
not allowed to do a cartwheel in the classroom (deontic modality) both have the same result, at
least in a rational and obedient child: she will not attempt to do a cartwheel in the classroom.
Dynamic, deontic, and epistemic modality alike play the role of delimiting the space of options
in our practical deliberation. Their metaphysics may be very diverse, and they may easily come
apart in more sophisticated deliberation. But the basic function of the different types of modal
knowledge is the same. It is not surprising, then, that a unified idiom has developed to express
and share these different types of modal knowledge.
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